


OPERATIONS
OF THE
TOCHI FIELD FORCE
IN
1897-98

M 616

COMPILED
(UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE QUARTER MASTER GENERAL IN INDIA)
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GLOSSARY OF VERNACULAR TERMS.

- Algad*.—Valley, water-course.
- Ata or Atta*.—Flour from which the "germ" has not been separated; in quality something like "middlings."
- Batta*.—Extra allowance, generally used of field service allowances.
- Bazar*.—Market place.
- Bearer*.—The bearer of a "doolie" or "dandi."
- Bildar*.—Spade labourer.
- Bhisti*.—Water-carrier.
- Bhusa*.—Chopped straw or chaff: chopped stalks of lentils are called "missa bhusa."
- Bunniah or Banniah*.—A native cornchandler, generally also a petty banker.
- Chattai*.—Coarse matting, usually made of rushes.
- Chenna or channa*.—Hindu name for "gram" (*q. v.*).
- Chittak*.—See "maund."
- Dandi or dandy*.—A light pattern of "dooli" (*q. v.*).
- Darbar or durbar*.—Court; levée, public reception of a "jirga."
- Dhall*.—A kind of pulse, largely used as a food-grain, in appearance like split peas.
- Dooli*.—Covered litter for sick, carried on a pole by 4 bearers.
- Double-fly*.—A term applied to a tent with 2 awnings with an air space between.
- Drabi*.—Transport driver.
- Ekka*.—A one-horsed, two wheeled, springless conveyance peculiar to India.
- E. P. Tent*.—European privates' tent, a large double-fly tent, weighing 900 lbs., area inside 20' x 16', accommodates 16 men: now only used in standing camps and on ordinary relief marches.
- Ghaza*.—A Muhammadan expedition against infidels.
- Ghazi*.—A Muhammadan who devotes his life to killing an infidel, and for choice an European.
- Godown*.—Store-room, store depôt.
- Gram*.—A vetch or pulse, the grain of which is largely used in India as a horse food.
- Gunny*.—A coarse cloth made of jute fibre, largely used for bags to hold grain, etc.
- Hamsaya*.—A dependent or vassal settler of alien race.
- Havildar*.—A native infantry rank corresponding to Sergeant.
- Jáwar*.—A tall millet, largely used in India as a food-grain.
- Jemadar*.—Native squadron or company officer.
- Jezail*.—Native made flint lock or match lock gun.
- Jirga*.—Assembly of tribal representatives ("maliks").
- Jhool*.—Heavy rug for horses or camels, usually made of felt.
- Kabul tent*.—An officer's double-fly field service tent weighing 80 lbs., the pattern was introduced by a committee that sat at Kabul in 1880 to deal with matters of field service equipment.
- Kach*.—Cultivation in, or bordering, the bed of a stream.
- Kajawa*.—Pair of crates carried by a camel for carriage of sick, etc.
- Kamarband*.—(*Kamar*, waist; *band*, bandage) cloth wound round waist, "cholera belt."
- Khan Bahadur*.—(*Khan*, chief; *bahadur*, brave) a title of honour bestowed by the Indian Government on Muhammadans.
- Khaki*.—"Dust coloured," generally used for the khaki cotton drill uniform worn by troops on service, etc.

Khud.—Declivity, precipice.

Kilai.—Village, but is often used in Waziristan instead of "kirri" (*q. v.*).

Kirri.—Encampment of nomads, in Waziristan consists of blankets and branches supported on sticks.

Kot.—Walled hamlet.

Kotal.—Pass.

Lance-naik.—Native infantry rank corresponding to lance-corporal.

Langri.—Cook for native soldiers.

Lashkar.—Army, a term used in Waziristan for a tribal gathering over 200 strong.

Malik.—Headman, "greybeard," tribal representative at a "jirga."

Masala.—Compound of spices, etc.

Maund.—The Indian "mán" or standard measure (80 lbs.) subdivided into 40 *seers* of 16 *chittaks* each.

Muharram.—The period of fasting and mourning observed by Muhammadans in commemoration of the deaths of Hassan and Hussein. It terminates in a ceremony known particularly as the Muharram, when religious excitement is rife.

Muharrir.—Writer, clerk.

Mulka mussoor.—An expensive kind of "dhal" issued to troops employed at high altitudes, as it is more easily cooked than ordinary "dhal."

Mulla.—One learned (or reputed to be so) in the Muhammadan scriptures.

Mussuck or massak.—The skin water-bag used by a "bhisti."

Naik.—Native infantry rank corresponding to corporal.

Nala.—Ravine, water course, often spelt "nullah."

Narai.—Pass (term peculiar to Waziristan).

Pakhal.—Pair of large water skins carried on a mule or bullock.

Powindah.—Carrier tribes, mostly Ghilzais, inhabiting Ghazni district, who annually visit India in the cold weather, mostly by the Gumal Pass.

Puggree.—Turban, native headdress. Sometimes written "pagri."

Punga.—Waziri term for an upland pasture in the mountains.

Ragha, ragha or rogha.—Waziri term for a stony plateau.

Salutri.—Native veterinary assistant.

Sanad.—Charter, engagement.

Sangar.—Stone breast-work.

Sardar.—Noble.

Sarkar.—The British Government, the term can, however, be applied to any rule or ruler.

Sarwan.—Camel driver.

Seer.—2 lbs. weight. See "maund."

Single-fly.—Term applied to tents with a single awning.

Sowar.—Native trooper.

Subadar.—Native company commander.


Talib-ul-ilm.—"Seeker after knowledge," *i.e.*, a theological student or pupil of a "mulla," usually treacherous, fanatical and depraved.

Tangi.—Defile, gorge.

Tonga.—A two-wheeled conveyance with springs, drawn by mules, ponies or bullocks. The ambulance pattern has collapsible seats and accommodates 4 seated or 2 lying down.

Wam or wom.—Waziri term for "Kach" (*q. v.*).

N.B.—Following the recent usage of some authorities the word "Waziri" is used in this work as an adjective; a Waziri tribesman being termed a "Wazir"; plural "Wazirs."



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Operations of the Tochi Field Force under the command of Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B., 1897-98.

The object of this expedition was to punish the sections of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs, who had been concerned in an attack at Maizar on the escort of the political officer in the Tochi, on the 10th June 1897. To explain the causes of this event, it is necessary to give a short account of our previous relations with the tribes.

Prior to 1893, Waziristan had been independent territory ; but for some four years before that time the Mahsuds and southern Darwesh Khels, egged on by the intrigues of Afghan agents, had given a great deal of trouble by their constant raids in the Gumal and in the newly annexed district of Zhob. In 1893 a British mission under Sir Mortimer Durand was sent to Kabul, and in November of that year a convention was signed by the Amir, by which His Highness resigned his somewhat shadowy rights in Waziristan and agreed that the whole of the country inhabited by the Wazirs, with the exception of Birmal, should thenceforward be recognized as lying within the sphere of British influence. This diplomatic settlement between the two Governments had, however, no pacifying effect on the robber tribesmen of Waziristan, who prided themselves on being subject to no one ; and raids into British territory were as frequent as before.

Our policy with regard to Waziristan had hitherto been confined to endeavours to control the tribes from without, by granting subsidies to the most influential headmen, and by enlisting tribesmen as levies to guard our border. When these inducements failed to secure their object, the only means of exercising pressure were threats of punitive expeditions, the institution of blockades, and the infliction of fines. But even increased allowances to the Wazirs failed to procure the security of the Gumal and Zhob, and the Mahsuds went so far as to murder maliks who surrendered offenders to the British authorities.

As by the middle of 1894 the policy of external control after a lengthy trial still showed no signs of proving effectual, Her Majesty's Government at length approved a change of policy. Waziristan having been formally recognized as within the sphere of British influence, our control could now be extended without offence to Afghan susceptibilities, while our increased responsibilities under the Durand Convention entailed steps being taken to make that control effectual. With every respect for the independence of the tribes, it was decided that two measures should be taken without delay. The first of these was the delimitation of the western boundary of Waziristan, as defined by the Durand Convention ; the second, the establishment of a military post somewhere near Wana, to stop the incessant Waziri raids in the direction of the Gumal and Zhob. The Government of India also at this time foresaw that the occupation of the Tochi might eventually be desirable for the effectual control of the Darwesh Khels of northern Waziristan, but no definite conclusions were as yet come to on this head.

The extension of our control in southern Waziristan was not carried out without a struggle. The British Commissioner had hardly entered tribal territory to commence the delimitation of the Indo-Afghan frontier, before the camp of his escort at Wana was attacked by some 3,000 Mahsuds just before dawn on the 3rd November 1894. The attack was beaten off with heavy loss, the tribesmen dispersing to their homes, while their leader, the notorious Mulla Pawindah, retired to his house at Marobi discredited for the time.

It was soon seen that no progress could be made until the Mahsuds had been severely punished. A force of over 10,000 men under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I., was accordingly despatched to the Mahsud country and the tribe reduced to submission. At the close of these active operations, the southern half of the western frontier was delimited ; but to complete the demarcation of Waziristan northwards to the border of Kurram, it

was necessary to enter the Tochi. A column accordingly marched into that valley from Bannu early in 1895 to escort the Boundary Commissioner, Mr. H. A. Anderson, I.C.S., who completed his work by the beginning of April.

The Dawaris, who inhabit the central and cultivated portion of the Tochi, although Pathan by race and Sunni Muhamedan by religion, have little in common with their neighbours, the Wazirs. Being an industrious but unwarlike race of cultivators, they have always been despised and oppressed by the freebooting Wazirs by whom they are completely surrounded; they had therefore at different times, since the British occupation of the Derajat, petitioned to be taken under our protection. They now put in a formal petition in writing for the permanent occupation of the Tochi, in which request

Request by the tribes for British occupation. they were on this occasion joined by the Darwesh Khels of the upper Tochi, as well as by the representative maliks of other sections of that portion of the Waziri tribe. No immediate reply could be given to so important a matter of policy, but it had already been decided by Government that the tribal allowances of the Dawaris and Darwesh Khels were to be increased, in view of the more direct control it was proposed to exercise for the future in their affairs; and pending the settlement of these allowances a military force was left in the Tochi.

During the month of May there were several murderous attacks on individuals in Dawar. On the 13th May, Lieutenant Limond, 6th Punjab Infantry, was stabbed by a band of four fanatics, while on the march half-a-mile from Boia, in upper Dawar, and died the following day; his syce and orderly were also dangerously wounded at the same time. On the 17th May, a Pathan lance-naik of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, while on water-piquet duty, was killed by some Mohmit Khel Waziri herdsmen in a nala close to the camp at Miramshah in the Tochi valley. On the night of the 24th May, a small party of Muhammad Khel Dawaris attempted to enter the post at Miramshah; one man succeeded in stabbing two sepoy, before he himself fell, and another of the attacking party was also killed. Towards the end of the month Mr. Anderson reported that there were symptoms of growing discontent among the Dawaris, especially among the lower orders and *talib-ul-ilm*, which he attributed chiefly to the delay in fixing their tribal allowances and to the uncertainty which prevailed as to the intentions of Government. In June, however, Mr. Anderson reported that the valley had again quieted down.

On the 31st July, Lieutenant A. M. Campbell, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, was very severely wounded and his horse was killed under him when returning to Boia from a reconnaissance towards the Arkharawalai pass; the assailants were concealed behind rocks and effected their escape without being seen. On the 2nd August, a sowar of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, on grasscutting guard, was shot dead about four miles from the camp at Boia. These offences seem to have been the work of individual raiders.

In August sanction was received from Her Majesty's Government to permanently locate a military force in the Tochi valley. The strength of the force was fixed at two battalions of native infantry, one squadron of native cavalry and a mountain battery.

Towards the end of October Government issued orders regarding future policy in the Tochi valley, the gist of which was as follows. The offer of the Dawaris that their country should remain under the British Government was accepted, some little revenue being taken from them at once, in anticipation of permanent arrangements hereafter. A simple form of administration was introduced, but it was limited to the country of the Dawaris, including any small Darwesh Khel patches that might be found within it. The Darwesh Khel territory outside the Tochi was ordered to be subject only to the same "political control" as was extended to Waziristan generally; but a somewhat closer relationship was to be maintained with the tribesmen in the 16 or 17 miles of the Tochi valley, through which the road runs above upper Dawar;

but even here there was to be nothing of the nature of direct administration. Allowances aggregating Rs. 47,872 a year were granted to the Darwesh Khel; and Rs. 15,864 to the Dawaris, subject in the case of the former to the following conditions :—

Darwesh Khel and Dawari allowances.

- (1) General good behaviour.
- (2) Prevention of raids and other offences across the boundary of British India, or in the protected areas.
- (3) Surrender for trial and punishment of tribesmen guilty of offences against us, or those acting under or in support of our authority.
- (4) Furnishing tribal escorts to officers visiting any part of their country under the orders of Government.
- (5) Rendering the services for which they receive allowances in any part of their country most convenient to Government.
- (6) Refraining from and preventing raids and other offences across the Afghan frontier.

The allowances of the Dawaris were subject to the condition of good behaviour on the part of the tribe and of all individual recipients. The construction of thirteen posts in the Tochi for occupation by levies was sanctioned at a cost of Rs. 45,000.

On the 31st October, Mr. Anderson announced to the jirgas of upper and lower Dawar the decision of Government regarding the future policy in the Tochi valley.

Negotiations with the tribes.

He further explained to them that they would not be allowed to levy fees from the Powindahs and others using the route, but that Government would demand grazing-fees from the Powindahs and would grant a share to the villagers. The jirga represented that they did not know the total cultivated area of their country, but they offered to pay for three years Rs. 6,000 *per annum* in recognition of the Government right to revenue, and they agreed to the measurement of their lands and to an eventual assessment in kind at the rate of one-tenth of the gross produce. The jirga further offered to contribute a sum of two thousand rupees annually by way of remuneration to certain subordinates of the leading maliks who would be employed in collecting revenue and rendering village service. The announcement of the allowances sanctioned by Government to the Dawaris was received with every sign of satisfaction, and the attitude of the tribe throughout, and their readiness to meet the wishes of Government, were looked upon as a proof that their offer to remain under the British Government was spontaneous and unanimous.

The allowances sanctioned for the Darwesh Khel were subsequently announced, but gave rise to some dissatisfaction. A large jirga of Darwesh Khels waited on the political officer of the Tochi; in December 1895, and represented that certain maliks and sections had been omitted in the distribution of allowances and that the Ahmadzai branch had been unduly favoured. They also made the following requests :—

- (1) that written sanads should be given to them setting forth Government orders regarding Waziristan;
- (2) that they should be allowed to select the officers to be appointed over them;
- (3) that no revenue should be taken from the Wazirs, either in the hills or in Dawar; and that if taken from those in Dawar, they should be allowed to pay through their own maliks, and not through the Dawaris;
- (4) that there should be no forcible interference in hill Waziri cases.

The jirga was dismissed with answers, based on the policy already given out by Government, and dispersed apparently satisfied.

Arrangements for occupation and administration of Waziristan.

By the end of 1896 the arrangements for carrying on the new policy in Waziristan were practically complete. Two political

officers had been appointed, under the orders of the Commissioner of the Dera-jat, for the political control of the country in northern and southern Waziristan, with head-quarters, respectively, at Miramshah and Wana. In southern Waziristan, a cantonment had been built at Wana held by a battalion of Native Infantry, one squadron of Native Cavalry, 2 mountain guns and 2 maxims; while military posts had been established at Sarwekai and Jandola on the Shuhur line of communications with Tank. The object of this force was to safeguard the Gomal and protect Zhob from Waziri raids, by watching the Mahsuds and the Ahmadzai Darwesh Khels of Wana and Shakai. In northern Waziristan, the Tochi was held by a military force with head-quarters at Miramshah and posts at Idak and Saiadgi. In the autumn of 1896 both the civil and military head-quarters were transferred from Miramshah to Datta Khel; and in the following spring the permanent strength of the troops was reduced to 4 guns of a mountain battery, 2 maxim guns, one squadron of Native Cavalry and 2 battalions of Native Infantry.

But the establishment of these military garrisons, and the construction of numerous posts held by tribal levies had, up to the time of the Maizar outbreak, done little to counteract the natural lawlessness of the inhabitants. Crimes of violence were of frequent occurrence and the presence of our troops had given opportunity for numerous fanatical outrages, in one of which the political officer in the Tochi, Mr. H. A. Casson, I.C.S., was dangerously wounded and had to be replaced by Mr. H. A. Gee, I.C.S., in the spring of 1896. Some measure of protection had indeed been afforded to the Dawaris against the depredations of their Waziri neighbours; but the latter, living as they did for the most part beyond the limits assigned for our direct control, had as yet shown but little sign of abandoning their predatory habits. In particular the long-established Waziri custom of raiding into Khost had continued as of old, and the Amir's subjects had not been behindhand in making reprisals from across the border.

The transfer of the head-quarters of the Tochi force from Miramshah in Upper Dawar to Datta Khel in the upper Tochi, which has already been mentioned, with a view to strengthening the hands of the well disposed maliks, had been viewed with apprehension by the unruly tribesmen, who were ready to resent all efforts to curb their lawless propensities. In dealings however with frontier tribes periods of unrest are common, and there was no particular reason for anticipating any serious disturbance.

We now come to the circumstances that led more immediately to the Maizar outbreak. In June, 1896, Honda Ram, the Hindu *muharrir*, or writer, attached to the Sheranni levy post was murdered in that village, and a fine of Rs. 2,000 consequently was inflicted on the Madda Khels. The actual murderer escaped to Afghan territory, but the Madda Khels subsequently surrendered for trial some men suspected by the political officer of complicity in the murder. A number of tribesmen, however, swore on the *Koran* that the suspects were innocent, and the latter were acquitted in accordance with tribal custom and were released by the political officer.

The Madda Khel inhabiting the lower portion of the Shawal valley (in which Maizar is situated) and the upper portion of the Tochi, from Sheranni to the Afghan frontier, are known as Ger Madda Khel to distinguish them from the Kazhawals, or Madda Khel inhabiting the Kazha valley north of the Tochi. The Madda Khel are a section of the Utmanzai branch of the Darwesh Khel

The Ger Madda Khel and their factions.

Wazirs, and their subdivisions will be found in the table given in Appendix I; but it may be mentioned here that the distinction between the Ger Madda Khels and the Kazhawals is in no way ethnographic, as every subsection of the clan appears to be represented both in the Tochi and the Kazha. These two valleys are however separated by a rugged uninhabited tract of hills some six or seven miles wide, a fact which naturally tends to keep the Kazhawals and Ger

Madda Khels somewhat apart; and of late years the former have sought to dissociate themselves more and more from the Ger Madda Khels, with a view to increasing their own importance and allowances.

In recognition of the submission to authority shown by the Madda Khels in surrendering for trial the men suspected of the murder of Honda Ram, the Government of India, in May, 1897, reduced the former fine of Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 1,200 (Kabuli), the blood-money due by tribal custom for the murdered man. The actual distribution of the fine was left to the Madda Khel maliks, and it was on this point that dissensions arose; the subsections residing at Maizar in particular, objecting to pay the share with which they had been assessed by Sadda Khan and his faction: for they contended that the offence was not a tribal one, and that the fine should have been paid by Sadda Khan and the inhabitants of Sheranni, where the murder took place.

This Sadda Khan, a Ger Madda Khel of Sheranni, was the chief of the Madda Khel clan and belonged to the Khazzar Khel branch of the Ali Khan Khel subsection. His father, Adam Khan, who was a man of mark amongst the frontier tribes, had been looked upon during his lifetime, not only as the chief of his own section, but as the leading sardar of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs living beyond our then existing border, and in virtue of his position was treated with great respect, even in the Kabul darbar. When Adam Khan died, his eldest son, Ghulam Khan, succeeded him; and, after the death of the latter the younger son, Sadda Khan, assumed the chieftainship. Sadda Khan, however, never had a tithe of the influence of his father, and his claim to the head-ship of the Madda Khel, although recognized by Government, was nevertheless disputed by a certain party in the clan. The leader of this opposing faction was Alambe Khan, also a Khazzar Khel Madda Khel of Sheranni.*

On the 6th June, the political officer, Mr. Gee, arrived at Datta Khel from Dawar, accompanied by his assistant, Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan. Next day the chief Madda Khel maliks, who had been previously summoned, came in, and some cases relating to the Manzar Khels, another section of the Darwesh Khel, were settled. Before the Madda Khel maliks were dismissed on the 8th, they were informed that Mr. Gee would visit Maizar and Dotoi with an escort on the following day, for the purpose of selecting the site for a levy post at Maizar and to discuss the fine in Honda Ram's case. This visit to Maizar was not a sudden idea. The political officer had not visited the place for several months and he had frequently spoken to the maliks of his intention of shortly visiting this outlying portion of the valley. He had paid a similar visit to the Kazha valley, north of the Tochi, at the beginning of April, and before the tribal jirga was dismissed on that occasion, it was an understood thing that Mr. Gee's next tour would be to Maizar, and he had summoned the maliks to Datta Khel on the 7th June in order to make final arrangements and to fix a date for his visit. The visit though fixed for the 9th June had, however, to be postponed to the following day on account of rain.

Mr. Gee's party started at 6 A.M. on the 10th June, intending to return to Datta Khel in the afternoon. The escort consisted of 12 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 200 rifles 1st Sikh Infantry, and 100 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry; the whole force being under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Bunny 1st Sikhs, then commanding the troops in the Tochi. Captain J. F. Browne and Lieutenant H. A. Cruickshank, R.A., Lieutenant A. J. M. Higginson 1st Sikhs, Lieutenant C. L. S. Seton-Browne 1st Punjab Infantry, and Surgeon-Captain C. C. Cassidy, I.M.S., were the other officers accompanying the party. Each infantry soldier carried 22 rounds in pouch and there were besides ten boxes of reserve ammunition; sixteen rounds per gun only were taken.

After leaving Datta Khel camp the road traverses, for some 8 miles, a fairly open valley till it reaches the large Madda Khel village of Sheranni, after which it passes for $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles through low stony hills, intersected with water-courses running

Description of the locality.

* The relationship of the leading maliks of the Madda Khel is shown in Appendix I.

down to the Tochi, until the low ridge overlooking Maizar is reached. Looking back eastwards from this point where the road crosses the ridge, (spoken of hereafter as the kotal), the camp of Datta Khel can be seen in the distance. On the western side of the kotal, and between it and the right bank of the Shawal stream, lies the cultivated tract known as Maizar, a plateau which extends some 2,500 yards from north to south and 1,200 yards from east to west, and has an elevation of 4,600 feet above sea-level. Maizar consists really of an upper and a lower plateau: along both sides of the former are scattered about a dozen walled hamlets or "kots" belonging to the Madda Khel, while the central portion consists of open terraced fields. The Shawal stream skirts the western edge of the lower plateau, joining the Tochi at the northern end of Maizar. Between the two plateaux there is a steep descent of 20 or 30 feet. A good idea of the locality can be obtained from Lieutenant Cockerill's sketch (facing this page) which was taken from the ridge overlooking Maizar from the east. The Bannu-Ghazni road, after crossing the kotal, skirts the Maizar plateau for about a quarter of a mile in a northerly direction, and then descends to the Shawal stream, which it crosses by a ford; it continues westward up the right bank of the Tochi, fording the river twice before Dotoi, about 4 miles above Maizar, is reached.

To return to the events of the 10th June: Mr. Gee and his escort reached

Story of the outbreak.

Maizar at 9-30 A.M. There was no sign of intended hostility; on the contrary women and children were seen about the villages. The Maizar maliks appeared to be perfectly friendly, and pointed out a spot under some trees on the edge of the upper plateau where they suggested the troops should halt, while they partook of a meal that was being prepared for the Mussalman sepoys of the escort. This food had, as a matter of fact, been provided by Sadda Khan, but its proffer was taken at the time as a token of spontaneous hospitality on the part of the Maizarwals. All these circumstances combined to lull the party into a false feeling of security. It is indeed doubtful whether Sadda Khan himself at all realized the irritation that existed. He was of course aware that the Maizarwals had defied his authority as regards the distribution of the fine, but he seems to have expected that they would be cowed by the appearance of the troops, and to have had no misgivings whatever as to the possibility of an outbreak, until some time after the troops reached Maizar.

The spot selected by the Maizarwals for the troops was close to the walls of a* Dreplari village, and was commanded by several other villages from 200 to 400 yards distant. Colonel Bunney ordered the mountain guns to unlimber close to the garden wall of the Dreplari village and drew up the infantry on the outer flank of the guns. As a precaution guards were posted facing outwards, the men were not allowed to pile their arms, and each sepoy retained his rifle.

Directly after the arrival of the troops at Maizar, Mr. Gee, with Captain Browne, R.A., and Lieutenant Higginson, visited Dotoi with an escort of sowars and in company with the maliks. They returned at 11-30 to Maizar, at about which hour, the promised meal was produced from a neighbouring 'kot' for the Mussalman sepoys; and the whole escort had breakfast, while a *jirga* was being held on the lower plateau below the Dreplari village. After the meal, the pipers of the 1st Sikhs began to play on the upper plateau. Suddenly a hubbub began in the village; the villagers who had been listening to the pipes drew off; a man was observed to wave a sword from the top of a tower; and two shots were fired in quick succession from the village, the second of which wounded Lieutenant Seton-Browne in the thigh. Firing now commenced from the villages to the south and east, and a hot fire was opened from the Dreplari village on the north. This was directed on the British officers, and Colonel Bunney was almost immediately mortally wounded by a shot in the stomach, but supported by 2 sepoys he continued for some time to direct the operations.

The guns had first to open with case, at 100 yards range, on a large number of men, who were firing from the entrance of the Dreplari village and were

* The Dreplaris are a subsection of the Madda Khels.


L. B. Topp, D.V. No. 2, 221
 Exd. C. J. A., March 1898

Looking W. from hill about 400 yards S.-W. of Kotai.

SKETCH OF MAIZAR.

(Sd) G. K. COCKRELL, Lieut.,
 Field Intelligence Officer,
 Tochi Field Force.

No. 1,403-L. 98



moving forward to charge the guns. They had not been long in action before Captain Browne, R.A., was wounded in the upper arm by a bullet which severed the artery, and Lieutenant Cruickshank, R.A., was twice shot in the right arm. Both officers still continued fighting their guns; and when the case shot were expended, shrapnel was fired reversed, thus driving the enemy back into the village. But as only 16 rounds per gun had been brought, the ammunition soon began to run short, and Colonel Bunny accordingly gave orders for a retirement* to the ridge.

At the commencement of the firing there had been a general stampede among the baggage mules, so that, when the retirement was ordered, most of the reserve ammunition and much other equipment had to be abandoned.

The enemy now appeared on all sides in great force, but the retirement, which now commenced under such very trying conditions, was carried out with great deliberation and in the most stubborn and gallant manner. At its commencement Lieutenant Higginson was shot through the arm, and Surgeon-Captain Cassidy in the knee, so that all the British military officers were now wounded, two of them mortally; but they all continued to carry out their duties and lead their men. The circumstances were trying in the extreme for the troops, and their staunchness is worthy of the highest praise. Subadars Narain Singh 1st Sikhs, Sundar Singh 1st Punjab Infantry, and Jemadar Sherzad 1st Sikhs, behaved with the greatest gallantry. Getting together a party of their men they made a most determined stand by the wall of a garden whence they covered the first withdrawal, remaining themselves under heavy fire till the enemy closed with them. It was at this spot that Subadar Sundar Singh 1st Punjab Infantry, was killed, and that by far the greater number of the casualties of the day occurred.

Under cover of this stand the wounded were carried and helped away, the guns withdrawing, along a lane, to a low kotal about 300 yards distant, where a fresh position was occupied; and the survivors of the party at the garden wall then withdrew. At this kotal a fresh stand was made, the guns firing blank to check the enemy, as the service ammunition had been all expended. Here Lieutenant Cruickshank received a third wound, which was instantly fatal. Captain Browne also, who had remained in command of the guns, supported by two men until he fainted from loss of blood, and who had been fastened on to Mr. Gee's pony when the retirement from the village was made, was found to be dead on arrival at the kotal. A further retirement from this kotal now became necessary; and it was carried out by successive units, very deliberately and with complete regularity, positions being held on the ridges stretching from south to north, until the Sheranni plain was reached, about two miles further east. All this time the enemy was constantly enveloping the flanks; and the main road along which the troops had marched in the morning had to be abandoned, as it was commanded on both sides, and as parties of the enemy were advancing from Sheranni. During this part of the retirement, Lieutenant Higginson was again shot in the arm. Eventually, about 5-30 P.M.,† a good position was found about a mile from the last of the above-mentioned ridges: reinforcements began to appear at sight, and the enemy was beaten off. These reinforcements, which had been summoned from the camp at Datta Khel, by *sowars* sent back from the kotal, reached the force about 6-15 P.M. They consisted of two companies of the 1st Sikhs, under Lieutenant deBrett, R.A., accompanied by Lieutenant Stockley, R.E., bringing up extra ammunition. They had covered the distance from camp (9 miles) in less than an hour and a half.

With the ammunition now received the heights around and the village of Sheranni were shelled, with the result that the enemy finally retired, and the

* The description of this retirement is based upon Lieutenant-Colonel W. duG. Gray's despatch, dated Datta Khel, the 16th June 1897, addressed to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force—Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, at the time of the occurrence, was at Miramshah in command of the 1st Punjab Infantry. In a subsequent report Lieutenant-Colonel Gray brought to notice the numerous acts of gallantry performed during the withdrawal from Maizar; see Appendix II.

† The fact that the retreat over a distance of three miles occupied 3½ hours shows how stubbornly the enemy was resisted.

village was partially set on fire. The further withdrawal was then unmolested, and the rear-guard reached camp at 12-30 A.M.

Colonel Bunny died of his wound on the road,* and his body, with those of Captain Browne, Lieutenant Cruickshank, R.A., and all the wounded, were brought in with the retiring troops. Some help was given during the retirement by Khidder Khels†, who brought water for the wounded; and during the following days, they brought in the bodies of all the killed. The bodies so brought in had been horribly mutilated, irrespective of their religion.

The numbers of the enemy, at first, were estimated at 500; but constant reinforcements during the retirement raised their eventual numbers to probably much over 1,000. They lost 100 killed and many wounded.

The news reached Lieutenant-Colonel Gray at Miramshah at 11 P.M. on the 10th and he arrived at Datta Khel, with Surgeon-Captain Ozzard, at 8 A.M. the next morning. It was at first the unanimous opinion that the outbreak at Maizar was due to a premeditated and treacherous act of fanaticism. These views were subsequently modified (as will be mentioned later ‡ in connection with the report of the special tribunal appointed to investigate the causes of the Maizar outbreak), but the situation must here be considered as it appeared at the time.

Review of the situation.

Sadda Khan and the maliks of the Madda Khel, who had accompanied Mr. Gee to Maizar had, when the firing began, separated themselves from the troops and made off to Sheranni, *via* the Tochi, accompanied by the assistant political officer, Khan Bahadur Ghulam Muhammad Khan. The latter rejoined Mr. Gee after the fight was over, but Sadda Khan and the other Madda Khel maliks remained with their clan. These men wrote, however, on the following day to the political officer asking whether they should come into Datta Khel, and stating that all the Madda Khels had fled to the hills: Sadda Khan also offered to send in some of the property lost during the fight. As the maliks were considered to be implicated in the attack, no communication was held with them, but they were eventually informed that no settlement was possible, except on the basis of the immediate and unconditional surrender of all maliks and ringleaders, on the understanding that they would be all put under arrest and tried.

In the meantime steps were being taken to reinforce Datta Khel and the troops in the Tochi valley, as well as the posts on the Shahur line of communications with Wana, in case the disturbance should spread to the Mahsud country and southern Waziristan.

At the time of the outbreak the force in the Tochi under Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, 1st Punjab Infantry, who assumed command on the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Bunny, was distributed as follows:—

Distribution of troops in the Tochi.

Datta Khel ...	{	4 guns No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery.
		2 Maxim guns.
		20 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry.
Boia ...	{	924 rifles, <i>viz.</i> , the 1st Sikhs, and 2 companies 1st Punjab Infantry.
		20 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry.
		92 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry.
Miramshah	{	2 Maxim guns.
		40 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry.
		368 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry.
Idak ...	{	20 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry.
		40 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry.
Saiadgi ...	{	20 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry.
		52 rifles 1st Punjab Infantry.

* Surgeon-Captain Cassidy succumbed to his wound on the 22nd June; and Lieutenant Higginson died of fever, while still under treatment in hospital at Datta Khel, on the 20th August 1897.

† The Khidder (or Khaddar) Khels are a subsection of the Mohmit Khels, and inhabit the Tochi Valley between Sheranni and Datta Khel.

‡ *Vide* pages 25 and 26.

The 1st Punjab Infantry were ordered to concentrate at Datta Khel, and 250 rifles of the 33rd Punjab Infantry were sent from Bannu on the 12th June, to take up the posts in the Tochi held by the 1st Punjab Infantry; while the 3rd Sikhs and 200 sabres of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry were despatched from Kohat, on the 14th and 15th June respectively, to Bannu to enable the rest of the 33rd Punjab Infantry and 1st Punjab Cavalry to reinforce the Tochi; and at the same time the 2nd Punjab Infantry were ordered from Abbottabad to Kohat to replace the 3rd Sikhs.

In southern Waziristan 100 rifles of the 4th Punjab Infantry were despatched from Wana to Sarwekai. This detachment returned to Wana on the 20th, on the arrival of 250 rifles of 4th Sikhs, from Dera Ismail Khan, the latter reinforcement being disposed as follows:—

Jandola	50 rifles.
Haidari Kach	100 „
Sarwekai	100 „

Immediately after the outbreak at Maizar, the Madda Khel had despatched messengers to the Mohmit Khels, Tori Khels and other sections of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs for assistance, and had also written to the Mulla Pawindah asking him to raise a *lashkar* of Mahsuds. They also approached the Afghan authorities in Birmal with a view to obtaining their support. It was for a long time uncertain what effect these appeals for help would have, for the events of the 10th June caused a considerable amount of excitement throughout Waziristan. The Mulla Pawindah, our former antagonist, summoned numerous meetings of the Mahsuds and others at which he made inflammatory speeches; and, although his words were not followed by deeds, it was more than once reported that large tribal gatherings had actually started for Maizar under his leadership.

The Commissioner of the Derajat wired on the 12th June from Bannu, where he had just arrived, that he had received a letter from Colonel Gray, commanding the troops in the Tochi, in the following terms:—

Opinion of the Commissioner of the Derajat, and the Officer Commanding in the Tochi as to the action requisite.

“If there is any intention of occupying Maizar or taking immediate action, I am strongly of opinion that the force employed should be of such strength as to reduce the chances of failure to *nil*. We do not know what combination we may have against us, and to attempt to enter Maizar for the purpose of occupying it with less than a strong brigade, including two batteries, supported by another brigade, would, I think, be inadvisable. In the matter of prestige, it would not be favourable for us to let the tribesmen conclude we could only put a small force in the field.”

On the 16th June the Commissioner again telegraphed from Miramshah that, although there was at present no combination of the tribes against us, the Madda Khels had appealed to the other Wazirs for help, and it was as yet too early to give a positive opinion as to the action of the latter. He, therefore, concurred with the Commanding Officer in the Tochi, that not less than a brigade, with another in reserve, would be required to occupy Maizar, and to move about with safety, with a view to enforce compliance with our terms.

On the 17th June it was accordingly decided by the Governor-General in Council that an advance should be made to Maizar in order to destroy the *kots*, as recommended by the Commissioner of the Derajat in his telegram of the previous day. It was announced that the advance would be made with a sufficient force to remain at Maizar, or in a convenient place near to it, and to hold its own against any possible combination that could be brought against it: that, on the advice of the Commander-in-Chief, the strength of the force was to be 2 brigades, the composition of which would be left to His Excellency. It was added that, as regards the terms to be offered to the tribes, the Governor-General in Council would await a communication from the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab,

Scheme of operations adopted by Government.

In accordance with this order in Council, the Commander-in-Chief submitted the same day to Government a scheme of operations, which will be found in appendix III.

Composition of the Tochi Field Force.

The troops detailed for the Tochi field force were as follows :—

General Officer Commanding—* ... Major-General G. Corrie Bird, C.B.

1ST BRIGADE.

Commanding—Brigadier General G. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.

2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

1st Regiment of Sikh Infantry.

1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry.

33rd (Punjabi Mahomedan) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

1 squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry.

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.

No. 2 company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

No. 2 British Field Hospital, A and B sections.

No. 28 Native Field Hospital.

No. 29 Native Field Hospital, A and B sections.

2ND BRIGADE.

Commanding—Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C. B.

3rd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade.

14th (The Ferozepore Sikhs) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

6th Jat Regiment of Bengal (Light) Infantry.

25th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.

1 squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry.

†4 guns, No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.

No. 2 British Field Hospital, C and D sections.

No. 30 Native Field Hospital.

No. 29 Native Field Hospital, C and D sections.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

100 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry.

No. 32 Native Field Hospital, C and D sections.

AT THE BASE.

Section of No. 1 Field Veterinary Hospital.

The point of concentration named for those troops of the field force not already in the Tochi was Bannu. A certain number of units had already been given orders to move in anticipation of sanction, before Government formally accepted on the 19th June the scheme of operations put forward by the Commander-in-Chief.

Arrangements for concentration of the Force.

Bannu (or Edwardesabad as the military cantonment is called) is by no means easy of access, especially in the hot weather. The three nearest railway stations are Darya Khan, Mari, and Khushalgarh, which are respectively 103, 82 and 113 miles from Bannu. All these stations are on the left bank of the

* Also invested with chief political control in the Tochi valley.

† The other two guns of the battery were at Wana.

Indus, which in the hot weather is a most serious obstacle. The difficulties of crossing the Indus from Darya Khan to Dera Ismail Khan, and from Mari to Kalabagh, were in the month of June considerable; but the boat bridge at Khushalgarh had fortunately not been dismantled. The Khushalgarh-Kohat route to Bannu, though the longest, was therefore selected, and orders were telegraphed to maintain the bridge-of-boats as long as possible. Had the outbreak at Maizar occurred a few days later, the bridge at Khushalgarh would have been dismantled as the river rose; and once dismantled, its re-establishment would have been practically impossible until the month of September. Fortunately the orders were issued in time, and the bridge was maintained throughout the hot weather and proved of the greatest value, not only for the Tochi field force, but also for the subsequent operations in Tirah beyond Kohat.

Although satisfactory arrangements were made for crossing the Indus, the march from Khushalgarh to Bannu involved special preparations. The road, though good in itself, is far from suited for the movements of troops in the hot weather; especially that portion between Kohat and Bannu, a distance of 84 miles. The country through which it passes is arid, and almost destitute of supplies, while the marches are long, and lie through rocky hills where water is not only very scarce, but is also in many places impregnated with salt. Special arrangements had therefore to be made for water-supply; while for the British troops, rest-camps, each consisting of 50 European privates' tents, were pitched on both sides of the river at Khushalgarh, at Gumbat, Kohat, Chichanna, Lachi, Banda, Khwarram, Latammar and Bannu. Shelter was thus afforded at each stage for 800 men during the heat of the day, and to avoid the intense heat the troops were ordered to march by night. An establishment for conservancy purposes was provided at each stage, and the necessary arrangements were made for pitching, and guarding the standing camps, under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force. These preparations all took time, and it was not until the 28th June that they were sufficiently advanced to admit of the first British unit leaving Khushalgarh.

In the meantime supplies and transport were being concentrated at Bannu. Messrs. Dhanjibhoy and Sons* had quickly organized a tonga service of 5 tongas per diem between Khushalgarh and Bannu, and the staff and establishments of departments were thus enabled to collect at that place. At the time of the outbreak there were only one month's supplies in the Tochi for the ordinary garrison of the valley; a large quantity of supplies had therefore to be laid in before an advance could take place. On the 7th July however satisfactory progress had been made in the collection of supplies; the base had been organized, and the 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders marched in, while the 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade, was only a march behind. Owing to the intense heat and the trying march the Highlanders lost 2 men by death on the road; but a large number of men in both battalions suffered from the effects of the sun.

Meanwhile some acts of hostility had occurred in the Tochi valley. On the 4th July some camel men proceeding to Boia without escort were attacked by a party of 20 or 30 raiders two miles from that post. One *sarwan* was killed, another was wounded, and two road coolies were also wounded.

Disturbances in the valley.

On the news reaching Boia a party of sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, accompanied by Lieutenant Stockley, R.E., and 50 rifles of the 33rd Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Climo, moved out from Boia in pursuit, while 30 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry were despatched from Miramshah. Lieutenant Stockley's party followed the tracks up a nullah leading northwards and captured 51 men, one of whom fired on the party, while others were found in possession of blood-stained swords. These men were tried and some of them imprisoned. On the same day a shot was fired at General Egerton's party on the march about four miles west of Miramshah. On the 5th July eight shots were fired into Boia at night. On the night of the 6th-7th July a sentry of the 1st Punjab Infantry was shot at Datta Khel and another of the 14th Sikhs at Idak; both were mortally wounded.

* Messrs. Dhanjibhoy received a subsidy of Rs. 3,000 per mensem from the 26th June for this service and for the conveyance of the letter and parcel mail between Khushalgarh and Bannu.

The concentration at Bannu being practically complete on the 7th July, orders were issued for the onward march up the valley, and for the concentration at

March to the front.

Datta Khel, with the view to an advance on Sheranni, to be completed on the 17th July. The Major-General Commanding left Bannu with his head-quarters on the 8th July and marched to Idak, 28 miles, stopping at Saiadgi to investigate an affray that had taken place there the previous day between the garrison and the levies.

It appeared that some unladen camels, returning from Idak, had the morning before taken a short cut across some apparently uncultivated fields in the river bed

Affray at Saiadgi.

just below Saiadgi post. The levies, a wild lot of Bakka Khel Wazirs, clad in the ordinary dirty clothes of their tribe, dashed down from their post and commenced assaulting the camelmén with sticks and stones. Hearing and seeing the disturbance, the officer commanding the military post turned out some of the 14th Sikhs and doubled down with them to the scene of the affray, under the impression that an attack was being made on the convoy by raiders. Before the mistake was discovered and hostilities could be stopped, some 14 or 15 levies had been killed and wounded. A sum of Rs. 5,000 was subsequently granted by Government as compensation to the Bakka Khel for the losses they had sustained.

On the 9th July, General Corrie Bird arrived at Miramshah, meeting Mr. H. A. Anderson, I.C.S., Commissioner of the Derajat; after handing over political charge of the valley, the latter officer proceeded to Idak *en route* for Bannu. The same day the 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, marched into Saiadgi, losing two men, including the regimental Sergeant-Major, from the effects of the sun, although the greater portion of the troops got into camp by 9 A.M.

The Major-General Commanding and staff halted at Miramshah on the 10th; and on the 11th, Major-General Corrie Bird marched to Boia, and the next day to Datta Khel where Brigadier-General Egerton, commanding 1st Brigade, had arrived a week before. On his arrival at Datta Khel, Major-General Corrie Bird found that Mr. Gee, the political officer, was incapacitated with fever and unable to carry on his duties any longer; and until a successor to him was appointed, Mr. J. G. Lorimer, I.C.S., continued to act as chief political officer with the expedition. Mr. R. E. Younghusband, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner of Bannu, eventually took up this appointment some 10 days later, whereupon Mr. Lorimer was attached to the 1st Brigade and Mr. A. B. Kettlewell, I.C.S., to the 2nd Brigade.

On the 13th July Major-General Corrie Bird issued the following proclamation to the headmen of all sections of the Darwesh Khel residing in Northern

Issue of a proclamation to the tribes.

Waziristan.

Whereas, on the 13th of June 1897, Mr. Gee, political officer in the Tochi, with a small escort of British Indian troops, after friendly pre-arrangement with the maliks concerned, visited Sheranni and Maizar, for the purpose of selecting a site for a post, and for realizing a fine which had been inflicted on the Madda Khels for the murder of Honda Ram, the Muharrir of the Sheranni post;

And whereas, while the British party, after receiving hospitality at the hands of Sadda Khan, one of the principal maliks, were resting under the shade of the trees at Maizar, they were attacked in a most treacherous and cowardly manner by a large body of tribesmen, and several officers and men were killed and wounded.

Now I proclaim to all concerned that I am ordered by the Sarkar to proceed to Maizar with a force sufficiently strong to hold its own against all comers and to compel obedience to the orders of the Sarkar.

And I inform you that it is my intention to destroy all the fortified kots in Maizar and Sheranni, whether resistance be shown or otherwise, and that I shall remain at Maizar or some convenient spot near to it, for so long as seems to me and the Government of India desirable.

And I further inform you that I shall in due course announce the terms of punishment which the Sarkar may decide to inflict on all those who were in any way responsible for, or who took part in, the treacherous attack on the British troops; with whom alone it is my business to deal.

And I warn all others who wish to live in peace with the Sarkar to refrain from obstructing my force, for, depend upon it, any further unfriendly acts will be severely dealt with.

In spite of the advance of re-inforcements, the disturbances in the valley still continued. Thus, on the early morning of the 8th July a party of marauders were discovered in the bazar of Datta Khel post, but managed to escape after severely wounding a bunniah. On the 10th, three camels belonging to a Kharoti trader were carried off by a gang of raiders near Idak. A party of cavalry and infantry, sent out in pursuit, recovered one camel which was too weak to travel fast, but did not succeed in overtaking the raiders who escaped to Zertanga hill. On the night of the 10th July the telegraph was cut between Miramshah and Idak, 100 yards of wire were carried off and several posts pulled up. Between the 12th and the 19th, there were several more cases of wire cutting. On the 16th July a party of raiders carried off some camels grazing three miles from Idak post. A pursuit party of 12 sowars, and 50 rifles 6th Bengal Infantry, turned out under the officer commanding the post, overtook the raiders and recovered four camels in a defile leading to Zertanga, but had to abandon the pursuit owing to the approach of night. There was a good deal of firing on both sides, and one sepoy of the 6th Bengal Infantry was wounded, and subsequently died.

Troops concentrated for active operations.

On the 19th July the troops mentioned in the table below were concentrated at Datta Khel; while the posts of Saiadgi, Idak, Miramshah, and Boia, were held by the 6th Bengal Infantry, 25th Punjab Infantry, and about 180 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry:—

Corps.					Effective strength of rank and file.
1ST BRIGADE ...	{ 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders ...				557*
	{ 1st Sikhs				738
	{ 1st Punjab Infantry				276
	{ 33rd Punjab Infantry				729
	{ No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, 6 guns ...				250
	{ No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners ...				195
2ND BRIGADE	{ 1st Punjab Cavalry				126
	{ 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade				695†
	{ 14th Sikhs				912
	{ No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery, 4 guns ...				182

The heat, during the march of 176 miles from the railway at Khushalgarh, had been very severe and especially trying to the British troops; but the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the Rifle Brigade, had 753 and 768 effective rank and file on the 19th July out of a total field service strength of 801 per battalion—a not unsatisfactory performance, when it is mentioned that temperatures of over 105° F. were registered during July in double-fly tents at elevations of over 4,200 feet above sea-level in the Tochi valley.

* This battalion had in addition 75 effective rank and file at Edwardesabad and 120 at Boia.

† This battalion had in addition 17 effective rank and file at Edwardesabad and 56 at Boia.

All being now ready, orders were issued for an advance to Sheranni on the 20th July. But before describing the operations, it will be as well to consider the

Military and political situation.

military and political situation existing at the time. The general gist of the reports as to the doings of the Ger Madda Khel was that the tribesmen had evacuated Maizar and Sheranni and had moved to the hills, taking with them their flocks and herds and as much movable property as they could carry, and that they had left only a few watchmen to irrigate the fields and keep a look-out on the movements of the troops. No reconnaissances were made from Datta Khel in order to avoid driving the Ger Madda Khel further afield, though from the reports of spies it was believed that the hostile tribesmen were scattered in the hills north of the Kazha, on the Lwara plain at the head of that valley, and on Charmina hill west of Maizar; and that it was more likely that they would fly across the Afghan border than that they would offer any resistance to the troops. The Madda Khels of the Kazha, who were held not to have been implicated in the Maizar outbreak, were evidently far more inclined to curry favour with the British than to throw in their lot with their kinsmen, who had committed themselves against Government. On the other hand it was reported that, if the Ger Madda Khel did fight, they would receive a certain amount of assistance from other sections of the Darwesh Khel as well as from the Mahsuds: and it was also known that the Mulla Pawindah, after endeavouring without success to stir up the Mahsuds, had been holding large meetings of Mahsuds, Tori Khels, and Mohmit Khels at the head of the Khasora Valley about the middle of July, at which *ghaza* had been preached and at which a certain amount of excitement had prevailed. So far as could be ascertained from these somewhat contradictory reports, it appeared that the maliks of the Tori Khel and Mohmit Khel, who were in receipt of British allowances, had succeeded in restraining their tribesmen, and that the Mulla had returned to Mahsud territory where he had with him a considerable armed gathering.

The orders originally issued for the advance to Sheranni on the 20th July were that the 1st Brigade with the addition of No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery and the Engineer field park, should start at 4-30 A.M., under the command of Brigadier-General Egerton, accompanied by the Major-General Commanding and divisional head quarters. Late however on the evening of the 19th, a messenger arrived from a Manzar Khel malik of Momirogha, who was believed to be trustworthy, reporting that Mulla Pawindah had arrived at Razani with 7,000 men and intended attacking either Datta Khel or Boia. Although the numbers were believed to be exaggerated, there was thought to be some foundation for the report. As Razani was only some 14 miles distant, and there were at Datta Khel a large number of transport animals, while the perimeter of the camp was large, the Major-General Commanding decided to leave there under Brigadier-General Symons, the 33rd Punjab Infantry, and 2 guns No. 6 Mountain Battery, in addition to the Rifle Brigade and 14th Sikhs, and to defer the march of the 1st Brigade until daylight. Two companies were also ordered to march from Miramshah next morning to reinforce Boia. From subsequent reports it appeared that Mulla Pawindah had actually near Razani a gathering of only 1,000 to 1,500 men, including the chief Tori Khel and Mohmit Khel maliks, and that he had expressed his intention of attacking Datta Khel, if harm was done to Sheranni. The maliks dissuaded him, however, from taking any action until it was seen whether any injury was inflicted on the Madda Khels; and the next day the Darwesh Khel tribesmen appear to have definitely refused to join the Mulla, who returned to Razmak.

In accordance with the orders mentioned above, the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Egerton advanced on Sheranni at 6-15 A.M., on the 20th July, and on arrival found it unoccupied. One

The advance on Sheranni.

squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry pushed on to Maizar, which was also found deserted except by a few watchmen who made for the hills. The rear guard of the column reported a collection of several hundred men on the low hills to the south of the road; the tribesmen, however, kept at a distance. The camp of the 1st Brigade was pitched south-east of Sheranni and entrenched, and the unladen camels returned to Datta Khel

under the escort of half a battalion of the Rifle Brigade, which had accompanied the advance for this purpose. As they were returning, some 20 or 30 armed raiders came down to attack the return convoy but made off on perceiving the escort. On the night of the 20-21st shots were fired into Sheranni camp but there were no casualties. The same night the wire was cut in three places near Saiadgi and at Islam Chowki, 7 miles from Bannu, where also a gang of about 60 raiders carried off 176 camels, the property of a contractor, killing one *sarwan* and wounding two others. The raiders were pursued by some sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry who recovered 50 camels. Suspicion of complicity in this attack fell on the border police and levies at Islam Chowki, as they refused to give any information or assistance to the cavalry patrol.

For the next few days the troops at Sheranni were engaged in destroying the numerous towers and defences of that large village, a work which was completed on the 23rd. Similar operations were then commenced amongst the numerous hamlets of Maizar, and by the 5th August all their defences had been destroyed. While these reprisals were going on, the camp at Sheranni was frequently fired into at night, but the only casualties were one Highlander slightly wounded and one mule killed.

As there was reason to believe that the men, who used to fire into Sheranni camp at night, came from the Kazha valley and returned thither before daybreak, an attempt was made to capture them on the 23rd, by sending troops by night to occupy the passes leading to that valley, and another detachment in the early morning up the Tochi to drive towards the Kazha any marauders still lurking in the neighbourhood of camp. The first party consisting of 300 rifles of the 1st Sikhs, started at 2 A.M., under the command of the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence; the second consisted of two companies Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, two companies 1st Punjab Infantry, and 20 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, 1st Punjab Infantry, and started at 5 A.M. for Tarmor, a village in the Tochi valley about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles above Sheranni. The first party was fired on after crossing the Tochi and Subadar Gufaraz, 1st Sikhs, was severely wounded; but the hills were piquetted by 6 A.M. and one marauder was shot but carried off by his friends. (He turned out afterwards to have been a cousin of Sadda Khan). Colonel Gray's column searched the villages and arrested some tribesmen found therein, who were afterwards found to be Saiadgis on their way to Birmal.

On the 31st July a large band of Khostwals, Tanis and Gurbaz, taking advantage of a rain and dust-storm about midday, raided some hired Government camels that were grazing on the Dandi plain some 5 miles north of Miramshah, under the guard of a Native Officer and some rifles of the 6th Bengal Infantry and two sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. The raiders succeeding in driving off 257 camels, wounding two others and killing two *sarwans*, but suffered a loss of four killed and two taken prisoners. Lieutenant-Colonel D. S. Cuninghame, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Road Commandant, on receiving the news at Miramshah turned out with a party of cavalry, but being misdirected turned up the wrong nala in pursuit, and the raiders unfortunately made their escape with their booty into Khost.

On this date Brigadier-General Symons, commanding 2nd Brigade, returned to Datta Khel from Sheranni and assumed command of the Line of Communications. During the month of July the telegraph was continually cut in Upper and Lower Dawar, for which offences fines were inflicted on the neighbouring villages. The post of Khajuri at the eastern end of Lower Dawar, at the mouth of the Shinkai Tangi, was taken over from the levies and occupied by 50 rifles Native Infantry till the end of the expedition.

In consequence of the camel raid of the 31st July and the rumoured gathering of a large number of Tanis and other Afghan tribesmen for the purpose of further mischief, and as an attack on Miramshah was threatened, the following movements were carried out, within 18 hours of the issue of orders, on the 1st

August : No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery moved from Sheranni to Miramshah ; 40 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry from Sheranni to Datta Khel ; the cavalry at Datta Khel moved to Boia and the cavalry at Boia to Miramshah ; 4 companies 33rd Punjab Infantry left Sheranni for Datta Khel ; 2 companies of the 25th Punjab Infantry at Datta Khel and 2 companies of the same regiment at Boia, moved to Miramshah ; Brigadier-General Symons also transferred his head quarters to Miramshah. However no attack was made, nor did the Khostwals and other Afghan subjects of Khost give any further trouble to speak of during the expedition : but the stolen camels were never restored, though they were for a long time in the possession of the Afghan Governor of Khost, Sardar Sherindil Khan, who had returned from Kabul shortly before the raid.

On the 2nd August, towards 8 A.M., about 100 Waziris began firing into Khajuri post from the hills to the north while another party looted a convoy of donkeys just arriving from Saiadgi. The enemy were driven off by a detachment of the 6th Bengal Infantry under Subadar Rambhagat, who with Lieutenant Donaldson, R. A., who was passing at the time, pursued the raiders killing one of their number. The latter, however, succeeded in carrying off 37 donkeys, 2 Government boxes and Rs. 177 in cash. On the same date Boia post was fired into continuously from 8 to 10 P.M. by several parties of the enemy, of whom a considerable number had collected with the intention of rushing the post. Finding it too strong they made off, carrying away one of their number. The only casualty in the post, which was well protected, was one camel killed.

On the 7th August Major H. M. S. Grover, D. A. Q. M. G. 2nd Brigade, and Captain Parker, 6th Bengal Light Infantry, with 30 rifles of the 6th B. L. I., and a few sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry dispersed a small gathering of Mahsuds near Khajuri, killing one and wounding several others.

The destruction of the fortified *kots* around Maizar and Sheranni having been completed on the 5th August, notices were issued on the same day to all sections

Negotiations with the Madda Khel.

of the Madda Khels to attend on the 12th instant and hear the further terms of punishment ordered by Government. The Ger Madda Khels, who were now mostly in the hills on the Afghan border north of the Kazha, had during the past 10 days been holding numerous meetings and had appealed for help to all the neighbouring tribes on both sides of the border, as well as to the Afghan Governors of Khost and Birmal. The messengers sent out with the above notices returned in due course with letters from the leading Ger Madda Khel maliks, stating that they did not wish to send in a large jirga, and asking that the terms might be announced to Shadam the brother, and Mozammil, the nephew of Sadda Khan, the latter a Jemadar of levies still in our service. It appeared therefore that although the jirga had been promised a safe conduct, the Ger Madda Khels were still distrustful and afraid of being arrested. The Kazha maliks sent no reply ; one of them who accompanied the General's messengers, stated that the message had been received, but that the maliks did not think it applied to them as they were innocent in the matter of the Maizar attack. General Bird accordingly again summoned the Ger Madda Khels and the Kazhawals to send in their jirga on the 16th and also called in some of the principal maliks of other sections of the Darwesh Khel.

On the 17th a durbar was held at which the Kazhawal jirga was present, but not that of the Ger Madda Khels, and General Bird announced the following terms of punishment :—

Announcement in Darbar of terms of punishment.

- (1) The Madda Khel tribe must come in and make submission, agreeing to surrender all maliks and other ringleaders in the attack on the political officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897, whom, after such enquiry as General Bird thinks fit, he may declare must be surrendered ; and all persons surrendered will be dealt with in such way, and be subject to such punishment, as the Government of India may determine.
- (2) All stolen property must be restored in good condition ; or, in default, the value, as determined by Government, must be paid.

- (3) Payment of the fine of 1,200 Kabuli rupees outstanding on account of the murder of Honda Ram, Muharrir of the Sheranni levy post, must be made good.
- (4) Payment will be required of a fine of ten thousand rupees in cash or arms, on account of the recent misconduct of the tribe. This fine may, with the sanction of the British Government, instead of being levied as above, be discharged, in whole or in part, by the tribe furnishing labour for the construction of the Sheranni post, or of any other work approved by Government without payment, or on such terms as the Government may prescribe.

The surrender of the following persons was demanded :—

Sadda Khan, Khizr Khel of Sheranni.
 Dande, ditto ditto.
 Alambe, ditto ditto.
 Sheikh Nur, Ali Khan Khel of ditto.
 Saiyad Wali, ditto ditto.
 Khanijan, ditto ditto.
 Modai, Dreplare of Maizar.
 Namwar, Khoji Khel of ditto.
 Marghat, ditto ditto.
 Bohtan, ditto ditto.
 Azim, Ali Khan Khel ditto (Parsha).
 Ware Khan, Macha of ditto (Suram).
 Mir Badshah, ditto ditto.
 Mohabbat Khan, Bakka Khel, hamsaya of Shawwaz, Khoji Khel.
 Salo, Dreplare.
 Nur Shah, Macha of the Kazha.
 Pyall Nur, son of Nur Shah, Macha.

The Madda Khels had of course forfeited by their misconduct the allowances which they received from Government, and this fact was also announced to them. The Kazhawals were told that they could not be considered exonerated from complicity in the Maizar attack until they had surrendered Nur Shah, and Pyall Nur his son, both of whom had taken part in the fight.

To avoid all risk of misunderstanding, General Bird then despatched the *Despatch of representative Maliks to the Ger leading Darwesh Khel maliks as well as Madda Khel.* Shadam and Mozammil to the Ger Madda Khels to explain the terms to all concerned, ten days being allowed within which the tribesmen might come in and make submission, failing which they would be considered the enemies of Government. The messengers however returned on the 21st with an indecisive answer, and General Bird sent them back to warn the Madda Khels in their own interests to make complete submission by the 27th. The messengers again brought back an indefinite reply on the 24th August; but they stated that Sadda Khan and others were anxious to come in on safe conduct to represent their case, and General Corrie Bird agreed to receive them on the 31st August. At this period there is no doubt that Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan, the Afghan Governor in Urgan, and Sardar Sherindil Khan, Governor of Khost, were in constant communication with the Madda Khels. Towards the middle of the month reports began to reach Waziristan of the fighting in the Swat valley and on the Mohmand border. Little excitement *Small effect on Waziristan of the fanatical tribal outbreaks on the Peshawar-Kohat border.* was caused thereby, as the tribesmen were overawed by the large number of troops concentrated in the Tochi. Indeed in spite of the successive outbreaks all along the Peshawar and Kohat borders, practically the only disturbing effect apparent in Waziristan, beyond a few abortive meetings summoned by the Mulla Pawindah, was the inclination to temporize evinced by the Madda Khels, in the hope that the course of events might enable them to obtain easier terms of submission.

While these negotiations were in progress, affairs still continued more or less disturbed in the Tochi valley. On the *Events during August.* 16th August, 42 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, reconnoitring up the Shawal Valley in search of Madda Khel raiders,

who were reported to have made off in that direction, had 6 volleys fired at them, but their assailants escaped into the hills about Charmina. On the 19th August, two mail *ekkas* were waylaid between Idak and Miramshah, close to the scene of a similar outrage that occurred in the spring, and in sight of the Lakka Ghundi and Sur Kamar levy posts. Two sepoy of the 25th Punjab Infantry escorting the *ekkas* were killed, as well as a clerk of the Telegraph Department and the two *ekka* ponies, while two rifles and 100 rounds of ammunition were carried off. It was afterwards ascertained that one of the raiders, a Jalal Khel Mahsud, died of a wound he received in this affair. Bad characters of the Mohmit Khels and Tori Khels were also implicated, and the Lakka Ghund levies were proved to have connived at the offence. The whole of the latter were subsequently arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from 6 months upwards. On the 20th August thirty raiders attacked two *bunniah*s two miles on the Bannu side of Saiadgi at 8 P.M. The Jemadar of the Saiadgi levies, a man who had done much good service, was passing at the time; he pluckily pursued the raiders, firing on them, but was shot dead. On the previous day 10 hired camels had disappeared while out grazing near Saiadgi, but from subsequent enquiries it appeared that they had been disposed of by the *surwans*.

On the 23rd August a column composed of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, a wing of the 1st Sikhs, 4 guns
General Egerton's 1st Kasha Column. No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, and 25 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry started from Sheranni under the command of Brigadier-General Egerton, to escort the Major-General Commanding during a tour through the Kazha valley. The force marched the first day *via* the Spalekun nala and Shrawane Narai and camped between the villages of Zoram Achar and Ismail Khel. On the 24th, camp was moved to a place a quarter mile west of Inzar Kach, General Bird with the cavalry and a small infantry escort proceeding by the river, the rest of the force marching by the Kashkarai Narai. The column halted at Inzar Kach on the 25th, while General Bird interviewed jirgas, and reconnaissances were made by the Intelligence Officers. It was here that General Bird received the reply brought by the messengers sent to Sadda Khan after the Sheranni durbar of the 17th. It was also ascertained by reconnaissances that the Ger Madda Khels were now mostly in the Mir Tsappar valley across the Afghan border, and that Sadda Khan, who had been at Inzar Kach as late as the 23rd, had rejoined the rest of the fugitives.

On the 26th, the column marched to a camp on Maidan Raghza, *via* Isham on the Sara Toi, General Bird proceeding, on political business, with the 1st Sikhs the Sapper Company and the Cavalry, down the river-bed to Ismail Khel, where the column had camped on the 23rd. The village was, however, found deserted, and after a short halt the troops continued their march, proceeding down the Kazha river and up the Sara Toi, and thence across country to the Maidan Raghza, rejoining the rest of the column. The next day the column marched to Ghazlamai in the Tochi valley at the mouth of the Duga nala, and on the 28th past Datta Khel to Sheranni, a hot and trying march of 15 miles. The visit of this column to the Kazha had a good effect on the Kazhawals, and the Ismail Khel subsection, which had been giving trouble, complied with the order to come into Sheranni on the 3rd September for the settlement of numerous cases outstanding against them.

On the 31st August, a reconnaissance sent up the Tochi to select the alignment for a new road, was fired upon near Landi Khel halfway between Maizar and Dotoi.

During the month of August the weather was of a monsoon character, and the clouds hung low, much interfering with survey operations. A considerable amount of rain fell in the hills which lowered the temperature somewhat, but kept the Tochi constantly in flood. At camps such as Sheranni, which were dependent on the river for their water-supply, constant floods in the river were a source of great discomfort; and no doubt accounted to some extent for the large amount of sickness, principally bowel complaints, that prevailed. The flood-water of the Tochi had a most unpleasant odour, so much so indeed

The water difficulty and sickness.

that the mules refused to drink it for days at a time; but when run through filtering channels into settling tanks, the animals drank freely, although the water in the tanks looked little better than liquid mud. It was found extremely difficult to filter the river water for drinking purposes, for the earthy matter with which the flood-water is filled is not easily precipitated, and alum seems to have little effect upon it, as it is apparently largely impregnated with various salts. The Company of Sappers and Miners, as soon as the demolitions were completed, were employed almost entirely in improving the water-supply at Sheranni. Wells were sunk along the edge of the riverbed and lined with wood (*chucks*), but although a great improvement in the water-supply was thus obtained, the wells were always much affected by the floods in the river. The use of water from the springs in the neighbourhood of Sheranni had to be discontinued, as they were found to be full of purgative salts.

The troops at Sheranni were largely employed during August in improving the road to Datta Khel which was converted from a fair to an excellent camel track. Numerous reconnaissances were carried out all down the line in spite of the heat, and parties were continually sent out to try and waylay marauders and wire-cutters.

On the 1st September, a column was sent out to Landi Khel for the purpose of making a road so as to avoid two difficult fords on the road to Dotoi. It was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon and consisted of the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade, 1st Punjab Infantry, 2nd Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, 2 guns No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, and a detachment of cavalry. The sappers returned to Sheranni on the 5th, the rest of the column remained out till the 7th September. They were repeatedly fired on, but there were no casualties.

On the 2nd September, Captain Unwin, 1st Punjab Cavalry, was fired on near the Mohmit Khel village of Tal near the Taghrai Tangi below Miramshah; and late in the evening a reconnaissance under Major Maxwell, 6th Bengal Infantry, returning from the Chinikai Narai, was fired at from both sides of the river in the same place and one sepoy, 6th Bengal Infantry, was mortally wounded. The next morning Captain Unwin with two companies 25th Punjab Infantry, and 16 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, surrounded the village of Tal and brought in the malik and four other men as prisoners. A fine of Rs. 1,200 was subsequently imposed on the villages of Tal and Anghar.

On the 3rd September, the maliks of Sheranni and Maizar sent in letters to General Bird definitely refusing to accept the terms offered them by Government. The Macha Madda Khels of the Shawal Tangi and the country about Dotoi sent in their maliks to sue for pardon; but, in accordance with the orders of Government, they were informed that they could not be dealt with separately. The Kazhawals were informed by General Bird that as they had not given up the two men demanded from them, he would again visit their country in the following week.

About 3 A.M., on the 5th September, some 80 or 90 shots were fired into Idak post from a small mound to the south. The fire was returned and the troops being well under cover, only two camels were hit by the enemy. A fine of Rs. 200 was subsequently imposed for this offence.

The weather at the beginning of September was abnormally hot, very little rain fell in the Tochi valley, but much fell in the hills and the river was constantly in flood. Captain Powell, R.E., commanding the Bengal Sappers and Miners, ascertained from careful observations that the bed of the Tochi at Sheranni had been lowered by fully two feet since the 20th July. The cases of fever and dysentery among the British troops at Sheranni, were now getting extremely numerous. The Rifle Brigade, which was to have accompanied the 2nd Kazha Column, was found to be unfit for that duty, and 440 of that battalion were moved into Datta Khel post on the 8th.

The 2nd Kazha column was formed of 356 rifles of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 506 of the 14th Sikhs, 500 of the 1st Punjab Infantry, No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, 2 guns No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, and 46 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. It assembled with ten days' supplies on the 11th at Datta Khel village, where Brigadier-General Symons assumed command, after handing over charge of the line of communications to Lieutenant-Colonel Cuninghame, 1st Punjab Cavalry. On the 11th the column, accompanied by General Bird and head-quarters, marched to a camp near Ghazlamai at the mouth of the Duga; and on the 12th September, it marched to Isham on the Sara Toi. On the 13th September, an

Night march and surprise of Dadam. infantry column of 900 rifles (300 each being taken from the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 14th Sikhs, and 1st Punjab Infantry) left camp at 2 A.M. under command of Brigadier-General Symons, with the object of surprising the village Dadam (said to be Sadda Khan's own village) and situated, according to the map, at about $7\frac{3}{4}$ miles to the north-west of camp in a direct line. Orders for the march of this column had not been issued until late on the previous evening, with the object of ensuring secrecy, and the troops turned out and moved off in perfect silence. The moon was full, and sky cloudless, so that movement was easy. The column advanced up the bed of the Sara Toi stream for about 7 miles, at which point the stream divided, one branch coming from the north and the other from the north-west. The detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry was accordingly sent along the westerly branch, while the rest of the column proceeded by the other. From the point of junction of these streams it became evident that no mules or other animals could ascend the valley to Dadam, as a succession of waterfalls and huge boulders was met with. A report to this effect was sent accordingly to the Major-General Commanding the force, as the intention had been for the remainder of the Kazha Column to follow by this route later in the day to Dadam, and to bring the camp with it. By 9-30 A.M. the main body of the infantry column had reached a high ridge (height 8,600), overlooking the village of Dadam at about 3,000 yards distance. Parties were sent to search the village, and a number of arms were found which were brought away: the few inhabitants that were seen, fled at the approach of the troops. The 1st Punjab Infantry detachment was fired at from a Khizzar Khel Kirri on their way to Dadam, in consequence of which, about 270 head of cattle, sheep and goats, were taken, as well as ten prisoners and some arms. A fine of Rs. 1,000 was subsequently realised in kind (10 cattle, 53 sheep and 12 goats) for the shots fired, and the arms were confiscated, but the rest of the cattle were restored. At 2-30 P.M. the infantry column started on its return march, the rear-guard reaching camp at 8 P.M. after 18 hours under arms. This march in the rocky beds of streams and by tracks only passable to footmen was a proof of the good marching power of the troops, some of whom had covered over 26 miles.

It having been originally intended to encamp at Dadam, the cavalry, guns, sappers, and 100 rifles, accompanied by the Major-General Commanding, left camp Isham at 5 A.M. and proceeded up the Sara Toi, while the baggage with 350 rifles followed at 6-30 A.M. with orders to halt at a village, some 3 miles above Isham. When General Symons reported from near Dadam that no road practicable for mules had been found, the two above-mentioned columns returned to a new camp, which was pitched near the village of Pirakai, on a *raghza*, or stony plateau, on the right bank of the Sara Toi. While returning, a portion of the troops was caught by a sudden flood in a

Troops caught by a flood.

tangi, and the section of the mountain battery had a narrow escape. Six men were swept away, of whom two were quickly recovered, and four were rescued in a semi-conscious state a considerable distance down stream. Thirteen mules were washed away, one being drowned, while others received severe injuries. No. 40, Gunner Indar Singh, No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, behaved with great gallantry. The stream was a roaring torrent of freshly melted hail, and intensely cold. A driver, who had been caught by the flood, had taken refuge behind a large rock in the middle of the stream, but was benumbed with cold and could not help himself. To all appearance there was no chance of reaching him, but Gunner Indar Singh stripped, and—dashing into the torrent—reached the driver,

and with great difficulty dragged him to the bank in safety. Gunner Indar Singh was subsequently awarded the Humane Society's Medal.

On the 12th September, a signalling party, proceeding to the hills above Sheranni, fell in with two armed parties of Wazirs who laid down their arms when ordered to do so. On the approach of the signallers one of the tribesmen suddenly stabbed a sepoy and made off with his rifle. He was, however, shot down and the rest of the party were brought in as prisoners. After this a notification was issued to the inhabitants of the Kazha that they were not to carry arms while troops were in the neighbourhood.

The Kazha column remained halted at Pirakai till the 19th September, as 2,000 mules had to be despatched from the Tochi to Kohat to join the troops assembling there for operations against the Afridis and Orakzais. On the 18th, orders were received for Brigadier-General Symons to proceed to Kohat to take command of the Kurram column; and he left for Bannu on the 20th September, being succeeded in the command of the 2nd Brigade and the Line of Communications by Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon, Rifle Brigade.

The following moves took place on the 18th: three companies of the 1st Punjab Infantry left the Kazha column for duty at Datta Khel, and one of the 14th Sikhs for duty at Boia. The head-quarters and 204 men of the 33rd Punjab Infantry, 83 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and 380 mules left for Datta Khel. The 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade left Datta Khel *en route* for Miramshah. This left in camp at Sheranni the 1st Sikhs; half a battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; two companies 33rd Punjab Infantry; four guns No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery; 40 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry; three sections No. 28 Native Field Hospital; two sections No. 29 Native Field Hospital; and two sections No. 2 British Field Hospital. On the same day the 6th Madras Infantry (6 British officers, 537 native ranks) arrived at Edwardesabad to relieve the 3rd Sikhs at that station, who were under orders for field service with the Tirah expeditionary force.

On the 19th, the Kazha column marched from Pirakai down the Sara Toi to Ismail Khel and encamped south of that village where it remained halted till the 25th, while the Sappers and Miners were making the road, between that place and Datta Khel *via* the Kram pass, practicable for camels. On the 25th, the column marched to Bibi and the next day sent back a party to destroy the *kots* in Pirano Kalai belonging to Nur Shah and Pyall Nur who had not surrendered themselves. On the 27th, the column marched back to Ismail Khel, and on the 28th to Datta Khel village.

On the 3rd October, Brigadier-General Egerton with a column composed of 200 of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 400 of the 1st Sikhs, 400 of the 33rd Punjab Infantry, 4 guns No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, and 18 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, marched from Sheranni to Dotoi to visit the upper Tochi, the Zowe valley and Shawal, as a certain number of the Madda Khel were believed to be harboured in these districts as well as by the Mahsuds to the south of Shawal. During the march to Dotoi

Major Kemball and Lieutenant Pirrie, survey officer, with an escort of 80 rifles of the 1st Sikhs under Captain Reid, were detached to ascend Charmina Peak (7,982 feet) for reconnaissance and survey purposes. Several parties of the enemy were met with who fired repeatedly on the troops, and one party in a commanding and almost inaccessible position near the top were dislodged with some difficulty, two sepoys being slightly wounded. The column halted two days at Dotoi, during which time reconnaissances and survey work were carried out, and on the 7th October, it marched *via* the Sind Narai, which the sappers had made practicable for camels, to a camp on the Karam Raghza halfway up the Zowe valley.

The next two days were devoted to survey and reconnaissance work ; and on the 10th the column marched by the Warziki Narai into Shawal, encamping close to the Gurbaz village at the junction of the Mana and Shawal valleys. On the 11th a reconnaissance was made down the Shawal Tangi for 4 miles, and survey work was carried out south of camp. Heliographic communication was kept up with the Tochi by means of a signalling party stationed on Bizha, 5 miles north of camp, and another party on the hills north of Sheranni ; and a message was received this day from the Major-General Commanding announcing a report that

Reports re Mullah Pawindah.

Mulla Pawindah was collecting a *lashkar* of Mahsuds to attack the column. This and similar reports were current until the column returned to the Tochi and were probably put about by the Mulla himself, who was afraid lest an attempt might be made to capture him.

On the 12th October, General Egerton marched up the Mana valley and crossed the Khina Narai (8,600 feet) into the Khina valley, where camp was pitched 4 miles below the pass. The supply of water was, however, scanty and only sufficient for the men and some of the horses, while the camels and mules had to go unwatered. On arrival in camp Major Digby, C. R. E., with Lieutenants

Ambush in the Khina.

Waghorn and Hingston, R.E., proceeded with a small escort of sowars to see what work was required to make the Yowa Tsirai pass practicable for camels, as the column had to cross into the Dariawasti valley next day. This party when returning was ambushed by a party of Wazirs when within a quarter of a mile of camp. Lieutenant Hingston's horse was killed, he himself, one sowar, and one horse being slightly wounded. The enemy then commenced firing into camp and before they were driven off succeeded in killing one mule and wounding two followers. This gang was afterwards reported to have been led by Bohtan and Modai, two of the proscribed Maizar ringleaders. (*See page 17.*)

On the 13th October, the column crossed the Yowa Tsirai Narai, height 8,300 feet, and camped at a spot called Dwa Kamar 4 miles below it, where three days' extra supplies were received from Datta Khel. The column halted one day at this camp, and on the 15th moved to a camp, in a nala leading up to Shuidar, whence a survey and reconnaissance party ascended to the summit of this mountain, (11,000 feet,) which is the highest but one in Waziristan. Lieutenant Pirrie, the survey officer, succeeded in putting in some useful

Survey operations.

work from this point, and during the tour of the Shawal column mapped several tracts of country not previously surveyed. But owing to political considerations the troops were unable to visit the unsurveyed country at the head of the Dhana and Shawal valleys. On the 17th, General Egerton's column returned to Datta Khel and was broken up.

On the 20th October, Major Willcocks, A. A. G., made a night march from

Night march to Momirogha.

Datta Khel with a party of the 1st Punjab Infantry to the Manzar Khel village of Momirogha at the head of the Khasora valley. The village was surrounded at daybreak, and a Madda Khel outlaw was captured and brought into camp with the men who had been harbouring him.

On the 23rd October, General Egerton moved out with three columns from

Reconnaissance of the Shawal Tangi.

Sheranni with a view to surprise and capture outlaws and to search for Government property hidden in the villages of the Shawal Tangi. The left column proceeded by the Gurgushti Narai, the centre by the Shawal valley from Maizar, while the 1st Sikhs under Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock crossed the Shawal at Maizar and, after a difficult march round the west of Charmina, descended into the Shawal Tangi. The centre column was fired on, and returning the fire killed 3 of their assailants. The village of Pungai was reached, but no Government property or outlaws were found.

On the 25th October, General Egerton marched from Sheranni with a

General Egerton's 3rd Kasha column.

column composed of the 2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 250

rifles 33rd Punjab Infantry, No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, 50 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, and 2 guns No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, to visit the Kazha and inspect and repair the boundary pillars from Dotoi to Mazdak. Major-General Bird joined the column at Inzar Kach on the following day and remained with it till the 6th November when he returned to Datta Khel. The 33rd Punjab Infantry and the guns were sent back to Datta Khel on the 9th, while General Egerton proceeded with the Highlanders and cavalry to Pirakai to complete the inspection of the boundary pillars as far east as the Dwa Nashtar Narai.

Meanwhile a small column was sent out under Major Kemball, D. A. Q. M. G.

Spinwam survey column. for Intelligence, to explore and survey the Mohmit Khel, Tori Khel, and Kabul

Khel country along the border of Khost. This column which consisted of 30 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, 2 guns No. 6 Bengal Mountain Battery, 250 rifles 14th Sikhs, left Miramshah on October 28th and was accompanied by a survey party under Lieutenant Pirrie, and by Mr. Lorimer, I.C.S., the political officer. On the 29th, the party camped at Kibalai near the Astanni Narai; on the 30th it crossed into the Ghorosti Algad and camped at the mouth of the Damoma in the Kaitu valley, proceeding on the 31st to Spinwam, where the column halted four days for survey and reconnaissance purposes. On the 5th November, the column marched to a camp on the Baran nala on the east edge of the Sheratala plain, thence to Idak on the 8th, and to Miramshah on the 10th November, where the column was broken up. Much of the country traversed by this column had not been previously visited, and a large extent of new country was explored and surveyed.

The principal change in the composition of the force which occurred during the month of October was that the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade was sent back to India during the month of October owing to the large number of sick in its ranks. Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon, Rifle Brigade, having been invalided, was succeeded in the command of the 2nd Brigade and Line of Communications on 4th November by Colonel E. S. Brook, Connaught Rangers, who was given the rank of Brigadier-General.

During October there was a good deal of wire-cutting along the line, and the camps, especially Sheranni, were occasionally fired into at night. The operations that were now going on against the Orakzais and Afridis did not, however, cause any general restlessness amongst the tribes in Waziristan. But although the Madda Khels had still failed to make submission and to give up the ringleaders for trial, there were signs that the tribesmen were getting uneasy at the approach of winter and the prospect of losing their spring crops by further delay in coming to terms.

On the 31st October, Sadda Khan, the head of the clan, gave himself up,

Surrender of Sadda Khan. his life having been guaranteed; and as there had hitherto been no opportunity of

hearing what he had to say in his own defence, he was allowed to state his case in full. It took some days to record his statement, which he ended by an undertaking to carry out the orders of Government to the best of his ability. In token also of good faith he gave up some Government property in his possession; and on the 4th November, he sent messengers to summon the rest of the tribe to assemble on the Lwara plain at the head of the Kazha valley, to decide whether they would accept the Government terms and return to their homes. At Sadda Khan's suggestion too, Major-General Corrie Bird now despatched an influential jirga of the leading Darwesh Khel and Dawari maliks, headed by Mani Khan, Isparka, the principal malik of the Ahmadzai branch of the Darwesh Khels, to explain to the Madda Khels generally the terms on which they would be allowed to return to their country. The Major-General himself proceeded from Datta Khel on the 12th November and joined General Egerton's camp at Ismail Khel in the Kazha valley to await the outcome of these negotiations. On the afternoon of the 14th a large jirga of the Madda Khel arrived in

Submission of the Madda Khel. camp and on the following morning formally made submission to General Bird,

with uncovered heads, presenting a petition asking forgiveness for the misconduct

of the clan, and explaining the way in which they proposed to carry out the orders of Government. In addition to Sadda Khan, four others, (*viz.*, Dande, Sheikh Nur, Khanijan, and Ware Khan) of the 17 proscribed ringleaders surrendered themselves, and 20 hostages were taken for the surrender of the remaining 12, and as security for the fulfilment of the promises made by the clan. During the latter half of November the Madda Khels continued to bring in Government property, and otherwise carried out the terms imposed on them, except that no more of the proscribed persons were surrendered. Permission was then given to them to return to their homes and commence sowing their crops.

On the conclusion of the above proceedings General Egerton marched with his column down the river to camp at Kanirogha, from which place he proceeded on the 17th to Boia. On the 18th November, a small column consisting of 250

Gur'az boundary column.

rifles of the 14th Sikhs and 25th Punjab Infantry, with 30 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, under Major Kemball, D. A. Q. M. G. for Intelligence, marched from Miramshah to inspect and repair the boundary pillars, to the eastward of those inspected by General Egerton's column, up to Laram, the eastern limit of Mr. Anderson's demarcation of 1895. This duty was completed on the 25th, when the column returned to Miramshah. The pillars were found to have been partly demolished; but they were repaired, with the exception of No. 12 which could not be reached in the time at disposal. The Gurbaz tribesmen, inhabiting the Afghan side of the border line in this section, were found to have deserted their villages from fear of reprisals for the camel raid of the 31st July, in which they had been implicated.

Major-General Bird who, after meeting the jirga on the 14th, had returned the same day to Datta Khel, proceeded to Sheranni on the 23rd and remained there

Evacuation of Sheranni.

till the 25th November, when Sheranni was evacuated, the 1st Sikhs and No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery marching back to a camp near Datta Khel village.

The weather had towards the end of November become much colder and the health of the troops was improving. That of the 6th Bengal Infantry and 25th Punjab Infantry was, however, far from satisfactory, and as affairs appeared to be approaching settlement, arrangements were made to dispense with their services by the reduction of garrisons in the upper part of the valley. The former eventually left Bannu for India on the 30th November, and the latter on the 3rd December.

On the 1st December a special tribunal consisting of Major-General G.

Assembly of special tribunal.

Corrie Bird, C.B., as President, with Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A. D. C., Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. H. Pollock, 1st Sikhs, and R. E. Young-husband, Esq., I.C.S., as members, assembled at Datta Khel for the trial of Sadda Khan, Dande, Sheikh Nur, Khanijan, and Ware Khan for their complicity in the Maizar outbreak. Alambe Khan surrendered himself on the 9th December, and took his trial with the others. The court sat till the 14th, but no other ringleaders gave themselves up; and the proceedings were then forwarded to the Government of India.

On the 1st December, a small column under Major J. H. Campbell, 2nd

Movements of columns, etc., in December.

Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, consisting of 3 companies of that battalion, 2 companies 1st Punjab Infantry, 2 guns No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, and 50 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry, marched from Datta Khel and, after touring in the neighbourhood of Sheranni and Maizar, returned on the 6th December to Datta Khel. On the 10th December, the same officer proceeded with his column for a tour in the Kazha valley camping at Ismail Khel, marching to Isham on the Sara Toi on the 11th, and to Ghazlamai at the mouth of the Duga on the 12th, where the column broke up; the Highlanders then rejoined the head-quarters of their regiment at Boia, and the rest of the troops returned to Datta Khel.

During December the Madda Khels paid, in money and arms, the first instalment of the fine imposed upon them for the Maizar outrage, as well as the fine of Rs. 1,200 (Kabuli) long owing for the murder of Honda Ram. The

villagers had begun to till their lands for the spring harvest; but, owing to the difficulty of obtaining timber and making mortar in the winter, they had decided to defer rebuilding until the spring, and to disperse in search of employment, after sowing their crops, until the spring harvest.

On the 3rd January 1898, the General Officer Commanding and divisional head-quarters marched to Saiadgi and on the 4th to Edwardesabad, where they remained, while the field force gradually broke up during the month. Major-General G. Corrie Bird reassumed command of the Punjab Frontier Force on the 31st January 1898, handing over the command of the troops* in the Tochi to Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, D.S.O., C.B., A. D. C., and the political control to Mr. H. A. Anderson, C.S., Commissioner of the Derajat.

The despatch of the Major-General Commanding the Tochi field force describing the operations, and the reports on the working of the various departments in the field will be found in the appendices to this work.

As a sequel to the description of the operations in the Tochi valley, it may be as well to conclude by narrating the subsequent political settlement which was arrived at by the Government of India. The Madda Khel jirga presented themselves in Darbar before His Honour the

Announcement of the decision of the Government of India in regard to the Maizar prisoners. Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab at Miramshah on 11th March 1898, and were there received by him in the presence of representatives of the Tori Khel, Mohmit Khel, Khiddar Khel, and Manzar Khel sections of the Darwesh Khel. The jirgas assembled rose to receive His Honour and the Madda Khel seated themselves bareheaded before him in token of their complete submission to Government. The Lieutenant-Governor then addressed the assembled jirgas as follows:—

On the 10th of June last, nine months ago yesterday, Mr. Gee, then political officer in the Tochi, went with an escort to Maizar after giving previous notice of his intention. His object was primarily to make a tour in that part of the country, and secondly to select a site for a post near Sheranni and settle the distribution of the fine imposed in the case of the murder of Honda Ram. When the civil and military officers and the sepoys were resting near the *kols* of the Maizarwals, an attack was made on them suddenly by some of the short-sighted Madda Khels. The attack was an unprovoked one, and the Government despatched a military expedition under General Corrie Bird for the punishment of those Madda Khels and to enforce compliance with the terms sanctioned by the Government of India. The Madda Khel section came in, made their submission, surrendered six out of the 17 men demanded by Government, paid part of the fines imposed on account of the misbehaviour of the section and part of the price of the property taken away at Maizar and not restored, and engaged to comply with the rest of the terms which they were unable to comply with at the time. The section thus made complete submission and complied with all the terms either wholly or partially. The Government was therefore pleased to withdraw the military expedition and restore the charge of the valley to the Commissioner as before. The Government expects that the section will try their best to bring about compliance with the terms which they were unable to comply with at the time.

The six men whom the Madda Khels surrendered were tried by a tribunal which assembled at Datta Khel in December last. The tribunal heard the accused persons in their defence, recorded all the evidence and submitted their report to the Government of India. The Government of India have now passed orders on the report of the tribunal and have communicated them by telegram. They are to the effect that Sadda Khan, Alambe Khan, Sheikh Nur, Ware Khan, and Khanijan shall be detained as hostages during the pleasure of Government and that Dande Khan shall be released. I accordingly now release Dande Khan before you. I have no authority to announce to you how long the five hostages will be detained. But I may inform you that the five men have not been proved guilty of treachery or of having personally instigated or led the attack. Their offence has been that they did not fulfil their duty as maliks or restrain their fellow tribesmen from making the attack, or warn the political officers that an attack was going to be made. For their own offence, therefore, as well as because the tribe has not yet complied with the terms of the Sarkar they are kept as hostages.

I am glad to note on this occasion that the other Waziri sections held themselves aloof from the disturbance. On the other hand they assisted the expedition in many ways

* The force left in the Tochi was as follows:—
2 squadrons, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
4 guns No. 6 Bengal Mountain Battery.
14th Sikhs.
33rd Punjab Infantry.
1st Punjab Infantry.

by furnishing supplies required for the expedition and by providing guides. Their conduct in this connection is creditable to them and is a proof of their loyalty to the British Government. I am aware that during the expedition fines were imposed on the Tori Khels and Mohmit Khels on account of some offences which were committed by bad characters, partly no doubt to bring discredit on the maliks of the sections concerned. What is creditable to the sections and maliks in this connection is that all the fines imposed, with the exception of a few small sums, had been paid up before I came to this valley. I may on this occasion mention the good and loyal service rendered by the Khiddar Khels on the occasion of the retreat of the escort from Maizar after the attack.

In conclusion I remind you, maliks, that though the British Government may sometimes be forced into war, what it loves, is peace, and for those who come under its influence it desires happiness and prosperity. If you wish to secure these for the people of this valley, you will do two things. First, you will lay aside your feuds and enmities, which are the cause of most of your troubles, and second, you will do your best to assist the Government in suppressing crime, and establishing order and security. If you are in difficulty or if you have any complaints, you are at liberty to make your requests to the officers of Government who are able to advise you and willing to consider every reasonable representation. But you must do your own part, and use your influence in the cause of peace and order. And this is what I now ask you to do, in bidding you farewell.

This is the first time I have met you in your country, and to mark the occasion I now give Rs. 1,000 by way of a feast to you all who are now present in the Darbar.

The tribesmen were then asked if they had any representations to make, and three general written petitions were handed in. They represented that none of the maliks had been concerned in the Maizar outbreak, and that the tribe had been sufficiently punished during the expedition. Sadda Khan and the other maliks had surrendered themselves on a royal assurance (*i'tibar shahi*) conveyed to them by General Bird that they should attend to carry out the orders of the officers of the time being. In reliance on this assurance they had attended and in violation of the assurance they had then been sent off somewhere and imprisoned. The jirgas represented that all sections of the Wazirs and Mahsuds were much irritated at this and that the maliks could not manage their hills and could not be responsible if any trouble occurred, for which Government would be displeased with them. They requested that as the Lieutenant-Governor had been good enough to visit their country he would show favour to them and release the prisoners.

To this petition the Lieutenant-Governor replied that he was not aware of any such assurance having been conveyed to them. General Bird was authorized to inform Sadda Khan that, if he surrendered, his life would be spared and he would not be transported across the sea (*la toro obo na*). This promise had been fully kept and the jirga had already been told by His Honor that the maliks would be kept as hostages only.

In a subsequent verbal representation the jirga, headed by Shadam Khan, brother of Sadda Khan, Khan Habib, Madda Khel, and Niaz Gul, Mohmit Khel asked that, as without Sadda Khan they were as men without feet, eyes, or ears, he at any rate might be released, and they were willing to pay any fine that might be imposed in lieu of his detention. At least they urged that he should be detained at Miramshah, and not taken out of the valley. They were informed that his detention as a hostage was necessary, but that the representations on his behalf would be remembered.

The Lieutenant-Governor then left with the same ceremonial as on arrival, and the jirgas dispersed.

On the 24th May 1898, the Governor General in Council published his decision on the report of the special tribunal which had been held at Datta Khel in December 1897 to investigate the causes of the Maizar outbreak and for the trial of the Madda Khel maliks and others concerned therein. After commenting on the procedure of the tribunal and thanking the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, (Sir Mackworth Young) for his report on the case, the Governor General in Council alluded to the services rendered by Major-General Bird who, throughout a very trying period, carried out the political duties entrusted to him with great

Government orders on the report of the investigation into the causes of the Maizar outbreak.

tact and patience, and to the entire satisfaction of Government. The Governor General in Council did not consider that the reason of the outbreak had yet been clearly or satisfactorily established; but agreed with Sir Mackworth Young that a general feeling of jealousy of Sadda Khan probably lay at the root of it, that the Maizar maliks were dissatisfied with the shares of the fine for the murder of Honda Ram, as distributed by Sadda Khan and his faction, and that from the first there were indications of opposition and resistance.

The India Medal, 1895, with clasp inscribed "Punjab Frontier, 1897-98,"
Grant of medal. was granted to all troops who proceeded
beyond Edwardesabad between the 10th
June, 1897 and the 30th January, 1898 inclusive.


APPENDICES.

For List of Appendices—see page II.

APPENDIX I. GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE MADDA KHEL.

30

BY
LIEUTENANT G. K. COCKERILL, 28TH PUNJAB INFANTRY, FIELD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, TOCHI FIELD FORCE.



NOTE.—In addition to the above there are four "hamsaya" sections who live with the Madda Khel, and share profit and loss with the n. viz., Achar, Tani, Laili, and Saifali. The sub-sections of Achar and Tani are given below:—




The Saifali hamsayas of the Madda Khel consist of a few families of the Saifali sub-section of the Kabul Khel.

APPENDIX I—(continued).
GENEALOGICAL TREE OF MALIK SADDA KHAN, MADDA KHEL.

BY
MR. H. A. ANDERSON, C.S., COMMISSIONER OF THE DERAJAT.

SADAR.



APPENDIX II.

EXTRACTS FROM THE GAZETTE OF INDIA AND SUPPLEMENTARY
DESPATCHES RELATING TO MAIZAR.

GAZETTE OF INDIA,—JULY 17TH, 1897.

* * * * *

No. 773.—The Right Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor General in Council directs the publication of the subjoined letter from the Adjutant General in India, submitting, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, reports from Lieutenant-Colonel W. duG. Gray, Commanding the troops in the Tochi Valley, relating to the attack made by Madda Khels on the political officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897.

These reports are to be regarded as despatches.

2. The Governor General in Council entirely concurs with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in his appreciation of the gallantry and devotion of the British officers, and of the coolness, bravery and discipline of all ranks when deprived of their leaders and compelled to retire under the most difficult conditions.

The conduct of both officers and men on this trying occasion was worthy of the best traditions of the Punjab Frontier Force, and will add to the high reputation for soldierlike conduct which the force has ever enjoyed.

No. 181-T., "*Field Operations—Tochi*," dated Simla, the 8th July 1897.

From—The Adjutant General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward the enclosed letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W. duG. Gray, Commanding Tochi Valley troops, reporting on the attack on the political officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897.

Nos. 230* and 233†, dated 16th and 28th June 1897, respectively.

2. His Excellency feels assured that there can be but one opinion as regards the behaviour of all ranks after the attack commenced. The report describes in graphic language the gallantry and devoted example of the British officers who, though wounded, continued to direct the withdrawal of the force until incapacitated by their injuries; the coolness and heroic conduct of the native officers, non-commissioned officers and men, the determined stand at the garden wall, where those who fell gave their lives to cover the withdrawal of their wounded comrades; and the admirable discipline exhibited in the deliberate and systematic withdrawal of the force, carried out as it was under a heavy fire and under most trying circumstances. These are some of the leading characteristics of the combat, and it is with a deep sense of satisfaction that His Excellency submits this record of a gallant deed of arms second to none in the annals of the Indian Army.

3. The march performed by the reinforcements from Datta Khel, who traversed a distance of 9 miles in an hour and a half under the burning sun of a June afternoon, shows the stamina and soldierlike spirit of the party and deserve marked commendation.

4. His Excellency desires also to express his hearty concurrence in the remarks made by Lieutenant-Colonel Gray on the valuable assistance rendered to the troops by Mr. Gee, political officer, during the retirement.

5. The staunchness and devotion of the whole force, and particularly the excellent conduct of the native officers when thrown on their own resources, are worthy of the highest praise; and while deploring the loss of so many brave soldiers, it is with a deep sense of admiration and appreciation of their conduct that His Excellency directs the submission of these reports, with a strong recommendation that they may be regarded as despatches and published under the orders of His Excellency the Governor General in Council.

* This letter has not been reprinted; but its contents are practically given on page 7 *et seq.*

† *Vide next page.*

SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCH BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GRAY.

No. 233, dated Datta Khel, the 20th June, 1897.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. DUG. GRAY, Commanding Tochi Valley Troops,

To—The Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force.

In continuation of my letter No. 230, dated 16th instant, I have the honour to report further on several instances of individual conduct.

2. After the two Royal Artillery officers had fallen, that is almost immediately after the attack began, the gunners continued to fire under the orders of their non-commissioned officers, until their ammunition was expended; in No. 3 subdivision firing blank by the Havildar's orders when the shells were expended, until the mules were ready. The men serving this gun were—Havildar Nihal Singh, Naik Utam Chand, Gunners Jowala Singh, Chet Singh and Diwan Singh (II). The carriage mule being wounded, Havildar Nihal Singh, Naik Utam Chand and Gunner Jowala Singh carried the gun-carriage to the relief line (about 150 yards). Gunner Chet Singh was wounded in the face when limbering up, and was taken away by Gunner Diwan Singh (II).

In No. 4 Subdivision, although the gun twice turned over backwards, and two lanyards broke, the men continued to fight their gun. They were—Naik Sharaf Ali, Lance-Naik Phulla Khan, Gunner Dulla Khan, and Havildar Umar Din (killed). The gun-mule in this subdivision was wounded just after being limbered up, and threw the gun and bolted. The gun was then carried away by Havildar-Major Muhammad Ismail, Gunner Dulla Khan, and Gunner Lakhu as far as the relief line.

Driver Havildar Rudh Singh gave great help in sending back the wounded, and Salutri Kewal dressed Captain Browne's wound under fire. The drivers all behaved excellently, even loading up the greatcoats on the relief line mules until ordered by Captain Browne to desist. Those whose mules were shot or broke away all helped other drivers or took their share in carrying the wounded. The Havildar-Major seems to have conducted the retirement of the section in a cool and able manner.

During this first withdrawal Lance-Naik Shah Sowar, 1st Sikhs, behaved with much gallantry, keeping the enemy off with his fire, while he accompanied and helped those carrying Captain Browne, R.A. (who had been wounded).

It is to be remembered that the guns, while being fought as above described, were at a distance of only 100 yards from a threatening enemy, and were under a converging fire from different sides.

3. The stand made at the garden wall has already been described. This was under the direction of Subadars Sundar Singh,* 1st Punjab Infantry, and Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs. The latter officer, also, with great presence of mind, removed a large quantity of ammunition from the reserve ammunition boxes of his regiment, and rapidly distributed it. Some was also carried away by Bugler Bela Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry. The value of this ammunition to the force cannot be over-estimated; had it not been rescued, it is difficult to think how the enemy could have been kept off at all.

The following men had been sent under heavy fire to fetch away the ammunition boxes by Subadar Narain Singh:—Naik Lachman Singh, 1st Sikhs; Sepoy Shiv Singh, 1st Sikhs, who went back twice, and was afterwards twice wounded; Sepoy Isar Singh, 1st Sikhs; Lance-Naik Atar Singh, 1st Sikhs (killed); and Langri Jhanda Singh, 1st Sikhs.

The conduct of Subadar Sundar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, at the place where he died, was most heroic.

4. At the garden wall many other men also behaved with great heroism. All those who fell there gave their lives to cover the withdrawal of their comrades. Among the survivors Lance-Naik Ishar Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, fought the enemy hand to hand very gallantly there, killing several with his bayonet, and generally rendering great help; and Bugler Bela Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, who has been mentioned above, was again conspicuous, fighting bravely and effectively with a rifle he saved from one of the killed, and later in distributing under fire the ammunition which had been saved.

5. During the first withdrawal to the kotal, Jemadar Sherzad, 1st Sikhs, carried Lieutenant Higginson, wounded, away under a very heavy fire. A little later, taking a rifle and ammunition from a dead sepoy, he covered the retreat of a party (consisting of Havildar Muhammad Bakhsh, Naik Khwaja Muhammad and Sepoy Isar Singh, 1st Sikhs), who were carrying Surgeon-Captain Cassidy wounded, to the rear. He also carried Surgeon-Captain Cassidy part of the way.

Sepoy Allahyar Khan, 1st Punjab Infantry, carried Lieutenant Seton-Browne, wounded, to the kotal.

Subadar Nawab Khan, 1st Sikhs, was one of the last to leave the scene of the outrage, and both there, and throughout the subsequent retirement, he worked in a very cool and admirable way.

6. During the general retirement from the kotal towards the place, where the reinforcements were met, the ability and coolness of Subadar Narain Singh, 1st Sikhs, mentioned above, were of the greatest value. Lance-Naik Assa Singh, 1st Punjab Infantry, did good work in helping Lieutenant Seton-Browne along when the enemy was pressing the retreat.

Sepoy Nurdad, 1st Punjab Infantry, repulsed an attack of a part of the enemy. After shooting down two at a very short distance, he led a successful counter-charge against them, being himself severely wounded.

7. Reference was made in the previous report to the most gallant conduct of the deceased officers—Colonel Bunny, Captain Browne, R.A., and Subadar Sundar Singh. At the time it was written, I was not aware that Lieutenant Cruickshank, R.A., had also behaved in a most conspicuous manner getting up and continuing to fight his guns, after being once shot down, until he was killed by another bullet.

8. The sudden and treacherous way in which the attack began, and the fact that at the very first the men saw all their British officers shot down, make the staunchness and gallantry of the native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, even more praiseworthy than they might otherwise have been.

The indomitable spirit of No. 6. Bombay Mountain Battery is beyond all praise.

9. The conspicuous behaviour of Lieutenants Higginson and Seton-Browne in conducting the retirement, while severely wounded, has been mentioned before.

10. I trust the General Officer Commanding may see fit to recommend these two British officers and all native officers, non-commissioned officers and men mentioned by name above for a signal reward for their gallantry. And I would also ask permission to submit a list of those killed at the garden wall, with a view to the recognition of their splendid conduct being extended to their widows or heirs.

11. When the previous report was written the casualties were under-stated. They were as follows:

Unit.	KILLED.						WOUNDED.							
							Dangerously.		Severely.		Slightly.			Horses and mules.
	British officers.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Followers.	Officers' chargers.	Horses and mules.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Followers.	British officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Native officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Followers.	
1st (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Punjab Cavalry.	3	1
No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.	2	...	2	4	1	2	1	5
1st Sikhs	1	...	12	1	3	1*	2	11	2	7
1st Punjab Infantry	...	1	7	...	1	1	2	...	4
TOTAL	3	1	21	1	4	7	1	1	3	15	2	12	1	5

* Since dead.

Total { Killed 26, and 11 horses and mules.
 { Wounded 35, and 5 mules.

Also 24 baggage mules missing.

* * * * *

13. Though it is not my business to report on civil officers, it would be unjust to omit mentioning that Mr. Gee's exertions and presence of mind were of great value in the help he rendered during the retirement and in sending to call up the reinforcements.

Extract from the "Gazette of India," No. 1090, dated 2nd October, 1897.

TOCHI.

With reference to G. G. O. No. 773 of 1897, the Right Hon'ble the Viceroy and Governor General in Council directs the publication of the subjoined letter from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting, under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel W. duG. Gray, 1st Punjab Infantry, lately commanding the troops in the Tochi valley, bringing to notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant H. S. deBrett, Royal Artillery, at Maizar, on the 10th June 1897.

No. 463-F., "*Field Operations—Tochi*," dated Simla, the 4th September, 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL G. DEC. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward the accompanying letter No. 850-C., dated 10th August 1897, from Lieutenant-Colonel W. duG. Gray, 1st Punjab Infantry, lately commanding Tochi Valley troops, bringing to notice the gallant conduct of Lieutenant H. S. deBrett, Royal Artillery, at Maizar, on the 10th June, 1897.

2. The Commander-in-Chief recommends that this letter be published as an addition to Lieutenant-Colonel Gray's former despatch which appears in G. G. O. No. 773 of 1897. His Excellency has much pleasure in expressing his appreciation of this gallant act which, performed as it was at the risk of Lieutenant deBrett's life, enabled a gun to be brought into action and thus assisted the escort most materially in its retirement.

No. 859-C., dated Camp Sheranni, the 10th August, 1897.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. DUG. GRAY, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force, late Commanding Tochi Valley Troops,

To—The Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, 1st Brigade, Tochi Field Force.

In paragraph 10 of my first report* on the affair of 10th June at Maizar, the rapid manner in which the reinforcements under Lieutenant H. S. deBrett, Royal Artillery, came up was brought to notice, and also the fact that the enemy was finally beaten off with the new ammunition then received.

2. In addition to the very important service thus rendered, I have now ascertained that Lieutenant deBrett behaved with great personal gallantry at the time. When he met the force, then closely pressed by the enemy, he found only one serviceable gun, but no sponges. This gun he served himself, ramming the charges home with a sepoy's rifle, without sponging out between the rounds; and he would not allow this most dangerous work to be done by any one else until a sponge had been improvised by wrapping a puggree round a lance.

3. The value of the fire thus maintained in finally dispersing the enemy was remarked in the above-quoted report, but the very gallant part that Lieutenant deBrett took in the service of the gun having only just come to light I

* Tochi Garrison No. 230, dated 16th June 1897, to Assistant Adjutant-General, Punjab Frontier Force.

feel that it would be an injustice not to lay more stress on the importance of the part he took generally in the work of the afternoon, and I would ask that the General Officer Commanding may now bring his energy and gallantry to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

3. It is necessary to explain that Lieutenant deBrett was unable to bring out with the reinforcements the two guns which had remained in camp at Datta Khel as all the gun and carriage saddles were with the Maizar party; it being Captain Browne's wish to make all his gun mules, some of which were young and new, take an easy share in carrying the guns.

Lieutenant deBrett, R. A., and Lieutenant Seton-Browne, 1st Punjab Infantry, the only surviving officers of the escort, received the Distinguished Service Order for their conduct on the 10th June, 1897.

APPENDIX III.

SCHEME OF OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE
DARWESH KHEL WAZIRS.

Simla, 15th June, 1897.

1. *Formation of force.*—The force which will be styled the Tochi Field Force will probably, besides holding the Tochi, operate to the west and south-west of Datta Khel to punish the sections of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs concerned in the attack of the 10th June on the political officer's escort.

It will be composed as follows :—

1ST BRIGADE.

2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
1st Regiment of Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
1st Regiment of Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
33rd (Punjabi Mahomedan) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
1 Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force.
6 Guns, No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force.
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
No. 2 British Field Hospital, A and B Sections.
No. 28 Native Field Hospital.
No. 29 Native Field Hospital, A and B Sections.

2ND BRIGADE.

3rd Battalion, the Rifle Brigade.
14th Sikh (The Ferozepore) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
6th Regiment of Bengal (Light) Infantry.
25th (Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry.
1 Squadron, 1st Regiment of Punjab Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force.
4 Guns, No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.
No. 2 British Field Hospital, C and D Sections.
No. 30 Native Field Hospital.
No. 29 Native Field Hospital, C and D Sections.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

No. 32 Native Field Hospital, C and D Sections.
* 100 sabres 1st Punjab Cavalry.

AT THE BASE.

Section No. 1 Field Veterinary Hospital.

2. The above mentioned troops will move on the field service scale of strength, establishments, etc., as laid down in the field service equipment tables for the different branches, except that the number of British officers with regiments of Native Cavalry and Infantry will not be increased above the peace establishment. Depôts will be formed as laid down in the "Mobilisation Measures" in the Field Service Equipment Tables. Depôts of Native Infantry will be on scale B.

3. *Concentration of Force.*—The corps and units not already in the Tochi and at Bannu will, on receipt of orders from Army Head-Quarters, be railed to

* These were detailed on the 28th June, 1897.

Khushalgarh, and march thence to Bannu, under arrangements to be made by the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, in communication, where necessary, with the Bengal Command.

The staff and departments of the force will be directed to assemble at Bannu.

After arrival at Bannu the General Officer Commanding the Field Force will assume command in the Tochi, and all movements beyond Bannu will be made under his orders.

4. *Commands and staff.*—

General Officer Commanding the Force ...	Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B.
Aide-de-Camp Captain H. N. Twynam, East Lancashire Regiment.
Orderly Officer Captain S. W. Scrase-Dickens, Highland Light Infantry.
Assistant Adjutant General Major J. Willcocks, D.S.O., Leinster Regiment.
Assistant Quarter Master General	... Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Nixon, 18th Bengal Lancers.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General (Intelligence).	Major G. V. Kemball, R.A.
Field Intelligence Officer Lieutenant G. K. Cockerill, 28th Punjab Infantry.
Superintendent, Army Signalling	... Captain G. W. Rawlins, 12th Bengal Cavalry.
Principal Medical Officer Surgeon-Colonel R. H. Carew, D.S.O., A.M.S.
Field Engineer Major T. Digby, R.E.
" " Captain A. L. Schreiber, R.E.
Assistant Field Engineer Lieutenant W. D. Waghorn, R.E.
Field Paymaster Captain P. G. Shewell, I.S.C.
Ordnance Officer Major C. H. L. F. Wilson, R.A.
Chief Commissariat Officer	... Major G. Wingate.
* Assistant to Chief Commissariat Officer.	Lieutenant J. L. Rose, 1st Gurkhas.
Divisional Transport Officer	... Captain H. James, Commis- sariat-Transport Department.
* Assistant to Divisional Transport Officer	Lieutenant E. C. Haag, 18th Hussars.
Inspecting Veterinary Officer	... Veterinary-Major G. T. R. Rayment, A. V. D.
Survey Officer Lieutenant F. W. Pirrie, I.S.C.
Provost Marshal Captain P. Malcolm, 4th Gurkhas.
Chaplain Reverend F. J. Montgomery.
" (Presbyterian) Reverend J. Cameron.

1ST BRIGADE STAFF.

Commanding Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C.
Orderly Officer Captain A. Grant, 2-4th Gurkhas.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General	... Captain H. B. Watkis, D. A. A. G.
" " Quarter Master General	Brevet-Major F. Wintour, Royal West Kent Regiment.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	... Lieutenant E. C. R. Annesley.
Brigade Transport Officer	... Captain M. S. Welby, 18th Hussars.

* These officers will personally report themselves for orders to the Chief Commissariat Officer, Rawal Pindi.

Commissariat-Transport Officers	...	{ Lieutenant H. W. R. Senior, 20th Punjab Infantry. Lieutenant T. S. Cox, 11th Bengal Lancers. Lieutenant J. Muscroft, 1st Gurkhas.
Veterinary Officer	...	Veterinary-Lieutenant F. W. Hunt, A. V. D.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling		Lieutenant P. D. McCand- lish, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
Provost Marshal	...	Lieutenant A. H. McLean, 2nd Argyll and Sutherland High- landers.

2ND BRIGADE STAFF.

Commanding	...	Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B.
Orderly Officer	...	Captain A. G. Dallas, 16th Lancers.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General	...	Captain J. McN. Walter, De- vonshire Regiment.
„ „ Quarter Master General		Major M. H. S. Grover, P. A. Q. M. G.
Brigade Commissariat Officer	...	Lieutenant E. A. R. Howell.
Brigade Transport Officer	...	Captain P. W. D. Brockman, 5th Bengal Infantry.
Commissariat-Transport Officers	...	{ Lieutenant N. J. H. Powell, 23rd Pioneers. Lieutenant P. H. Cunning- ham, 1st Bombay Gren- adiers. Lieutenant G. E. Tuson, 16th Lancers.
Veterinary Officer	...	Veterinary-Lieutenant C. B. M. Harris, A. V. D.
Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling		Lieutenant M. Bell, 3rd Rifle Brigade.
Provost Marshal	...	Lieutenant G. A. H. Beatty, 9th Bengal Lancers.

5. *Staff Offices.*—The 2nd Infantry Brigade staff office, maintained at Rawal Pindi, will be detailed as the staff office of the General Officer Commanding the Force, and after it has been completed, as detailed in sub-paragraph (a) below, it will be sent to Bannu in charge of a clerk from the Rawal Pindi district staff office.

An additional clerk will also be appointed from the Punjab Command office to take charge of this office in the field.

The Base Commandant's staff office for the northern line of communications, maintained at Rawal Pindi, will be detailed as the staff office of the 1st Brigade, and will be despatched to Bannu in charge of a clerk from the station staff office at Rawal Pindi.

The Section Commandant's staff office for the northern line of communications, maintained at Sialkot, will be detailed as the staff office for the 2nd Brigade, and will be sent to Bannu in charge of a clerk from the station staff office at Sialkot.

These three staff offices will at once be replaced under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, and the cost of such replacement debited to these operations.

(a) Before despatch to Bannu, the office detailed for the General Officer Commanding the Force will be augmented by the following books, etc. :—

The supply of the above will be arranged for under the orders of the Adjutant General in India. One copy of the Indian Penal Code will

N. B.—Lieutenant-Colonel D. S. Cunninghame, 1st Punjab Cavalry, was subsequently detailed as Section Commandant, Line of Communication, from Edwardesabad to Miramshah.

also be supplied to this office by the Judge Advocate-General in India.

- (b) All the staff offices will be supplied under the orders of the Adjutant General in India, with G. G. Os., G. O's., G. O. C. C's., and Army Circulars from this date to the conclusion of the operations.
- (c) The Director General of Ordnance will take the necessary steps to supply the camp equipage required for these staff offices. This will be sent from the Rawal Pindi Arsenal to the offices at Rawal Pindi and Sialkot. An additional general service 80-lb. officers' tent will be supplied for the use of the staff office of the General Officer Commanding the Force for the accommodation of the two clerks.
- (d) Departmental offices will be formed and equipped under departmental arrangements.

6. *Clothing*.—The summer scale of clothing for troops and followers, as laid down in the field service departmental code, "Commissariat-Transport" and in the field service equipment tables, will be issued except to attendants of hired transport, who will receive one blanket only.

Wadded sunshades for helmets will be provided by British Corps under regimental arrangements at a cost not exceeding Re. 1 per head. Cost to be recovered on contingent bills.

The hob-nails and toe-plates, in possession of corps as mobilisation equipment will be at once placed on the boots.

7. *Equipment*.—All units will be equipped on the field service scale as laid down in the field service equipment tables.

Units will be supplied with field service form No. 6 by the Adjutant General in India.

Orders have already been issued for the transfer of mobilisation equipment to the 14th Sikhs and the 25th Punjab Infantry.

Units now detailed for service, which are already in possession of the articles of mobilisation equipment, maintained in regimental charge, will only require to be completed by departments of supply with the articles now kept in departmental charge pending mobilisation, in accordance with the checked indents drawn up for the same. This will be done at once; and all the equipments of these corps will be replaced without delay under the orders of the Lieutenant-Generals Commanding the Forces concerned, the cost of replacement being debited to these operations.

Units, which are not already in possession of mobilisation equipment, will be at once completely equipped on the field service scale by departments of supply without indents.

Watches and magnetic compasses to complete the signalling equipment will be issued by the mathematical instrument office to all infantry regiments detailed for service.

A reserve of 20 sets of water-gear will be maintained at Bannu by the Commissariat Department.

Beyond Bannu the scale of baggage, tentage, etc., may be reduced at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding the Field Force.

8. *Establishment*.—The Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, can authorise such modifications in the scale of establishments laid down in the field service departmental code, "Commissariat-Transport," as may be necessary. Any conservancy establishments that may be required on the Lines of Communication will be arranged for under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Force in communication with the Commissary-General, Punjab Command.

9. *Ammunition*.—As laid down for corps in the field service manual, part V, and the field service equipment tables.

10. *Supplies*.—One month's supplies for the force will be collected at Bannu. Five days' rations for men and two days' grain for animals will accompany the

troops operating in advance of the advanced depôt (wherever it may be formed, probably Datta Khel).

Supplies will be packed in waterproof bags where necessary.

11. *Transport*.—Transport will be supplied as stated below:—

STAFF, normal scale, *i.e.*, pack mules.

INFANTRY OF 1ST BRIGADE, 2nd alternative scale, *i.e.*, pack mules.

„ 2ND „ normal scale, *i.e.*, obligatory mules and camels.

CAVALRY, normal scale, *i.e.*, regimental ponies and Government mules.

MOUNTAIN BATTERIES, normal scale, *i.e.*, pack mules.

SAPPERS AND MINERS, 1st alternative scale, *i.e.*, pack mules.

FIELD HOSPITALS, normal scale, slow moving, *i.e.*, obligatory mules and camels (*for ambulance transport, see next paragraph*).

Similar transport will be provided for supplies and grain as for the infantry of each brigade.

Corps and field hospitals moving by rail will be accompanied by their obligatory pack mules from their entraining stations, and will receive the balance of their transport under the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab.

Staff units and departments will draw their transport at Bannu.

Corps already in the Tochi and at Bannu will be equipped with transport under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Field Force.

12. *Medical*.—Strict medical examination of troops and followers is to be made before they proceed to the front, in accordance with paragraph 49, field service departmental code, “Medical.”

Reserves of medicines and medical comforts will be arranged for by the departments concerned.

Riding mules or ponies with riding saddles will be substituted for ambulance tongas for the field hospitals belonging to the 1st Brigade. Corps of the Punjab Frontier Force will take their ambulance camel kajawas.

Such additional ambulance tongas (with cattle, etc.), as may be required for the line of communications in advance of Bannu, will be arranged for in the usual manner.

At Bannu A and B sections of No. 3 British Field Hospital with E. P. tents, if buildings are not available, will be established as a general hospital; also a general hospital of 150 beds for natives.

A staff surgeon is authorised as a collateral charge.

A supply of lime-juice as an antiscorbutic will be taken to the advanced base.

13. *Veterinary*.—Veterinary stores and establishments, as required, will be supplied under the orders of the Principal Veterinary Officer in India, and veterinary examinations of horses and other animals will be held before they proceed to the front.

14. *Ordnance Field Park*.—A depôt will be formed at Bannu containing stores on the scale laid down in Ordnance Field Park tables, and any special engineer equipments which may be deemed necessary. The Ordnance Officer will receive orders from the General Officer Commanding with reference to the formation of any advanced depôts which may subsequently be required.

15. *Engineer Field Park*.—An Engineer Field Park with an establishment of one British non-commissioned officer, one Native non-commissioned officer, two sapper artificers, carpenters, two sapper artificers, smiths, four sappers, one sweeper, one bhustie, one cook and a suitable proportion of stores will be despatched from Rurki to Bannu.

The Field Engineer will arrange under the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Force for a sufficient supply of explosives for demolitions, etc.

16. *Signalling*.—Communication by signalling will be maintained beyond Datta Khel, up to which camp the telegraph line extends. This will be arranged

for by the General Officer Commanding the Force from regimental equipment, supplemented, if necessary, by the Ordnance Department (*vide* G. O. 53 of 1892).

17. *Telegraphs*.—The Director General of Telegraphs will arrange for the opening and strengthening of such local offices as may be considered necessary.

The staff and departmental officers of the force will be permitted to send telegrams on the "debit note" system from the Bannu telegraph-office.

The Lieutenant-Generals Commanding the Forces, Punjab and Bengal, will authorise the despatch of telegrams on the debit note system of payment from such offices as may be concerned with the equipment of the force or its maintenance in the field.

18. *Post Office*.—A field post office will be attached to each brigade. The Director General of the Post Office will take such steps as he may consider necessary for strengthening the local offices in the Tochi, etc.

19. *Tonga Service and bridge-of-boats*.—The Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Punjab, will arrange for the establishment of a tonga service of five tongas per diem between Kohat and Bannu as soon as possible, for strengthening the tonga service between Khushalgarh and Kohat to the extent he may think desirable, and for maintaining the bridge-of-boats at Khushalgarh as long as possible.

20. *Supply of Maps and Reports*.—Maps and reports will be supplied by the Intelligence Branch, Simla.

21. *Submission of reports*.—As laid down in the field service manual, part XI, appendix F. The General Officer Commanding the Force will correspond direct with Army Head-Quarters.

22. *Officers' Messes*.—On the scale laid down in the field service manual, part XII, section III.

23. *Survey Party*.—The Surveyor General of India will arrange for a survey party to join the force at Bannu.

24. *Concessions and privileges*.—The troops and followers will be considered on field service for all concessions and privileges from the date of leaving Bannu. This includes the grant of free rations to hired transport and their attendants.

Concessions which are admissible from or between certain dates fixed by regulations will have effect from such dates; free rations will not be given until the column leaves Bannu. Commissariat-transport establishments will receive universal rates of pay and 50 per cent. batta. Staff officers will draw pay from the date on which they join their appointments.

Compensation paid for hired transport animals stolen, killed or captured by the enemy may exceed the rates laid down in paragraph 587, field service departmental code, "Commissariat-Transport," in special cases, with the approval of the General Officer Commanding the Force, who will also dispose of all recommendations for payment of compensation for casualties arising from ordinary causes.

Free passage by rail to their homes may be granted to owners and attendants of hired transport whose animals have become non-effective during field operations, on their furnishing no demand certificates to the effect that their claims have been paid in full.

APPENDIX IV.

Return of strength of the Tochi Field Force on the 1st August, 1898.

CORPS.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		Horses exclusive of Officers' charges.	Mules.	Equipment.	Guns.
	Officers.	Warrant, Non-commissioned Officers and men.	Officers.	Native Officers, commissioned and men.				
Staff ...	48	5
2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders	26	774
3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade	27	799
1st Punjab Cavalry	5	350	351
No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery	5	255	5	138	25" R. M. L.	6
No. 6 (Bombay) do.	4	218	4	93	25" R. M. L.	4
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners	4	194
1st Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force	10	771
1st Sikh Infantry do.	11	771
33rd Punjab Infantry	10	738
6th Bengal Infantry	10	737
14th Sikhs	9	735
25th Punjab Infantry	9	737
Total	101	1,578	77	5,506	360	231	...	10
	7,262							

APPENDIX V.

STANDING ORDERS.

TOCHI FIELD FORCE.

I.—RETURNS.

Attention is directed to the field service manual.

The General Officer Commanding expects that every effort will be made to send in punctually to divisional head-quarters the returns mentioned in appendix F, part XI, field service manual.

Periodical reports and returns mentioned in paragraph 2.—The following are the dates on which these returns are to be submitted by divisional head-quarters, and they should reach the Assistant Adjutant-General one clear day before these dates.

(a), (b), (c), (d). 1st of each month.

(e), will be rendered on the 28th June and every alternate Monday.

(f), (g), (h), (i), as laid down in appendix F.

A weekly diary of all occurrences, movements, casualties, and everything of interest in the brigade, including a record of the weather and rainfall, will be submitted by each brigade and detached columns made up to Saturdays. These are submitted in original to Army Head-Quarters, where they will be printed and returned for distribution. After comparison, the originals may be destroyed.

Particular attention is called to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.

The number (if any), rank, name, and corps of all casualties are to be submitted as soon as possible to divisional head-quarters. Personal enquiry by adjutants and staff officers of brigades will facilitate the furnishing of this information.

Para. 9.—The names of persons and places are to be *hand printed* in all communications and not merely in despatches. Corps will post to the Deputy Adjutant Generals of their respective commands, their monthly returns (Army Forms 13, 105, and India Army Form 234) on the 1st of each month. When, however, a corps is so situated that its return cannot reach the command head-quarters by the 10th of the month, its strength should be telegraphed in form below:—

From station

To place.

From person

To Deputy Adjutant General.

CORPS.

Strength on first	_____	Field Officers (a)
in India	_____, out of India	Captains (a)
in India	_____, out of India	Subalterns (a)
in India	_____, out of India	Staff (b)
in India	_____, out of India	Total (c)

Native Commissioned Officers—, Warrant Officers—, Non-Commissioned Officers, rank and file present—, (d) Sick—, absent (e)—, Total (f)—

Explanatory notes for guidance.

- (a) Seconded Officers should not be included.
- (b) Staff to include Adjutants, Quartermasters, and Riding masters.
- (c) To include all present or absent.
- (d) To include all present at head-quarters, except sick.
- (e) To include all absent from head-quarters, on command, furlough leave, etc.
- (f) To include all Native commissioned officers, British or Native non-commissioned officers and men.

II.—SANITARY.

(See parts II and XI, *field service manual*.)

In camps a latrine ground is to be pointed out for troops and followers, and provost marshals will see that no other place is used for purposes of nature, provosts will be posted to keep the drinking water-supply unpolluted.

In standing camps latrines are to be distinguished by a flag, and the earth will be raised up when the trenches are filled in the shape of the letters L. T.

Whenever a follower is sent to hospital, a memorandum showing the corps or detachment to which he belongs, the articles in his possession, and the date up to and for which he has received pay and rations, will be sent with him.

III.—MARCHES AND BAGGAGE.

(See paras. 741 to 777, *Part I*; also paras. 116—122, *part XI*, *field service manual*.)

Each unit on the march should be complete in itself and should be followed by

- 1st Reserve ammunition.
- 2nd Water mules.
- 3rd Signalling equipment.
- 4th Entrenching tools.
- 5th Field stretchers and regimental ambulance transport.
- 6th Cooking utensils.

All followers not required with the above establishments are to accompany the baggage of their corps and generally assist their respective baggage guards.

Baggage Masters (para. 752) will see that the baggage, exclusive of that mentioned above, marches off the ground in the following order:

1. Field Hospital (*para. 106, part II, field service manual*).
2. General Officers Commanding, divisional, and brigade staff baggage.
3. Regimental baggage and supplies in order of march of corps.
4. Commissariat godown.
5. Ordnance godown.
6. Spare animals.

Baggage guards will be detailed by Brigadier Generals as thought necessary. They should move by sections and never by single men or files.

The greatest attention will be paid to the careful adjustment of all loads and that animals are not overloaded with the private property of followers.

IV.—OUTPOSTS AND PIQUETS.

Every position selected for a camp or bivouac should offer fair defensive capabilities. Piquets, camps, and bivouacs, must invariably be made defensible against attack by *sangars* or other means.

Piquets and sentries should not fire at night except in some real emergency.

Alarm posts are always to be told off, and on an alarm the men fall in at them and await orders. Strict silence must be maintained.

V.—CAMPS.

Whenever possible, camps will be formed with infantry on all four sides, the guns, staff, departments, supplies, and animals in the centre. The general principle to be observed will be that the ridge poles of the tents of the infantry are parallel to the defensive line, to enable the men in case of alarm to move quickly out into their places. Cavalry should not be told off to hold any part of the defensive perimeter. Cooking by day must be done *outside* the enclosure. Streets must invariably be left the whole length and breadth of the camp and to

each corner of the enclosure to admit of communication. Inlying piquets must always be told off. A type of temporary post is shown in field service manual, part XI, appendix E.

VI.—SIGNALLERS.

All regimental signallers are to be placed at the disposal of the Superintendent of Army Signalling.

VII.—WORKING PARTIES.

Working parties employed in work out of camp are to take their arms with them and a covering party must be told off, and each man must keep his rifle and accoutrements close to himself while working. Villagers or unauthorised persons are not to be allowed to approach and mingle with working parties.

VIII.—FORAGING PARTIES.

The escorts with foraging parties should be so placed as to see all the men employed, and should prevent any men from straying beyond certain limits fixed by the commander of the party.

IX.—SURVEY PARTIES.

The officer commanding the escort with a survey party is responsible for the safety of the party, and will decide as to the advisability or otherwise of visiting particular localities, having regard to the strength of the escort.

X.—ORDERS AND REPORTS.

All reports and messages sent in by officers on detached duty are to be *written* and *not verbal*. All orders in camp should be written, and as far as possible, all orders in the field also. The Major-General Commanding hopes that the style of all memoranda and letters will be made as brief as possible, and the wording couched in the first person; the formal commencement and ending of ordinary official letters being reserved for communications intended to be submitted to Command and Army Head-Quarters.

XI.—TELEGRAMS AND HELIOGRAMS.

Every telegram and heliogram must contain, *in the body of the message*, the place from which it emanates and the date. If it is repeated to persons other than the addressee, this fact must be stated at the end of the message, *e. g.* 180 B. Miramshah, 30th June. X X X Addressed to General Officer Commanding 1st Brigade, repeated to General Officer Commanding 2nd Brigade, and Officer Commanding Bannu.

The following only are authorised to send "clear the line" messages *in the field* :—

The General Officer Commanding the Force or Assistant Adjutant General; Assistant Quarter Master General, and Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence, on his behalf. General Officers Commanding Brigades, and Chief Commissariat and Divisional Transport Officers on matters connected with occurrences of great and urgent importance within the zone of their authority. This power should be used as little as possible. The telegraph should never be used where visual signalling is established and will suffice.

XII.—LEAVING CAMP.

No one is to leave camp singly or unarmed. Officers proceeding more than one mile from camp or leaving the road are invariably to be accompanied by an escort armed with rifles and of such strength as may be considered necessary by the officer commanding the camp or post, or, if moving along the road, by a cavalry escort.

XIII.—CHARGERS.

Officers should register their chargers with the staff officers of their respective brigades, showing date of purchase, age, when bought, price paid, height and colour.

XIV.—TRANSPORT.

Transport lines at all posts must be protected by a substantial fence or stone wall as may be locally most convenient and officers commanding posts will see that the animals are securely guarded.

All transport, except obligatory mules with corps and hospitals, should be handed over to the transport officer at the post immediately on their arrival, and a report made of what transport remains in hand with the corps or individuals. Unless this is done, transport cannot be fully employed in bringing up supplies.

All casualties are to be reported, immediately they occur, to the brigade or other transport officer to which the transport belongs, or from which it has been received. The reports from detached parties must be in writing, and give a short account of the occurrence.

Officers will be held responsible for any casualties occurring among the transport animals in their charge which are not immediately reported at the time.

Medical officers in charge of hospitals are reminded that riding ponies form part of the ambulance, and that these should be included in their daily states under a separate heading and all casualties among them reported to the brigade or other transport officer.

It behoves officers to see that fatigue parties are given, whenever required, for tying up and putting on loads; that loads are tied up and put on properly; that the animals are not overloaded; and that no sick or galled animals are ever used on any pretence.

It is the duty of the troops to tie up all loads, to put them on the animals, to attend to them on the march, and to unload at the end of the march. The drivers have all they can do to look after, water and feed their animals and themselves.

Great care is to be taken that transport animals are not loaded up unnecessarily early before marching off.

It is impressed on all ranks that one of the most important duties of rear and baggage guards is to readjust loads which may fall off, to see that the men and animals close up, and march with as broad a front as possible.

XV.—POSTAL.

(Para. 68, part VIII, field service manual.)

At stations where there is no field treasure-chest, commissariat officers are required to take over daily the cash collections of the local post-office, whether such money is required by the Commissariat Department or not. At places where there is no commissariat establishment the officer commanding will take over the postal collections and arrange for their safe custody and despatch to the nearest field treasure chest.

All corps passing to the front should communicate with the postmaster of the base post-office, giving the names of all officers with them and instructions as to the disposal of their mails. The officers of the several departments should also furnish this information regarding themselves, and subsequent movements of individuals should be communicated. The base post-office is located in the cutcherry compound at Edwardesabad.

XVI.—INTELLIGENCE.

When a field intelligence officer accompanies a reconnaissance, he will furnish the sketch and report, which will then not be required from the officer commanding reconnaissance. Information gathered will be sent to the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence at divisional head-quarters through the officer commanding the advanced brigade unless the General Officer Commanding the Force is with this brigade in which case it will be sent direct to

divisional head-quarters. If no field Intelligence officer accompanies a reconnaissance, the officer commanding the party will be responsible for the sketch and report.

The 2-inch scale will be used as a rule for routes and the 6-inch scale for ground, positions, etc.

All field intelligence sketching should, if time permits, be finished in pen and ink; but the submission of an important report should on no account be delayed for the elaboration of the sketch. No colours should be used, nor are hills to be stumped in, as this destroys the practical value of a sketch by preventing its reproduction. Sketches, etc., will invariably be submitted through the officer ordering the execution of the work, to the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, divisional head-quarters, for final disposal. Officers are invited to assist in the collection of information and any person may, when time can be saved thereby, communicate direct to the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence information of an important nature which has come to his personal notice, such report being nevertheless made to his commanding officer as well.

Commanding officers will keep a list of the names of men in their corps who are capable of giving or obtaining information regarding the country in which the troops are moving.

The field intelligence officer will have free and preferential use of all the means of obtaining and circulating information in use in the field, whether by signalling, telegraph, orderlies or cavalry, post relays, etc. All messages marked "Intelligence" will have precedence.

XVII.—PRESS CORRESPONDENTS.

No person will be allowed to correspond with the press unless permission has been received from Army Head-Quarters for him to do so.

The rules regarding newspaper correspondents may be seen at the office of the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence.

APPENDIX VI.

Extracts from the Report on the working of the Intelligence Department of the Tochi Field Force, by Major G. V. Kemball, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence.

3. All political correspondence, in accordance with the orders of the Major-General Commanding, passed through and was recorded in the intelligence office, the incoming papers and the drafts of outgoing correspondence being deposited in the office of the chief political officer of the force.

4. The following was the procedure with regard to survey operations.

The survey officer was required to send in proposals *in writing* to the D. A. Q. M. G. for Intelligence, if possible twenty-four hours in advance, of the work he proposed to execute. These proposals had to show the number of parties going out, the hour at which they should start, the limits within which they would work and the proposed division of the permanent survey escort between them. The D. A. Q. M. G., Intelligence (after consulting the chief political officer, A. Q. M. G., etc., if necessary), obtained the orders of the General Officer Commanding, regarding strength of escorts, etc., and communicated the same to the General Officer Commanding the brigade supplying the escort.

Subject to the provisions of paragraph IX of the standing * orders of the force, the survey officer was held responsible that his parties did not go beyond the limits assigned and that they returned to camp by the specified hour. He was also required to report daily at that hour either personally or in writing to the D. A. A. G. of the brigade supplying the escort whether all his parties were in or not.

5. With regard to the collection of information; this duty was performed principally by the field intelligence officer, or by the D. A. Q. M. G. when he could be spared from the office at head-quarters.

No opportunity was found for the employment of military intelligencers (soldiers).

For gazetteering some knowledge of the local vernacular is practically indispensable as well as some previous training in the work, if satisfactory results are to be obtained, and officers are with difficulty to be spared from their regiments on service. Great difficulty was experienced in finding suitable officers who could be spared to assist in intelligence work.

6. With regard to the publication of information, news was furnished to the force, from the intelligence office, by means of daily communications reproduced by means of the acme duplicator and posted to officers commanding posts, General Officers commanding brigades, the base commandant, etc. These communications contained not only news from the Tochi, but also telegrams of interest regarding events on other parts of the frontier. Latterly many telegrams of interest have been repeated by wire instead of by letter. Orders were issued that all communications were to be posted up in all camps in conspicuous positions where they could be read by all ranks. In standing camps notice-boards were provided; in others, the communications were usually affixed to the post-office tent.

* *Vide* appendix V.

APPENDIX VII.

Extracts from the Report on Engineer operations of Tochi Field Force by Major T. Digby, R.E., Commanding R. E., Tochi Field Force.

On arrival at Bannu, 30th June 1897, I assumed charge of the duties of Commanding Royal Engineer on the staff of the General Officer Commanding the Tochi Field Force and commenced to arrange for the supply of tools, stores and explosives likely to be required during the expedition, to supplement a small field park which had been despatched from Rurki.

3. On July 1st, Captain Schreiber, R. E., proceeded with the advanced guard of the 1st Brigade to inspect the military posts on the line of communications, and make proposals for improving their defences; at the same time arrangements were made with the Public Works Department for the supply of labour required for the improvement of water-supplies, and construction of minor buildings for the increased garrisons of the posts.

4. The existing track from Bannu to Datta Khel required immediate improvement to facilitate transport, and instructions were therefore given to Major Chesney, R.E., the Executive Engineer of the Tochi division, to execute all necessary work. In the meanwhile the Punjab Government were requested by wire to sanction a preliminary expenditure of Rs. 10,000 on the new cart-road to Miramshah, which coincides with the old track for a considerable distance.

5. The minor improvements required in the defences of Saiadgi were left in the hands of the Public Works Department and on the 10th July the sappers marched to Idak, where I employed them for two days in making the camp defensible. Passing through Miramshah post, which had been improved by infantry working parties, the sappers halted at Boia and strengthened it sufficiently in three days.

6. On the 13th July, I inspected the temporary trestle bridge at Boia which had been recently erected and almost immediately breached by heavy floods. The Tochi river at Boia is about 700 feet wide with a fall of one in seventy: floods due to sudden rainfall in the neighbouring hills come down with great rapidity, and the stream rushes like a mountain torrent over a bed of boulders resting in alluvial deposit. The main stream constantly changes its path, cutting a new channel through the soft bed, and no reliance can be placed on what would ordinarily appear firm foundations. There was no more suitable site for a bridge within reasonable distance.







Taking into consideration the nature of the river-bed and the velocity and height of floods, which were reported to exceed 10 feet per second and 6 feet rise above ordinary level in twelve hours, I decided that no temporary bridge of available materials would be suitable. The floods are usually temporary, and as the Commissariat Department guaranteed to keep up a reserve of 15 days' supplies at Boia and twenty days' supplies at Datta Khel for all advanced troops, it was considered that a bridge at Boia was unnecessary for the purpose of the expedition, although most desirable in connection with the proposed new cart-road. The soundness of this view is demonstrated by the fact that no interruption to traffic has since been caused by floods at Boia.

8. Satisfactory arrangements for water-supply had already been made at the posts on the line of communications. At Datta Khel an excellent spring, yielding sufficient drinking and cooking water for the camp, was discovered in the hills east of the post, and collected in a masonry reservoir. But great difficulty was experienced in obtaining a suitable water-supply at Sheranni. Trial wells were sunk in nalas around the camp to over 60 feet depth, but no water was obtained. Springs were found, one in the hills south-east, three miles distant, one on the road to Maizar one and a half miles distant, and one on the right bank of the river, half a mile west of Sheranni; but in the first case the labour of carriage, and in the others the small supply, put their use out of question. Eventually it was found necessary to sink wells on the river bank and to depend on filtration; and observation of these wells established that their supply depended on the river and was not drawn from inland. Although clear drinking water was thus procured, substances in solution in the Tochi stream could not be eliminated.

Taken from "Report on Engineer Operations, Tochi Field Force, 1897."

Yards 30 0 250 500 750 1000 1250 Yards.



<i>Made roads</i>	
<i>Water</i>	
<i>Cemetery</i>	
<i>Village</i>	
<i>Cultivation</i>	
<i>Defences</i>	

A. A. CROOKSHANK, *Lieut.,*
2nd Bengal Sappers & M.,
Tochi Field Force.

No. 1,452-I, 98.

I. B., Topo. Dy. No. 2,325.
Exd. C. J. A., July 1898.

SHERANNI TOCHI VALLEY,
October 24th, 1897.

9. On the 8th of August, the road from Sheranni to Datta Khel was commenced by strong infantry working parties under Captain Schreiber, R.E. The existing track was widened and improved, and diverted where the gradient exceeded one in ten. This road was completed for four miles from Sheranni before the end of the month. The track over the Spinchilla pass, between Boia and Datta Khel, was converted to a good camel-road and completed during the same month.

11. On the 19th August, I reconnoitred the Shrawane Narai, with a view to the construction of a road leading to Ismail Khel in the Kazha valley. A road passable by mule transport was completed by the sappers in three days.

12. On the 2nd September, I accompanied a column which camped at Landi Khel, three miles west of Maizar, and arranged for the construction of a mule-road on the right bank of the Tochi between Landi Khel and Dotoi.

23. The Tochi expedition has not been fertile in opportunities for extending engineering experience, but possibly some of the few minor suggestions I propose to make may be worthy of consideration :—

- (i) Small temporary posts on the line of communications are usually commenced by troops encamping on the line, and strengthened as opportunity occurs. They are frequently irregular in shape, as additions are made from time to time to provide for previously unforeseen requirements, and they are often flanked by small towers, the defenders of which must inevitably fire into each other in case of sudden attack. I suggest the addition to Field Service Manual, Part XI, of another type of temporary post, showing a main post properly flanked, with the men's tents placed along the defensive perimeter, so that they can fall in at once on alarm posts, the interior space being reserved for cavalry, artillery, hospital, and commissariat.

As such temporary posts on a line of communications are likely to be permanent for many months, sufficient space should in the first place be included for post and telegraph offices and other departmental requirements, including Civil and Public Works Departments enclosures.

If owing to such considerations the perimeter is greater than can be manned by the garrison at regulation intervals, the flanking defences may be strengthened, and the troops distributed in groups along the parapet instead of at fixed intervals.

In a long line of communications held by small posts at intervals of 10 to 15 miles, it will probably be necessary to provide at each, accommodation for a very considerable transport establishment. The troops required for the duties and defence of each post are usually quite inadequate to protect a large transport enclosure if (as frequently occurs) it is attempted to man its walls in the same way as those of the main post. It is therefore suggested that the transport should be in a hornwork outside the main post, provided with ditch and walls calculated to prevent a sudden rush, and flanked by a strong raised piquet at its salient, and by the main work.

- (ii) A better class of mules is required for the first line of equipment of a sapper company. On many occasions, especially when roads are prepared for an advancing force, they have to traverse the worst ground, and I am strongly of opinion that a class of animal more of the quality of mountain battery mules is urgently needed. This improvement would add considerably to a company's mobility.
- (iii) It has been noticed that the fuze supplied by the Ordnance Department was of variable quality and in some cases bad. This may be due to climate, but it should be possible to supply an article less sensitive to heat and elevation.

The helms supplied for pick axes were also of an inferior description.

- (iv) After the field park arrived at Sheranni, I issued picks and shovels to each regiment of the 1st Brigade to be retained during the expedition, as their light entrenching tools were unsuitable for road work. The heavier tools would be as useful for entrenching purposes as the authorised supply, and it is a question if it would not be advantageous to substitute the heavier for the lighter tools on the frontier.
- (v) It is suggested that each sapper company should be provided with a portable electric lighting apparatus, which could probably be carried on two or three mules ; or one such apparatus might be supplied to a field park.

24. Before closing this report it may be well to give a brief sketch of the progress of work in the Tochi Executive Division of the Public Works Department :

Cart-road : Section Bannu to Saiadgi.—The steep gradients between Baran Nala and Saiadgi have been cut down, and the cart-road has been worked into the existing road at these points, so that no interruption will be occasioned to traffic. The culverts are not yet constructed. A diversion has been made between Islam Chowki and the Mirian-Bannu road, so that the existing road between Bannu and Baran Nala, which is part of the new cart-road, may be closed, raised, and metalled, without interruption to traffic.

Saiadgi-Khajuri-Idak Section.—Work has principally been concentrated on the heavy rock cutting at Ghalakot, which will shortly be completed. The earthwork of this section is well advanced ; from Khajuri to Idak the road is in good order.

Idak-Miramshah Section.—About one mile of earthwork completed near Miramshah, and considerable progress made at Isha Kotal.

Miramshah-Boia Section.—The survey and sanctioning have just been completed, and work will commence at once.

Boia-Datta Khel Section.—Parties are engaged on heavy rock cutting above the river, and considerable progress has been made with earthwork.

APPENDIX VIII.

Extracts from the Report of the Signalling Operations of the Tochi Field Force, 1897, by Captain G. W. Rawlins, 12th Bengal Cavalry, Superintendent, Army Signalling.

Personnel.—In this expedition the whole of the signalling has been carried out by the signallers of the regiments composing the force, the equipment being freely supplemented from the field ordnance depôt. Lieutenant McCandlish, 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and Lieutenant Bell, 3rd Rifle Brigade, were appointed Assistant Superintendents of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, respectively, and the regimental signallers of all the regiments of the force, as per margin, were placed at my disposal.

	Brigade Signallers.
2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders	12
3rd Rifle Brigade	12
1st Punjab Infantry	6
1st Sikh Infantry	6
6th Bengal Light Infantry	6
14th Sikhs	6
25th Punjab Infantry	12
33rd Punjab Infantry	6
Total	66

Office.—The office with which I was supplied did not arrive at Datta Khel until the beginning of September. In addition to Army books 125 and 127, two bulky company acquittance roll ledgers were sent. These latter appear to me to be unnecessary, as no regimental accounts pass through the Superintendent's hands, except working pay, which is drawn and adjusted regimentally. The two memorandum books were wrongly inscribed; likewise a rubber-stamp inscribed Assistant Superintendent, Army Signalling, 3rd Division. A large bundle of field passes on vellum might also have been dispensed with.

Work done.—The field telegraph had long been opened to Datta Khel; henceforward all the real signalling work was done onwards from that place. The work now, between Sheranni and Datta Khel was heavy and regular, but we had plenty of men for it, as well as for the reconnaissances which went out very frequently. Lamps were at work until midnight unless otherwise ordered, and an all-night watch was kept up between Sheranni and Datta Khel.

Two things interfered grievously with our work during the latter part of July and first-half of August. A heavy bank of clouds rose with clockwork regularity from the south; and by 3 P.M. (generally our busiest time) the sun was completely obscured, forcing us to take to the big flag—a slow and laborious process; secondly, the atmosphere of the valley became so hazy at night, that it was only with the greatest difficulty we could read a B B lamp, although the distance from Datta Khel in a direct line could not have been more than six miles. We had brand new lamps and the best oil. On 20th August, two C C lamps arrived and very welcome they were. I regret to say, however, they were not particularly good ones: one arrived with its glass plates broken; they were not of the latest pattern, and their springs and levers were continually going wrong. With the help of regimental armourers and mistris, they were brought to the scratch every evening, and at any rate we could read them.

The monthly numbers on the Sheranni and Datta Khel files for August, September, and October are irrespective of all columns and reconnaissances.

	August.	September.	October.
Datta Khel	1,987	2,097	1,291
Sheranni	1,104	940	1,089

On 12th October, the column crossed over the Khina Narai and dropped down into the Khina valley, a deep, gloomy ravine bounded on each side with thickly-wooded precipitous *khuds*, from two to three thousand feet high. By ascending the northern one, we got into communication with a party on Shatgalai Narai, previously arranged for.

APPENDIX IX.

Extract from the Report on the working of the Army Veterinary Department with the Tochi Field Force, 1897-98.

3. *Transport mules.*—A large number of mules reached the base in poor condition and galled; many of them had to be admitted under treatment on arrival for the latter cause, and struck off duty for rest for the former. Some galls were of the nature of old standing sitfasts and should not have been sent on service, but others were recent and undoubtedly the result of improperly fitting saddles and the long hot march from Khushalgarh; to which in my opinion may also be ascribed a large number of the out-of-condition cases. In the course of a month or so under judicious treatment, rest, and extra diet nearly all these animals were fit for duty. Very little constitutional disease occurred amongst the mules, the chief causes of inefficiency being, as is usual on service, galls of a more or less serious nature; some cases of lameness occurred from the soles of the feet wearing thin owing to the stony nature of the ground marched over; such cases were shod up when shoes were procurable and generally resumed duty in a few days. On the whole the mule transport may be considered highly satisfactory. I would, however, suggest that when saddles are newly stuffed or new saddles issued to animals before proceeding on service, they should be most carefully fitted; animals affected with sitfasts (called by the saltries and drivers "tikri") should not be sent, and if possible, nothing under five years old.

4. *Army Transport bullocks.*—Bullocks were used in the cart train which worked between Bannu and Saiadgi, the first post on the line of communications. Foot-and-mouth disease broke out amongst them but fortunately of a mild type; and when I left the force it had nearly died out. Owing to the intense heat and the work they were called on to perform, a good many, especially amongst the younger animals, fell off in condition. An increase of ration and rest, partial or whole, in most cases proved sufficient to render them fit for duty. Some cases of Tympanitis occurred, but constitutional disease otherwise was rare. Galls and injuries were the chief causes of inefficiency.

5. *Camels.*—A large number of camels were attached to the force. These were of two classes—Government which were the property of the State, and animals hired for the expedition only.

(a) *Government camels.*—The Government camels were not satisfactory. Many lost condition rapidly and many were always on the sick list. They were chiefly stationed at Boia and received extra care and attention. I consider they proved unsatisfactory chiefly from the following causes :—

- (1) A certain number were too leggy and narrow and should never have been purchased.
- (2) The sarwans, as a rule, were ignorant of their work, incorrigibly lazy, and neglected their animals whenever they were not under strict European supervision.
- (3) For some time the browsing they got at Boia was insufficient, and though this was remedied later on by sending the animals further out, yet, meantime, many fell off in condition and with difficulty were brought round again.
- (4) The heat and damp during July and August were great and this told against them.
- (5) Many were affected with hydatid cysts in the lungs and succumbed rapidly when attacked by ordinary ailments.

Although no doubt the above causes, especially No. 2, were accountable for a considerable amount of inefficiency, still I am not satisfied that many of the cases of sickness which terminated fatally were the result of natural disease. The symptoms were often obscure, deaths sudden, and *post-mortems* unsatisfactory, showing gastric and intestinal irritation, and occasionally congestion of the liver, but the lesions were often not sufficient to produce fatal results. It is possible of course that some plant on the browsing ground was poisonous and that the camels being new to the country ate it.

(b) *Hired camels*.—The hired camels may be considered on the whole to have done well, at most of the posts they kept their condition fairly, there were not many severe galls and the sick list was not heavy. Severe galls, injuries, and debility cases, not likely to recover in a short time, were discharged. Taking them all round they were as good and serviceable a lot of camels as I have ever seen in the field.

8. *Cavalry*.—The squadrons of the 1st (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Punjab Cavalry which were distributed up and down the line, had extremely hard work. They were continually employed in escort and convoy, and the horses got but little rest. As a result many were poor. Extra food and partial rest for the worst cases did much towards improving their condition, but many remained very thin. Owing to the bad and stony nature of the ground over which they often had to move at speed, many were beginning to show decided marks of work. They were shod with very broad webbed shoes which gave considerable cover to the soles, and hence in spite of the stony nature of the ground they had far less bruised feet than might have been expected. These shoes I recommended to the regiment when with them in 1894-95, and was glad to find that the result of their adoption answered my expectations.

13. *Camel browsing*.—At nearly all the posts, from Bannu to Sheranni good camel browsing was obtainable. The following were the commonest camel fodders that came under my observation:—

Zizyphus nummularia (Ber), *Alhagi maurorum* (Jowassa), *Suaeda nodiflora* and other varieties of "*lāna*," *Carlina corymbosa*, a yellow thistle, *Salvadora oleoides* (Pilu), *Olea cuspidata* (Kao), *Quercus ilex* (Holly-oak), *Sageretia brandrethina* (Mamana) *Caragana brevispina* (Azgai), *Acacia modesta* (Palosi), and *Reptonia buxifolia* (Gurgura).

14. *Water*.—The water, as far as the animals were concerned, seemed to have no ill effects, though they drank from the Tochi river, which bore the evil reputation of causing acute diarrhoea and dysentery amongst men. When the river was in flood the water was much discoloured and the mules in many instances refused to drink it. Veterinary-Lieutenant Hunt, at Sheranni, had trenches dug covered with tarpaulins; into these extemporized troughs the water was poured and the dirt allowed to settle; the mules drank then fairly well.

15. *Disease, glanders*.—One case of glanders occurred amongst the horses of the detachment, 1st Punjab Cavalry, at Idak on July 13th. The usual measures to check the further progress of the disease were adopted and up to September 19th when I left the force, no further cases occurred. The Principal Veterinary Officer sent me some "*mallein*," but I was unable to use it, as the Officer Commanding the regiment feared that in case of a horse being destroyed for reacting to the test, compensation for his loss would not be paid by Government.

16. *Foot-and-mouth disease*.—As already mentioned, an outbreak of this malady occurred amongst the bullocks working the cart train from Bannu to Saiadgi. An outbreak also occurred amongst the slaughter cattle at Datta Khel; under a combined system of segregation, treatment and destruction, we were able to stamp out the disease.

17. *Skin disease*.—A number of cases of skin disease occurred amongst camels, chiefly at Miramshah and Boia. Neither Veterinary-Lieutenant Harris, nor myself could detect any parasite, and the symptoms differed from those shown in true scabies. To guard against possible contagion affected animals were segregated and treated with Tara Mira oil.

Remarks by the Principal Veterinary Officer in India, dated the 11th February, 1898.

The work was arduous and continuous and necessitated very great and incessant care and foresight to prevent the introduction and spread of contagious diseases among the animals of the force; and, when such diseases did occur, to promptly stamp them out. It was fortunate that only one case of "*glanders*" occurred among the horses of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. On the matter being reported to me, I at once despatched

sufficient " mallein " to inoculate 10 horses with a view to the immediate detection and suppression of the disease, but owing to the scruples of the Officer Commanding and his fear that horses destroyed, for reacting to the agent, would not be considered as " glandered " and so compensation be withheld, no inoculations were carried out. Very fortunately, up to the present, no other case has occurred. Had the contrary been the case, it would probably have resulted in very serious loss to Government and might have considerably hampered the operations. I hope that the serious nature of glanders-farcy and the imperative necessity for its prompt suppression will in future be better understood, and inoculation with " mallein " welcomed rather than opposed. Healthy horses rarely, if ever, react to this agent, when the operation is properly performed, whereas those affected immediately do so, and in this way it is of immense assistance in the suppression of such a virulent and dangerous disease as glanders-farcy.

APPENDIX X.

Extracts from the Report on the Working of the Medical Department by SURGEON-COLONEL R. H. CAREW, Principal Medical Officer, Tochi Field Force.

The following changes are, I consider, advisable:—

The establishment of the British Field Hospital, although sufficient when all sections are together, is not sufficient when sections are detached and there is no reserve to fall back on in case of sickness. There should be five Medical officers to each field hospital, one to each section, and one in reserve, to be available in case of sickness, and also to go out with small columns and reconnaissances when it is not necessary to detach a whole section. Cooks and water-carriers should be increased to eight; ward sweepers to twelve. I found the present establishment to be insufficient and without any allowance for sickness.

The equipment is sufficient for ordinary purposes, but as the number of sick treated is liable to exceed the number equipped for, two extra tents for each field hospital are required. There is no provision of tents for followers, kahars and mule drivers; this I consider very essential.

Field tongas proved suitable as ambulance transport where the roads are fairly good; useless on hill-roads and riverbed. Dandies proved suitable for bad roads and for carrying serious cases. The present pattern answers very well.

Owing to the long line of communication and the large number of sick required to be carried, the work of the bearers was very heavy; a very large number broke down under the strain and had to be invalided. The men sent to replace them were simple coolies, knew nothing of their work, and proved absolutely useless. It is absolutely necessary that a reserve of men trained to and hardened to the work should be kept.

Riding mules proved most useful and suitable: a new pattern saddle was under trial and proved a great improvement on the old. Ponies proved not strong enough to carry a heavy man.

Separate carriage should be provided for the line gear, jhools, etc. It makes the weight to be carried excessive, besides making the seat uncomfortable to the patient.

Two camel cacolets were under trial and did not prove a success: they are too light and springy and very uncomfortable. Camel kajawas proved very useful for cases unable to ride, but not sick enough to require a dandy. Those in use were of a very primitive pattern, clumsy and roughly made; they could easily be improved on.

March to the base.

The long march from Khushalgarh to Bannu, 110 miles, although not strictly part of the expedition, must be considered from a medical point of view, as there is not a doubt that to its effects a great part of the sickness among the troops may be attributed. The march was very trying especially to British troops. The heat was excessive, the country a desert, water scarce and bad, and the daily marches long. Everything possible was done for the safety and comfort of the men: rest-camps of E. P. tents were pitched, all marching was done at night, and ice was provided at each halting-place. Each British regiment was accompanied by two sections, British field hospital, with full ambulance transport. Both British regiments suffered severely, especially the Highlanders who lost two men from sunstroke, and also a large number of cases of heat fever.

Climate.

The climate of the Tochi is very trying, excessive heat in summer and great cold with biting winds in winter, with a large diurnal range of temperature averaging 30 degrees between day and night; as the valley lies outside the monsoon zone, there is no regular rainy season, but thunderstorms with heavy rain occur in July, August, and about Christmas. In the early part of July when the troops were marching from Khushalgarh the heat was very great; from the 1st to the 8th, taken in a double-fly Kabul tent, the maximum averaged 112.4°, and it twice

reached 116°; the minimum averaged 83°; diurnal range 29. At Sheranni during August the average maximum was 91·6°; and minimum 63·6°; the hottest day was the 4th, when the thermometer reached 105°. The average reading for the next three months was—

				Maximum.	Minimum.
September	89·1°	56·5°
October	82°	49°
November	78°	37°

The prevailing wind was from the east up to the beginning of September, when it usually was west up to noon, changing to east in the afternoon. Up to the end of October it was hot and dry, in November and December cold and biting. At and above Miramshah there is hard frost during the winter and snow lies at Datta Khel.

Health and disease with the probable cause.

At first the British troops appeared to enjoy good health, but after a short time the effects of the very trying march from Khushalgarh to Sheranni began to tell. No doubt the constitutions of the men had suffered, and when they were exposed to the unhealthy climatic conditions of the upper Tochi valley they were more disposed to contract disease and often had less recuperative power than healthy men. As might be expected in a large camp where a large number of men and animals were confined within a limited space disease began to appear. At first ague entirely of climatic origin, next mild diarrhoea and dysentery, increasing in severity and eventually becoming epidemic and very severe.

The exciting cause at Sheranni was no doubt the water. The only available source of supply was the Tochi river: this, in addition to containing a large quantity of salts in solution, chiefly sulphate of soda, contained a large amount of earthy matter in suspension, also a considerable amount of vegetable matter, due to the extensive irrigation in the upper valleys. This was always worse when the river was in flood, even when clear minute particles of mica were observable. Irritation of the bowels was set up and diarrhoea appeared, frequently developing into dysentery. Malaria, although not actually the exciting cause, was present in almost every case, and in many it was almost impossible to say which was the primary disease. Early in September the epidemic form of diarrhoea and dysentery ceased, and ague became very prevalent, also remittent fever of a very severe type, and continued until the cold weather set in. At the other stations down the line the same diseases prevailed, but of a milder type, which I attribute to the water-supply being obtained from springs and free from suspended matter.

There was a marked and unaccountable difference in the two British regiments. Their camps were within a few hundred yards of each other, their conditions of life were exactly similar; but, although the number of admissions in both regiments was much the same, and for the same diseases, the type of disease was very different. In the Highlanders disease ran an ordinary course, was amenable to treatment and the majority recovered: in the Rifles a very low form prevailed, and once a man took sick, he hardly ever was fit for duty again; they were utterly wanting in recuperative power. Thinking their camping-ground or water-supply might have had something to say to it, they were moved to a fresh camp on higher ground, and after a short time to a new camp near Maizar, 3 miles from Sheranni. There was no improvement and they were moved down to Miramshah. Here for a short time they improved, but it was only temporary. They were moved down to Bannu and left the valley for India on the 30th October completely broken down. The Highlanders improved rapidly and in the cold weather were very fit and well. I can only attribute the difference to the superior physique of the Highlanders.

Enteric fever was never epidemic and it was impossible to trace the disease to any particular source. The total number of cases was small, not nearly so many as occur in any Indian cantonment. The first cases in the opinion of the Medical Officer in charge of the field hospital were contracted in India or on

the march to Bannu. The latter cases were undoubtedly of local origin ; what the cause was it is impossible to say. The very insanitary condition of the fields round the villages where every irrigation channel was used as a latrine and the water from which eventually entered the Tochi river, may possibly have been the exciting cause. In this disease as in others and for the same reasons the Rifle Brigade suffered more than the Highlanders.

With the exception of a few cases contracted at Bannu, venereal disease was unknown. As might be expected there were at first a few relapses from disease contracted in India, and a few cases of secondary disease. The very small number shows that the medical examination before leaving India was carefully carried out.

The same diseases and from similar causes prevailed among the Native troops, although in a milder form. Their health was fairly good with the exception of the 6th Bengal Light Infantry and 25th Bengal Infantry ; the former broke down completely, and the 25th were but little better, almost entirely due to ague. The 6th were quartered at Miramshah, which I consider the healthiest post on the line, and I can only account for their collapse to their being Jats and to the want of their customary food, *i.e.*, milk and fresh vegetables. They could not assimilate the ordinary rations, and not being accustomed to meat, its issue as diet was productive of more harm than good ; even when given in hospital, it acted as a purgative. I cannot but consider that this class of man is utterly unsuited to service in a country where only the ordinary field rations are available. In the case of the 25th Bengal Infantry constant daily convoy duty along the bed of the river may have been the exciting cause. In both regiments the men from being strong and in good condition became weak, anæmic, and emaciated and fell easy victims to malaria.

The followers were wonderfully healthy considering their hard work and exposure, until the cold weather set in, when pneumonia and other chest affections were prevalent.

The rations were very good, especially the bread and mutton. Fresh vegetables, except onions it was almost impossible to procure in any quantity. Preserved potatoes and compressed vegetables were issued. The men do not care for them ; in fact they are wasted ; and unless some better manner of preserving them is invented, I consider they are almost useless as an article of diet. At most of the posts fowls, eggs and fresh milk could be bought, although the price was exorbitant. Fresh onions were issued as an extra three times a week. Extra meat and *gur* to non-meat-eaters were always issued after hard work, and rum was issued on special occasions.

The hospital comforts were excellent and the supply was always ample. Brands' essence of mutton and chicken were found most useful and palatable. The preserved milk was very good and many sick preferred it to fresh. The wines and spirits were generally good ; a better class of port wine is desirable, that supplied is sweet, heavy and not palatable to a sick man. It would be a great improvement if there was an uniform brand for all kinds of liquor.

Clothing was suitable to the climate and season, but I do not consider the dress of the Highlanders suitable for active service especially in hot weather. The kilt is very heavy, soon becomes saturated with perspiration, is very warm over the stomach, in fact acts as a thick kamarband. When the men get back to camp, they naturally take it off and frequently change into thin khaki, and if it is hot generally neglect to put on their flannel belts : to this no doubt many cases of sickness are due. In the majority of frontier wars the principal part of the sick carriage must be riding mules : it is obvious that such a dress must be most uncomfortable.

Sick transport.

The transport consisted of ambulance tongas, dandies, riding mules and ponies and camel kajawas. The tongas could only be used between Saiadgi and Bannu over a fairly good road. Dandies, as the country was easy and the roads good, proved suitable for serious cases ; the pattern in use did very well.

60. The men first sent up as bearers were of a good class and did excellent work, but owing to the long line of communications and the large number of sick to be carried, their work was very heavy; a large number broke down and had to be invalided. The men sent to relieve them were simply coolies: knew nothing of their work and proved absolutely useless.

The mules were very good and proved most useful. The ponies were very inferior, and quite unable to carry a heavy man.

The camel kajawas used belonged to the frontier regiments, were heavy and clumsily built, still they proved a most useful mode of carriage for cases not able to ride, but not bad enough require a dandy. They are especially useful for natives.

Two pairs of Egyptian camel cacolets were sent for trial. They were not a success; they were too large, too lightly built, and the shaking was so great, even a healthy man could not endure it.

Sick convoys.

Convoys were arranged on the staging system. Each post was provided with carriage for 10 dandy cases and 30 riding cases, the convoys leaving Sheranni three times a week. This worked very well in the early part of the expedition: latterly when sickness increased it was found necessary to send large convoys right through, the transport being provided from the field hospitals.

Remarks by the Principal Medical Officer, Her Majesty's Forces in India.

2. The following table illustrates the amount of sickness and mortality with the force:—

Detail.				British officers.	British troops.	Native troops.	Followers.
Average strength				145	709	5,165	3,902
Admissions	{	Number	...	124	1,921	4,539	2,458
		Per cent. to strength	...	86	271	88	63
		Per mille	Field	1,584	5,022	1,671	1,197
		Per annum	Cantonments	924	1,453	976	No data.
Deaths	{	Number	...	3	118	64	97
		Per cent. to strength	...	2.1	16.6	1.2	2.5
		Per mille	Field	38.3	308.5	23.6	47.3
		per annum	Cantonments	17.5	15.5	12.4	No data.

3. From the above it will be observed that British troops suffered about three times more than Native troops, and that followers were the healthiest; while the admission-rate in the field was for British officers and Native troops about twice as great as that in cantonments and for British troops more than three times greater. Further, that the death-rate for British troops was 14 times greater than that for Native troops, while it was 20 times greater in the field than in cantonments; and that for British officers and Native troops the death-rate in the field was twice as great as that in cantonments.

4. The principal diseases were enteric fever,* ague, dysentery, diarrhoea, remittent fever, heat apoplexy,* debility, mumps,† bronchitis,† pneumonia,† scurvy,†

* British troops.

† Native troops and followers.

and liver and spleen affections.†

5. The amount of sickness amongst the several corps raised considerably as will be seen from the following table:—

Corps.					Admissions.	Per cent. to strength.
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders	981	238
Rifle Brigade	863	372
No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery	89	33
1st Punjab Infantry	325	44
14th Sikhs	368	52
1st Punjab Cavalry	152	56
No. 2 Company Sappers and Miners	98	56
1st Sikhs	456	65
33rd Punjab Infantry	417	65
No. 6 Bombay Mountain Battery	196	74
25th Punjab Infantry	827	132
6th Bengal Infantry	1,569	257

6. The death ratio in the Rifle Brigade was very high, being 26 per cent. against 7 per cent. in the Highlanders. Amongst Native troops the 6th Bengal Infantry had the highest ratio being 23 per cent. on strength.

7. Amongst British troops the large number of admissions for ague was due to climatic causes, while bowel-complaints were due to the quality of the water which was highly charged with salts in solution. The cause of the marked difference in the two battalions was due to the physique of the Highlanders being superior to that of the Rifle Brigade.

8. There were 70 admissions for enteric fever, 32 of whom died. Originally the disease was imported from Bannu, but latterly it was due to local origin, water being the exciting cause. The fields, where every irrigating channel was used as a latrine, the water from which entered the Tochi river, were in a very insanitary condition.

9. Venereal diseases gave 57 admissions; some of these were contracted at Bannu, while others were relapses or of a secondary type.

10. Amongst Native troops the same causes contributed to the sickness, but to a lesser degree. The 6th Bengal Infantry being composed of Jats were unable to procure their customary food of milk and vegetables, consequently the men suffered more than those of any other corps.

11. The rations were good, but preserved potatoes and compressed vegetables were disliked by the men and consequently were wasted.

APPENDIX XI.

Extracts from the report on the commissariat and transport arrangements of the Tochi Field Force, 1897-98, by Lieutenant-Colonel G. Wingate, Chief Commissariat Officer.

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27. *Distribution of supplies.*—The supplies were distributed as follows :

Thirty days' supplies coming from India, or in course of collection at Bannu by local purchase.

Thirty days' supplies kept at the base godowns at Bannu, from which the requirements of the stages and the advanced depôt at Datta Khel were met.

Twenty days' supplies kept in the advanced depôt for the garrison there, and all troops in front of it.

Ten days' supplies kept in the godown of the 1st Brigade, for the troops at Sheranni and beyond.

Fifteen days at each stage, for the garrison of that stage only.

(The scale prescribed at paragraph 281 of the field Commissariat code is impracticable).

Subsequently, in order to provide for an expected movement towards Kurram, 15 days' supplies for two brigades were collected and maintained at Miramshah during a period of three months.

Great pains were taken to ensure the rapid turn over of the above collection of supplies, by which losses in store from deterioration, etc., were reduced to the lowest possible dimensions.

46. *Fresh vegetables.*—Nearly half the supply of onions was purchased in Waziristan. This was fortunate because loss on onions carried up from the base was so heavy, and it was essential for the health of the troops and followers to make a frequent issue of fresh vegetables. The Bannu market for potatoes in an ordinary year is supplied from Khost and Tirah ; but owing to the North-West Frontier disturbances this source of supply failed, with a result that potatoes were procured with the greatest difficulty, the price never falling lower than Rs. 7 per maund. A good way of packing potatoes is an inner covering of good *chattai* matting with an outer strong *gunny* bag, or potatoes and onions should be packed in country-made baskets.

A supply of *dhail*, *mulka mussoor*, was also arranged for from India as a substitute for vegetable rations of British troops.

47. *Compressed vegetables and preserved potatoes.*—The compressed vegetables prepared in Germany and supplied through India Office were scarcely ever consumed, and it seems quite useless keeping this article of ration in stock. Even when drawn they were generally thrown away. The same may be said about the preserved potatoes.

49. *Fresh meat.*—About 1,000 cattle and 400 sheep were obtained from India; while 126 cattle and 1,076 sheep and 886 goats were purchased at the base. The rest of the supply was arranged for by purchases in the field, assisted on a few occasions by captures of cattle, sheep, and goats from the enemy. Waziristan was quite capable of providing all the live stock required by the field force, but it was not considered expedient by the political officers to requisition the local tribesmen to a greater extent than was done. The average outturn was as follows :—

Slaughter cattle—125 lb. live weight.

Slaughter sheep—33 lb. "

Goats —58 lb. "

50. *Firewood.*—Owing to the scarcity of forest-growth in Waziristan, the troops and followers at many of the camps had to be supplied with firewood by the Commissariat, and later on during the winter months firewood had to be issued to provide fires for hospitals and guards, etc.

53. *Fodder*.—The provision of fodder in Waziristan was a matter of anxiety throughout the expedition, notwithstanding that no pains were spared to procure all the *bhusa* and grass that could be obtained, the offered for rates which were extremely favourable to the villagers. About 53,000 maunds of *bhusa* and 31,000 maunds of grass were actually bought in Waziristan, and nearly 12,000 maunds of *bhusa* were taken from the captured villages. Small reserves of *bhusa* were maintained at most of the posts, neatly stacked in circular stacks of 100 maunds each, leaped over the top to exclude rain. No fires occurred and losses in these stacks were practically *nil*. Great importance should be attached to the careful preservation of loose dry fodder collected in the field. As a rule, it is thrown in a heap into which the rain pours, setting up fermentation and rot; and subsequent consumption of it by transport animals is most prejudicial to their health.

Fifty-five thousand maunds baled *bhusa* was imported from India and we could not have got on without it. The bales pressed at Amritsar, not being bound, used to swell with rain and became bad loads for pack transport, the *bhusa* also often becoming so rotten as to be unfit for fodder, whereas the bales that were received from cotton presses were bound with flat hoop iron and successfully resisted the worst weather. Having gone to the expense of compressing *bhusa* in hydraulic presses, it is a mistake to try and save the few annas that would provide the hoop iron binding, which will hold the bale together and preserve its contents undamaged under the severe conditions of field service.

54. *Grain*.—No grain for animals was imported from India. About 94,000 maunds Marwat gram (*chenna*) was purchased at the base, and about 13,000 maunds of barley was bought in Waziristan. The Marwat *chenna* is a small grain, but famous in the Derajat for excellence, and Waziristan barley, although rather too bearded, is a sound grain. Gram was sent up the line uncrushed. This was a great improvement; there were no losses from bags of crushed gram becoming a mass of mould through getting wet in transit.

65. *Hospitals*.—Ice for British and Native general hospitals at the base was sent by the Chief Commissariat Officer, Rawalpindi, at great expense, during the summer months; this supply was discontinued from 15th October. Owing to the abnormal increase of sickness, the expenditure of condensed milk, essence of mutton, extract of beef, brandy and port wine was more than usual. Fresh milk was procured with great difficulty; the supply gave most trouble at Miramshah, where the demand was the greatest, nearly 76,000 pints of fresh milk having been purchased from the villagers there. For pure milk 4 annas a pint had to be paid.

66. *Sanitary arrangements*.—Fifty conservancy bullocks were received from India and were distributed between Bannu and Datta Khel. They were a poor stamp of bullock and not at all up to dragging rubbish and filth carts in single yoke over stony ground. Several of the conservancy bullocks being unfit for their work were transferred to the butchery account and slaughtered. The large heavy rubbish and filth carts are unsuited for use on lines of communication on the frontier and were got up the lines with the greatest difficulty. Conservancy establishments were also provided for each camp. Of those that arrived from India nearly all deserted (about 160 sweepers, *bildars*, etc.), and the base Commissariat Officer had to arrange to procure others on special rates of pay. The whole subject of conservancy bullocks and establishments for the field is one that requires to be carefully gone into and placed on a more practical footing.

80. *Etappen system*.—I have much pleasure in attaching a very interesting report furnished by Captain H. James who was the divisional transport officer. While agreeing generally with his recommendations, I am fully of opinion that to the adoption of the *Etappen* system for forwarding stores on the line of communications is attributable a lower percentage of casualties among the camels, bullocks, and their attendants working on the line of communications, and a larger measure of comfort both to animals and men, than is possible when sleeping away from their own station. The *Etappen* system has greatly assisted the successful management of the drivers and their animals, by never allowing them to get away from their officers and non-commissioned officers, who in the course of time have got to know and understand them.

This is the first time that this system has been tried successfully with camels over a period of six months working under very trying circumstances in a hostile, sterile, and hilly country. I would recommend that the forwarding of Commissariat stores by road should be always carried out by this system, the advantages of which may be briefly stated as follows :—

- (a) The transport animals and attendants never quit their own stations.
- (b) The supervision of the transport officer and his subordinates over the transport allotted to his stage is much more effective.
- (c) The foraging of animals is on the whole better supervised at their own post than at any other, and this is of vital importance.
- (d) The draught or pack animal carries the load only half a stage. The transport attendant conducts his laden camels over only half the road and rides home on one of his unladen camels, arriving back much fresher and fitter to look after his animals than when he has gone through the whole way to the next stage.
- (e) The changing of loads leads to greater efficiency. Unserviceable gear comes under immediate observation, and can be then replaced by serviceable articles. The actual time for transferring loads at the half-way place should not exceed one and a half hours for three hundred camels, or one hour for hundred and fifty carts ; loads of smaller convoys can generally be transferred in one hour. Under any system, the guards that accompany convoys are changed half-way. There is always some delay in doing this, generally at least half an hour.

81. *Convoys*.—Convoys ran daily except Sundays. There is a distinct advantage in securing to our overworked transport and godown establishments one day's rest in the week.

82. *Hired camels*.—I am not disposed to think that we can dispense with the assistance of hired camels in Asiatic warfare, but that rather whenever a good road does not exist for wheel-carriage we must depend on camels to forward the stores of an army. The moderate death-rate of under 13 per cent. among the large number of hired camels employed for upwards of six months on this duty in Waziristan is, I think, a remarkable testimony to the encouraging results which follow taking pains in the management of these valuable transport animals. The usual cause of death assigned was cystic pneumonia, but I think that exhaustive investigation into the causes of death among camels would reveal others besides this. The casualties by discharge of hired camels during the expedition are to be attributed mainly as a concession to the owners, many of whom, as the weeks and months went by, became discontented and home-sick, resulting in the neglect of their camels which frequently made it a matter of expediency to allow them to take them away. The causes that operate to produce discontent are well known and are all remediable. For instance, obtaining 500 camels by contract from Lorinda Mull of Peshawar and 400 from Dharam Singh and Jewan Mull of Rawal Pindi, were causes of endless complaints from owners, and also of anxiety to the Transport Officer who was in charge of them. The owners of these camels after coming in contact with other owners, who were paid direct by commissariat-transport Officers, began to regard the big contractor as having done them out of what they regarded as their rights. In short, however convenient it may have been to employ these two middlemen to procure camels in India, it proved to be only an impediment in the field. The casualties among Lorinda Mull's and Dharam Singh's camels come to about 45 per cent. against only 13 per cent. among camels hired without the intervention of the middlemen.

Another cause of discontent among the owners of hired camels was that the officers, who had been employed to select and hire them in India, did not accompany them to, and remain with them in, the field. Nothing can be worse, from an executive point of view, than the removal at the very commencement of the

only officer who knows all about the men and the circumstances under which they were induced to hire out their camels for the expedition.

Another cause of discontent arose when jhools had to be issued to protect the camel from cold. The owners said that they never used jhools and why should they pay for them, as it was only exposure in the field that made it necessary. The code price for a camel jhool is nine rupees, and in order to allay the discontent, I obtained the concurrence of the Examiner of Commissariat accounts to recover only Rs. 5-8 and Rs. 3-8 according to the description of jhools issued. The cheaper quality came from Umballa and were too inferior and light (weight $10\frac{1}{2}$ lbs.) for a camel jhool.

The entire absence of diarrhoea among the camels and other transport animals for such a long period can only be attributed to the sound condition of the grain and fodder fed out.

There need be no difficulty in arranging for the crushing of the daily feed of grain at the various stages where transport animals are located. The present Beaufort and Hunt's kibbling machine taken to the field is useless for crushing barley, which is the grain that is most required to be crushed. This department ought to have a superior oat-crushing machine, which the leading manufacturers of agricultural machinery in the United Kingdom would have no difficulty in supplying. It is, however, quite possible to be too particular about crushing gram (*chenna*); on the other hand it is very necessary to crush barley, specially the hard variety of this grain growing in Waziristan. According to the departmental rule, soaked crushed gram (*chenna*) was issued to the Government camels at Boia; whilst in the same lines a *sarwan* of hired camels would have nothing to do with the crushed gram or with soaking it in water, but gave dry uncrushed gram to his camels.

83. *Government camels*.—The main causes for the heavy mortality (41·47 per cent.) and break down (41·88 per cent.) among the 733 Government camels were:—

- (1) that the Government camels, when compared with the hired camels in Tochi, were of a distinctly inferior stamp;
- (2) the attendants were not real *sarwans*, but the ordinary coolylaborer hanging about the bazars, who is ready to take service for any sort of job, they had no idea how to manage camels.

The mortality among the Government camels to that among the hired camels was as five to one.

84. *Hired transport*.—In my opinion the only transport that should be hired are camels, and that because only their own *sarwans* know how to manage them. All other carriage (mules, donkeys, and draught bullock carts) should be purchased outright at the commencement before despatch from India. Ponies and pack bullocks should not be either bought or hired, as they always break down. Newly purchased animals should be well branded with six-inch letters on the neck or flanks to prevent exchanges.

89. *Temporary agents*.—A principal cause why transport animals arrived from India at Bannu in poor condition was sending them under charge of temporary agents who were more anxious to make money than to feed the animals. One of these agents, named Soojan Singh, was placed under suspension, tried by the magistrate and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and 500 rupees fine.

Extracts from a report by Captain H. James, Divisional Transport Officer, Tochi Field Force.

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Employment of transport.—The method on which the Transport was worked was as follows:—Mules were issued to the 1st Brigade for all purposes, and also to the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, (of the 2nd Brigade) which moved with the 1st Brigade. The 2nd Brigade marched with obligatory mules and camels to their stations on the line; the camels were never actually made over to corps, but were employed on convoy duties and remained in commissariat charge. Mules

were not available for convoy work, as they were fully employed with various columns, and on fatigue and supply duties in connection with the 1st Brigade between the advanced dépôt (Datta Khel) and the camps in the vicinity of Sheranni.

Owing to the necessity of rapidly stocking the posts up to the 21st July, camels worked on the through convoy system. From this date they had assembled at the post allotted to them and they worked from their own post to the one immediately in advance, returning empty the following day. But on the 5th August, the *Etappen* system, *i. e.*, changing loads half-way on each stage, commenced, and remained in force until the demobilisation of the force. The suitability of this system for work with camel transport was much questioned, and at the commencement and during the hot months it was decidedly unpopular both with camel-owners, transport officers, and the military escorts, the reasons advanced being—

- (i) Inability to obtain grazing for the camels, owing to two hours' detention on line of march, this being the usual time occupied in forming up, unloading, checking and making over, reloading and restarting the convoy. Owing to this detention the camels were on return to their stations unable to proceed out to graze, the grazing-grounds being too far away.
- (ii) Exposure to the sun. This is very trying both to men on duty and to loaded animals. It was asserted that animals would feel the work less arduous if they marched back empty the following day, instead of having daily to do work under loads.
- (iii) Double work performed by the camel-drivers in unloading and reloading.

I am of opinion that during the hot weather the *Etappen* system is not suitable for camel transport. During the autumn and winter months when the shortness of the days will not admit of the camels proceeding to the grazing-grounds, and when the fatigue involved by climatic conditions is not so great, I consider the *Etappen* system to be suitable, one advantage being that the attendants would not have to take bedding with them. Great stress had been placed upon the advantage accruing under the *Etappen* system of the camels being always present at one post, but under the staging system the camels also belong to one post, and as they are accompanied by an officer, sergeant, or agent from their own post, it is not apparent why they should not be sufficiently supervised during the one night they are absent from their own post.

Convoys ran daily (Sundays excepted) until 1st December, 1897, when in order to lighten escort duties they moved three times a week.

The total maundage conveyed from the base, and including purely local services at posts by the convoy camels, was 2,88,442 maunds; and the daily average amount lifted per post (exclusive of Sundays) was 314 maunds. The daily average number of convoy camels present from 1st July to 15th January, 1898, may be taken as 470 per post. That is to say, each camel with the force, on the average, moved 66 maund, or about 27 seers, (54 lb) one march per diem. At certain stages 4 maunds instead of 5 maunds was fixed as the load; and each camel was at work approximately every other day.

It would thus appear that in maintaining a camel train under service conditions, the average lifting power per camel, which according to regulation (after allowing for the return journey unloaded) should be $2\frac{1}{2}$ maunds, may practically be said to be, under the most favourable conditions, not more than one maund per diem daily. Thus if there are five stages, 2,000 camels would be required to move forward a daily convoy of 500 maunds. This number 2,000 would allow for wastage by deterioration for about two months, when it would depend upon the condition of the remaining camels to what extent replacement of the original 2,000 should be arranged for. To work camels more heavily than shown above would mean that the animals would become non-effective within a shorter period.

Grain vup fodder.—Mules were fed on half gram, half barley rations; unfortunately it was not possible to arrange that the barley should always be

crushed, and as about 70 per cent. of mules appear to be unable to digest uncrushed barley, in my opinion it would be best, if practicable, to issue a reduced gram ration in lieu of barley when arrangements to crush the latter cannot be made.

At Datta Khel and Sheranni, owing to scarcity in the grass supply, when *bhusa* was issued, it was given at the rate of 10 lb. per mule. The animals did not suffer at Sheranni; during August and September they obtained a certain amount of grazing from the village fields. When the weather became colder in October, the full regulation scale of fodder was issued.

The hill grass of the Tochi valley is inferior, being mostly *Andropogon laniger*, "sargarra" (Pushtu), "kawi" (Punjabi). Green fodder, "javar," and young sugarcane was obtainable at Bannu from September to January and much benefitted the bullocks who were given a part ration of the same.

* * * * *

Camel grazing.—Under ordinary circumstances the Tochi valley may be considered a fair camel-grazing district, yet no district can be expected to subsist the large number of animals which have to be maintained for a field force. The distance the camels had to proceed for graze was from 3 to 6 miles, and from danger of attack from raiders the best grounds could often not be made utilised.

The description of camel shrubs generally obtainable were as follows; at the lower elevations up to Miramshah *Zizyphus nummularia*, "bher" or "jhar," (Pushtu, "karkanra"). This is the shrub from which in the Bikaner District "palla" is obtained by cutting down the shrub and beating off and collecting the leaves, and on which cattle are fed during the winter months. (*Acacia modesta*) "phulai" (Pushtu, "pilosi"). (*Salvadora persica*) "kareel," "jhal" (Pushtu, "plin" or "plewan").

At Miramshah and towards the higher portions of the valley "pilosi" becomes more plentiful and distinctive local shrubs attaining to the size of small trees, are met with; these being (*Reptonia buxifolia*), "gurgura" (Punjabi, "pathak"), this is considered locally the most suitable and has a small edible berry; (*Celastrus parviflora*) "suragl'ai" (red thorn), a thorny bush; (*Olea europea*) "khawan" (Punjabi, "khan"), the wild-olive; (*Pistacia terebinthus*) "shuia," a fairly large tree with coarse leaves; (*Quercus ilex*) "tsirai," the hill-oak; these two latter grow on the higher hills. Here and there is a species of "lána" (*Haloxylon griffithii*), but it is not the true "khár" (*Haloxylon salicornicum*) and is not considered suitable for camel grazing, as it has poisonous qualities. A small bush with formidable thorns, "aghzai" (*Prosopis spicigera*), called in Pushtu "pushkan" or "zarai" and "kanda" in Punjabi, is met with, but is only edible in spring after good winter rains. (*Alhagi camelorum*) "jowassa" (Punjabi), "tanda" (Pushtu) is met with especially on cultivation after the rains in August and September; it is one of the best camel fodders, being the true camel thorn. In the valley generally a coarse description of grass grows in the nalas, called by Pathans "woorga" or "shahar," and by Punjabis "soorut"; there was a large quantity of this at Datta Khel, and during August and September whilst it was green, it was readily eaten by the camels, as at that time the far grazing was not available. It is not, however, a good fodder.

Other shrubs are of course met with but not to any considerable extent; amongst them are "chinjanwalli" (Pushtu), a shrub somewhat like asparagus in appearance; (*Periploca aphylla*), "barera" (Pushtu), or "bhata" (Punjabi), a leafless plant resembling a rush; (*Daphna lycium*) "laghuna" (Pushtu), a small bush with pinkish yellow flowers; "zir largai" (Pushtu), a shrub with yellow wood.

Treatment of camels.—Veterinary officers described the disease of which the animals died as cystic pneumonia, *post-mortems* invariably disclosed hydatid cysts in the lungs, and often in the liver. The parasite causing the cysts or watery tumours is considered to have been absorbed into the system through the drinking water. Whether the presence of these cysts is sufficient to account

for death is doubtful. The pneumonia is most probably the actual cause, and very possibly the camel is extremely susceptible to this disease from what would seem to be slight or insufficient causes, *viz.*, from a chill when working in a heated condition, or from exhaustion on the line of march, whereby the lungs become overcharged and injured.

Itch or mange, known in the vernacular as "Kujli," "Kharish," or "Paman" readily attacks camels, and is due, I think, to an impoverished condition of the blood, or to low condition. Chronic debility ensues, and a fatal termination to mange cases may be anticipated. The only remedy (about which no delay must take place) would seem to be complete change to a warm climate, great care and a plentiful supply of green food. Veterinary officers made microscopic examinations of the itch or mange, but were unable to detect any parasite, and therefore designated the disease as a species of skin disease or eczema. Whatever the technical designation of the disease may be, there is no doubt but that the opinion held by all camelmen as to its being highly contagious is correct. In ordinary circumstances, on the plains of India taramira oil is doubtless of advantage when administered by skilled *sarwans* at the proper time—usually in autumn when, possibly, the drying up of jungle fodder and the cold at night affect the animals.

Certain *masalas* may be similarly employed, but this class of treatment cannot be depended upon. British officers have seriously informed me that the camel owners' remedy for camels in a state of debility, *i.e.*, jackal-stew in Somali land, goat-stew in the Punjab, has had a remarkably good result; probably, however, the improvement is due to the greater care and selected fodder given at the same time to the sick animals than to the effect of this empirical treatment.

APPENDIX XII.

Amount of transport employed on the Tochi Field Force, 1897-98.

Source from which obtained.	AMOUNT OF TRANSPORT COLLECTED.								REMARKS.
	Camels.	Mules.	Bullocks.	Ponies.	Donkeys.	Mule carts.	Bullock carts.	Other carts.	
BY HIRE.									
From the Dera Ismail Khan District...	693	
" " Kohat District	1,186	
Supplied by L. Lorinda Mull K. B. at Peshawar.	500	
Supplied by the Peshawar and Rawal Pindi Contractors.	400	
Taken up locally by the Field Commissariat Officers.	177	
DEPÔT TRANSPORT—									
Peshawar District	(a) 221	150	...	15	(a) 16 of these appear to have become casualties while en route to Khushalgarh. (b) Two of these died at Khushalgarh.
Rawal Pindi "	(b) 285	920	233	52	80	...	
Lahore "	114	294	343	144	...	
Sirhind "	29	438	6	20	3	...	
Meerut "	...	670	
Bundelkhand "	...	34	
Rohilkhand "	...	63	
Oudh "	...	176	
Allahabad "	...	55	
Nerbudda "	...	94	
REGIMENTAL TRANSPORT—									
1st Devonshire Regiment	...	87	
2nd Oxfordshire Light Infantry	...	20	
1/1st Gurkha Rifles	...	22	
2/4th Gurkha "	...	64	
2/1st Gurkha "	...	69	
30th Punjab Infantry	...	5	
1st Punjab Infantry	50	38	
34th Pioneers	...	109	
21st Punjab Infantry	...	53	
Gordon Highlanders	...	87	
3rd Rifle Brigade	...	79	
28th Punjab Infantry	...	65	
K Battery, R. H. A.	...	28	
4th Dragoon Guards	...	15	
2nd Derbyshire Regiment	...	10	
1/3rd Gurkha Rifles	...	7	
2nd Battalion, Essex Regiment	...	54	
GRASS MULES—									
1st Punjab Cavalry	...	54	
TRANSFERRED FROM OTHER FORCES—									
From Tochi Garrison	48	440	16	2	7	...	
Out of transport collected at Rawal Pindi for the 2nd and 3rd Reserve Brigades.	22	
Out of transport collected at Khushalgarh.	1,250	
Total transport supplied for the Tochi Field Force.	(c) 4,953	4,200	(d) 620	89	234	...	(c) These include 1,250 camels subsequently supplied. (d) Two of these died at Khushalgarh.
DETAINED AT KHUSHALGARH.									
Depôt Transport—									
Sirhind District	...	31	170	73	...	
Lahore "	115	10	...	
Rawal Pindi "	43	10	...	
TOTAL	...	31	328	93	...	

APPENDIX XIII.

Extracts from the Gazette of India and despatches at the close of the Tochi Expedition.

GAZETTE OF INDIA,—JANUARY 1ST, 1898.

* * * * *
No. 1432.—The Right Honourable the Governor General in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the subjoined letter from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting a despatch from Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., Commanding the Tochi Field Force, describing the operations of that force from June to November last.

The Field Force has, under Major-General Bird, fully carried out the objects of the expedition, and the Governor General in Council, in concurrence with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, desires to express his high appreciation of the discipline, resolution, and patient endurance displayed by all ranks under the severe trials to which they have been exposed.

No. 255-F, dated Fort William, the 17th December 1897.

From—Major-General G. DEC. MORTON, C.B., Adjutant-General in India,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a despatch from Major-General G. C. Bird, C.B., Commanding the Tochi Field Force.

2. This force was despatched to hold the Tochi valley and to punish the sections of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs concerned in the treacherous attack on the Political Officer's escort on the 10th June, 1897. The force has accomplished the object for which it was detailed, and the tribesmen have submitted to the terms imposed by the Government of India. Although practically unopposed by the enemy, the duties devolving on the troops have been of an unusually trying nature owing to the unhealthiness of the climate.

3. Amidst much sickness, which has resulted in a heavy death-roll, the good discipline, the endurance, and the soldierly qualities of all ranks have been most marked, and are, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, deserving of high commendation.

4. His Excellency would draw attention to the excellent work which the Medical Department is reported to have performed during the operations and to the good service rendered by the other departments of the force and by the officers whose names are mentioned in the despatch.

5. I am desired to add that the Commander-in-Chief considers much credit is due to Major-General Bird for the manner in which he has conducted the operations committed to his charge.

No. 2365-A., dated Camp Datta Khel, the 25th November 1897.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL G. CORRIE BIRD, C.B., Commanding the Tochi Field Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the following report on the operations of the Tochi Field Force.

2. The object with which the force was sent up was to punish the Madda Khel section of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs concerned in the attack on the political officer's escort at Maizar on the 10th June 1897. On that occasion out of a force composed of 12 sabres, 2 mountain guns and 300 rifles, with 6 British officers, the losses sustained amounted to 3 British officers killed and the remaining 3 wounded (two of whom have since died), one Native officer killed, 22 non-commissioned officers and men killed and 25 wounded.

3. I arrived at Bannu on the 21st June and assumed command. The force was composed as follows :—

1st Brigade.

Commanding—Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
 2nd Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
 1st Sikh Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
 1st Punjab Infantry, Punjab Frontier Force.
 33rd (Punjabi Mahomedan) Bengal Infantry.
 One squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force.
 6 guns, No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force.
 No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

2nd Brigade.

Commanding—Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B.
 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade.
 6th Bengal (Light) Infantry.
 14th (The Ferozepore Sikh) Bengal Infantry.
 25th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry.
 One squadron, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Punjab Frontier Force.
 4 Guns, No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.

Line of Communication.

100 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry.

Of the above troops three battalions, four guns, and two squadrons were already in the Tochi valley. The General Officer Commanding the 1st Brigade left Bannu on the 1st July, and assumed temporary command in the valley. On 6th July I issued final orders for the onward move.

4. The Highlanders arrived at Bannu on the 7th, and the Rifle Brigade on the 8th July, completing the force. The long march from Khushalgarh, performed at the hottest time of year along a waterless frontier, was, in my opinion, a very great trial of discipline and endurance, but all corps did it within the specified dates. I left Bannu on the 8th July for the Tochi; next day I met Mr. Anderson, C.S.I., Commissioner of the Derajat, at Miramshah, and assumed political control of the valley. The Commissioner left the same day for Bannu.

5. During the advance of the various corps from the base to concentrate at Datta Khel, no opposition was offered, but several posts were fired into by night, resulting in one sepoy of the 14th Sikhs and one sepoy of the 1st Punjab Infantry being killed; two camp followers were also wounded. Brigadier-General Egerton and staff were fired on near Boia. Some Powindah camel contractors who, by the terms of their contract, travel without guards and march as they please, were also attacked, and, in addition to animals taken, one *sarwan* was killed and three wounded. One party of marauders was pursued from Boia and 51 men captured and brought into camp. On the 16th July, a large gang of Mahsuds drove off some contract camels at graze without guard near Idak; they were promptly followed up and attacked at dusk, and the camels recovered. One sepoy of the 6th Bengal Infantry was dangerously wounded and had his leg amputated.

6. On the 13th July, I issued a proclamation to the tribes in accordance with the orders of Government. This set forth that it was my intention to destroy all the fortified *kots* in Maizar and Sheranni, whether resistance was offered or not, and that the force would remain at Maizar or some convenient spot near it, under my command, as long as it should seem desirable to the Government of India. It was also stated that the object was to punish only those who were in any way responsible for, or took part in, the treacherous attack on the British troops on the 10th June, but that any further unfriendly acts by whomsoever committed would be severely dealt with.

7. On the 20th July, the 1st Brigade, with the exception of the 33rd Punjab Infantry, with two guns of No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery, under Brigadier-General Egerton, advanced on Sheranni. I accompanied this force. Sheranni

was found to be deserted, and the 1st Punjab Cavalry moving on at once to Maizar, found it had been evacuated; one armed Madda Khel was shot. The name Maizar is applied generally to that part of the Shawal valley, and includes numerous large fortified villages and a great deal of cultivation, watered by an excellent system of waterways carried along the hill sides. Some 500 men had kept abreast of the rear-guard on the hills to the south, but disappeared as the force neared Sheranni.

8. On the 21st July, the destruction of the fortified *kots* of Sheranni was commenced, and within ten days all such defences as far as Tarmor on the Tochi were levelled. Over 7,000 maunds of bhusa, some grain, and a good number of arms, and some Government and private property lost at Maizar were found. The troops worked admirably. During the first fortnight of the occupation of Sheranni, the camp was constantly fired into at night, resulting in one man of the Highlanders being wounded and two mules killed; the use of star shell on the first night of firing and the posting of surprise parties outside the intrenchment so disconcerted the enemy, that their subsequent efforts were confined to shooting from longer ranges. On the night of the 20th July, a Powindah camel-driver was killed and two wounded, near Islam Chauki; there was no post occupied by our troops near to this.

9. On the 22nd July, I visited Maizar, and went over the scene of the fighting of the 10th June; the gun and baggage mules were still lying where they had been shot; every village in the settlement was deserted; some 6,000 maunds of bhusa, which was eventually carried away for our transport animals, and numerous articles of Government and private property were found. This same day two columns under Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, 1st Punjab Infantry, and Major Kembell, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, left Sheranni to surprise some Madda Khels reported to be harbouring in Tarmor. Major Kembell's column was fired on just across the Tochi, and Subadar Gulfaraz, 1st Sikhs, was severely wounded in the shoulder. Only a few of the enemy were met and one of them was killed. From the date of arrival at Sheranni, daily reconnaissances and survey parties were sent out in all directions, and the entire country thoroughly searched and surveyed.

10. On the 26th July, the demolition of the villages in the Maizar and Upper Tochi valleys was begun, and within a month all the fortified *kots* had been destroyed. The troops, British and Native, vied with one another in this arduous duty, performed under a fierce sun and frequently amidst monsoon storms. On the 28th July, Brigadier-General Egerton reconnoitred with two battalions and four guns as far as Dotoi, on the Tochi, and close to the Afghan boundary-pillars. The villages had been recently occupied. Some of the enemy were seen on the hills, and fired on our main body, but were driven off by a few volleys. On the 30th July, a strong reconnaissance went up the Shawal valley as far as Pungai; the inhabitants had fled, but a good many looted articles were found in the villages. A few shots were fired at the column, which were replied to; a good deal of grain and bhusa were brought in. Several reconnaissances were later made to Dotoi, which effectually kept the Madda Khels out of the valleys.

11. On the 3rd August, a band of Wazirs, estimated at 150, appeared on the low hills near Khajuri, and opened fire on the post, garrisoned by 50 rifles of the 6th Bengal Infantry; a small party, assisted by the escort of a passing convoy, attacked and drove them across the Tochi; our casualties *nil*; the enemy had one man killed. On the 7th August, Major Grover, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, 2nd Brigade, with 30 rifles of the 6th Bengal Infantry and a few sowars of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, dispersed a small gathering of Mahsuds near Khajuri, killing one and wounding three men. During August small columns from all posts on the line of communications regularly scoured the whole country north and south of the Tochi river. A party of 40 sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry was fired on near Maizar by Madda Khels on the 17th August, and next day I again had their main water-courses cut, and commenced the cutting of their ripening crops, and from this date onward for two months a regular daily supply of green fodder was brought in by the transport; this was far the heaviest punishment that could be inflicted on the tribesmen, more especially as they had been down nightly to water their crops, in the hope of eventually reaping them should a settlement be arrived at.

On the 19th August, an attack was made by some Tori and Jelal Khel on the mail *ekka* between Miramshah and Idak. The enemy, who numbered about 50, lay in ambush; two sepoy of the 25th Punjab Infantry, who were escorting the mails, were killed, and a native telegraph signaller was killed and a follower wounded; one of the Wazirs was killed, and several are reported to have been wounded.

12. A column under command of Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon, Rifle Brigade, proceeded from Sheranni to Landi Khel on the 1st September, to construct a mule-road along the Tochi to Dotoi. The column was out a week. The camp was frequently fired into at night, but no casualties occurred. A small column from Miramshah was fired on from some steep hills on the 2nd September and one sepoy of the 6th Bengal Infantry killed; a few transport animals were also killed and wounded by night firing at Idak.

13. On the 23rd August, a strong column under Brigadier General Egerton moved into the Kazha valley. I accompanied the column. All the country as far as the Afghan border and to the west of Stara Bibi was surveyed. The troops returned to Sheranni on the 28th August. Early in September I was informed that some Madda Khels were being harboured in the Kazha and in consequence on the 11th of that month, a force consisting of the troops in the

40 sabres, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
2 guns, No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery.
Wing, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
14th Sikhs.
1st Punjab Infantry

margin, under the command of Brigadier-General Symons, proceeded up the valley. I joined the column at Ghazlamai. On the 13th September Brigadier-General Symons, with 800 infantry and unaccompanied by ani-

mals of any kind, made a night march from Pirakai to surprise the Dadam settlement of villages close to the Afghan border and said to belong to Sadda Khan, the head of the Madda Khels. The surprise was complete; only a few shots were fired and 270 head of cattle and sheep were brought in. A fine of Rs. 1,000 was taken in cattle; some arms were also captured. This was a most arduous day's duty, 26 miles being covered, the highest village reached being over 8,000 feet. The guns and baggage had followed at daylight and were overtaken by a mountain flood in a gorge, and had a narrow escape; one mule was drowned and some ammunition and stores lost. A gunner of the 3rd Mountain Battery very pluckily saved a comrade, for which he has been recommended for the Humane Society's medal. On the same day a sepoy was attacked by a Wazir, who was at once shot down. On the 19th September, Brigadier-General Symons left the column for Tirah. On the 22nd September, Subadar-Major Wali Khan, 2nd Punjab Infantry, one of my Native Assistant Political Officers, with a small party, surprised the village of Toda China in the Sara Toi valley, and brought in a Madda Khel who was wanted, and 68 head of cattle.

The *kots* of Nur Shah and* Pir Shah (Madda Khels wanted for the Maizar affair) on the Bibi Algad were destroyed on the 16th September, and all their crops cut. This same night a Wazir was shot near Idak post.

14. Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon assumed command of the

† Detachment, 1st Punjab Cavalry.
4 guns, No. 3 Mountain Battery.
200 men, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
400 men, 33rd Punjab Infantry.
400 men, 1st Sikhs.

2nd Brigade on the 2nd October. On the 4th October, a column† left Sheranni to search the Zowe, Shawal and Khina valleys. After passing Landi Khel a survey escort of 100 men was fired on from

the slopes of Charmina and a sharp fire kept up; two sepoy of the 1st Sikhs were slightly wounded and one of the enemy hit. On the 9th and 10th the rear-guard was fired on, and a camel killed. On the 12th October, a small reconnaissance party of cavalry accompanying Major Digby, R.E., and some other engineer officers, who were out reconnoitring the road for next day's march, were fired on from both sides of a steep *nala*; Lieutenant Hings-ton, R.E., was slightly wounded, and his horse killed; one sowar of the 1st Punjab Cavalry and a horse were wounded, and the enemy, then firing at long range into the camp, wounded one follower and killed a mule. The mountain guns and a few volleys from camp soon cleared the heights. A Madda Khel was shot this same day near Tarmor, and on the 17th the water channels at Maizar, which had been restored by night, were again destroyed.

15. On the 20th October, a few sabres of the 1st Punjab Cavalry and 200 of the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Major Willcocks, Assistant Adjutant General, made a night march and surprised the large village of Momiroga, near the Mahsud border, and brought in a Madda Khel wanted for Maizar and a man who had harboured him, with their cattle and sheep. Three small columns made a raid up the Shawal valley on the 23rd October, and surprised a party of the enemy who had taken refuge there; the 33rd Punjab Infantry was fired on, and, returning the fire, killed two men, and the Highlanders shot a third. A good many cattle and sheep were captured.

On the 25th October Brigadier-General Egerton moved into the Kazha valley, to examine and restore all the boundary pillars on the Afghan border between Dotoi and Laram, in accordance with instructions received from the Government of India. I joined this column the next day at Inzar Kach.

The incessant move of troops up all their valleys into their remotest villages was at last beginning to weary the Madda Khels, who were without lands, houses or resting-places, and on the 29th October five headmen of Tarmor, who had joined in the attack of 10th June, gave themselves up unconditionally in my camp at Inzar Kach, and these were followed on the 31st by Sadda Khan, the head of the tribe, and his brother Shadam and four *maliks* of Sheranni. Sadda Khan alone was promised that he would not be executed or transported. The arms and property looted at Maizar are being brought in daily, and will probably all be given up very shortly.

At the end of October some night firing into Sheranni took place, and in consequence parties of the 1st Sikhs lay up in Tarmor and surprised the raiders, killing two men, one of whom turned out to be Sadda Khan's cousin. This was the enemy's last attempt to molest us.

16. On the 28th October Major Kemball, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, accompanied by Lieutenant Pirrie, Survey Officer, and an escort of 30 sabres, two guns and 250 rifles, left Miramshah to fill in the unsurveyed portion of the country north of that post and between Thal and the Tochi valley. This column returned to Idak on the 8th November, having reached within five miles of Thal and thoroughly surveyed all the intervening country and the Baran pass. On the 4th November, Brigadier-General E. S. Brook assumed command of the 2nd Brigade, *vice* Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon invalided home.

17. On the 30th October, the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade, which had been in this valley four months, left Bannu for India. This fine corps had been the victim of an epidemic of dysentery and enteric fever, and had lost three officers and 75 non-commissioned officers and men, besides a very large percentage of officers and men invalided or left behind in the field hospitals. I cannot bear too high testimony to the discipline which cheerfully endured and the pluck which combated the scourge during a long and trying season, and the battalion carried away with it the regrets of the whole force at the losses they had sustained.

18. With the submission of the tribe, the military operations practically ended. The orders I had received have been carried out. The *kots* of Sheranni, Maizar and all the villages in those valleys have been destroyed. Dreplari (the original village which commenced the attack of the 10th June) has been levelled. The waterways have been rendered temporarily useless, and some 20,000 maunds of bhusa, a considerable quantity of grain, and many hundred cattle, sheep, etc., have been taken; and lastly, crops sufficient to feed the main portion of the transport of the first Brigade for three months have been cut or eaten up. It will be some years before the Madda Khels can recover from the damage done them.

19. The losses by disease have, I regret to say, been very heavy; 3 British officers and over 100 British soldiers have died from sickness, besides 50 Native soldiers and many followers. Great numbers have been invalided or are still in hospital. The troops notwithstanding these trials have worked cheerfully and done their duty splendidly, and I thoroughly endorse the high opinion formed of them by the General Officers commanding brigades, and would here place on record my high appreciation of their discipline and soldierly qualities.

20. The Medical Department has been exceptionally hard worked throughout the expedition, and my best thanks are due to all ranks of the profession. The commissariat-transport has worked smoothly and without a hitch of any kind; the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of this department, more especially those who have borne the burden and heat of the day along the line of communications, are deserving of commendation. The Veterinary Officers and subordinates have also worked admirably, and to them is, in large measure, due the excellent condition of the animals and the very small amount of sickness among them. The Intelligence Branch has reported on near 200 miles of routes, and gazetted the whole country over which the force has operated. The Survey Department has completed an accurate survey over 920 square miles of country, and triangulation has been carried over 800 square miles. The other departments with the force, the Ordnance, Pay, etc., have been very satisfactory.

21. By the "Scheme of Operations" the movements of the force were practically limited to the country south-west and west of Datta Khel; the operations have, however, in fact extended over all the country south of Datta Khel to the Mahsud border, which has of necessity been the limit in that direction. To the south, the west, and northwards from Datta Khel columns have continuously been on the move searching every valley and village up to the Afghan border. The boundary line has of course been the refuge which all have availed themselves of; being so invitingly close at hand, the tribesmen have time after time after firing on our columns, re-crossed into Afghan territory to wait a fresh opportunity.

I learnt at the very beginning of the expedition (and this has since been confirmed by Sadda Khan) that when our troops advanced into the Tochi valley, the Ger Madda Khels as a body took refuge in Afghan territory to the north-west of Charkhel, between boundary-pillars Nos. 3 and 8, and here they remained. Only a few raiders at a time came down to fire into our camps, or occasionally water their fields by night. Recently, when the cold became very severe, they broke up and took refuge in Birmal, Jadran, Tani and Khost, and this explains the impossibility of inflicting any serious injury on the tribe in the field; nevertheless their existence has been a precarious one, and they have been taught that the demands of Government must, in the end, be acceded to.

22. In conclusion I have the honour to submit, for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the names of the following officers:—

Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Nixon, 18th Bengal Lancers, Assistant Quarter Master General—is a staff officer of much ability and energy. He is a quick and accurate worker, and has, as senior officer of the staff, conducted his duties with tact and courtesy to all; he possesses the best qualities of a staff officer, and I trust his services may receive special recognition. He is an officer well worthy of advancement.

Major J. Willcocks, D.S.O., 1st Battalion, Leinster Regiment, Assistant Adjutant General—is a most capable and efficient officer; reliable and a hard worker; possessing a thorough knowledge of both staff and regimental duties; his services have been of the greatest value to me and the force generally. I bring his name to special notice for advancement in the service.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. Wingate, Chief Commissariat Officer.—I am much indebted to this officer for the good work he has performed. His energy and ready resource successfully overcame all difficulties, and to his sound judgment is due the efficient manner in which the department has worked. He is an executive officer of a high standard and specially deserving of recognition. He has been ably assisted by the officers of the department, amongst whom I would specially bring to notice Captain H. James, Captain C. H. Clements, and Major C. V. W. Williamson.

The Medical Department has been administered by Surgeon-Colonel R. H. Carew, D.S.O., Army Medical Staff, and I would bring to special notice the names of the following officers for good work performed :—

Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Simmonds and Surgeon-Major H. C. Hudson, both of the Indian Medical Service, and Surgeon-Captain L. P. Mumby, M.B., Army Medical Staff.

Major G. V. Kemball, Royal Artillery, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General, Intelligence Branch, is a very capable and energetic officer. His work has been most efficiently performed, and the information gained by him has invariably proved of great value. He is deserving of special recognition.

Major T. Digby, Royal Engineers, Commanding Royal Engineers, has performed all his duties to my entire satisfaction. His work is always certain, and he has been ably seconded by the officers and men under him.

Captain P. Malcolm, 4th Gurkhas, Provost Marshal, has carried out his duties with zeal and tact.

Captain G. W. Rawlins, 12th Bengal Cavalry, Superintendent, Army Signalling, is an officer of exceptional energy. Under him the signalling work of the force, which has been heavy and continuous, has been most efficiently performed, and great credit is due to him and the officers and men under his orders.

Lieutenant G. K. Cockerill, 28th Punjab Infantry, Field Intelligence Officer, has a complete knowledge of his duties, and is very thorough and reliable. He has done much valuable work for his department.

The officers of my personal staff, Captain H. M. Twynam, East Lancashire Regiment, Aide-de-Camp, Captain S. W. Scrase-Dickens, Highland Light Infantry, and Lieutenant G. R. Fitz R. Talbot, Royal Horse Artillery, Orderly Officers, have rendered me every assistance.

Brigadier-General W. P. Symons, C.B., commanded the 2nd Brigade until transferred to Tirah. I had every reason to be thoroughly satisfied with him.

Brigadier-General C. C. Egerton, C.B., D.S.O., commanded the 1st Brigade throughout the operations, and is an officer of undoubted ability and energy. His wide experience and sound judgment were of much value to me on many occasions.

Colonel the Hon. M. Curzon, Rifle Brigade, commanded the 2nd Brigade for a short time after Brigadier-General Symons' departure, and carried out his duties to my entire satisfaction.

24. I wish to bring to notice the following commanding officers :—Lieutenant-Colonel C. Hogge, 33rd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. B. Coats, 25th Punjab Infantry, and Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) J. A. H. Pollock, 1st Sikhs.

25. Of the officers who have been specially brought to notice by General Officers Commanding Brigades I would mention the following :—

1st Brigade...	{	Brevet-Major F. Wintour, Royal West Kent Regiment, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
		Captain H. B. B. Watkis, 31st Punjab Infantry, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.
2nd Brigade	{	Major M. H. S. Grover, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General.
		Captain J. Mac N. Walter, Devonshire Regiment, Deputy Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. S. Cunninghame, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Road Commandant, has conducted his duties as such to my satisfaction.

26. The following warrant and non-commissioned officers have performed excellent service:—

Sub-Conductor J. Wiggins, Military Secretary's Office,—Head Clerk, Divisional Office.

Staff Sergeant E. H. Chapman, Punjab Command Office.

Staff Sergeant T. Taylor, Intelligence Branch.

Conductor P. Phillips, Commissariat Department.

Sergeant W. Kemp, Commissariat Department.

3rd Class Assistant Surgeon H. C. Thomson, Indian Sub-Medical Department.

489, 1st grade Hospital Assistant Abdullah, Indian Sub-Medical Department.

Conductor G. W. Gurr, Ordnance Department.

27. I desire to record my recognition of the assistance afforded me by Mr. R. E. Younghusband, I.C.S., who has been Chief Political Officer of the expedition throughout. I trust his services may receive suitable recognition. My thanks are also due to the other civil officers, Mr. J. Lorrimer and Mr. A. B. Kettlewell, who accompanied the field force.

For the good work done by the Telegraph Department I would record my special thanks. A new line was constructed from Bannu to Datta Khel most expeditiously by Lieutenant Green, Royal Engineers.

I would commend the work done by the Postal Department under Mr. W. T. Van Someren as worthy of recognition. Work was carried on without a hitch.

I would express the obligation of the force to the following chaplains:—Reverend F. J. Montgomery, M.A., Church of England, Reverend J. Cameron, Church of Scotland, and Reverend W. G. Rumboldt, Roman Catholic Chaplain.

TOCHI FIELD FORCE.

Return of Casualties during the expedition * from 21st June to 25th November, 1897.

SUMMARY.

Officers ...	{	Killed	0
		Died of wounds received at Maizar			2
		Wounded	2
Non-Commissioned Officer and men.	{	Killed	6
		Died of wounds received at Maizar			1
		Wounded	6
Followers ...	{	Killed	2
		Died of wounds received at Maizar			1
		Wounded	7

* For casualties prior to June 21st, see Appendix II.